



*Arleigh Burke-class Aegis USS Higgins under way with USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group*

# NATO Missile Defense and the View from the Front Line

By KAREN KAYA

**A**t the November 2010 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting in Lisbon, leaders of 28 nations gathered to chart the Alliance's future course. They identified three essential tasks for the Alliance going forward: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.<sup>1</sup> They adopted a new strategic concept that laid out the Alliance's defense doctrine and vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This called for a NATO that is more agile, capable, and cost-effective and that is able to defend its members against the full range of threats.

The new strategic concept is meant to guide the Alliance during the next 10 to 15 years as it restructures its forces according to new threat perceptions. The concept assesses that the greatest threats will come from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It also recognizes that proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions. Based on this assessment, the concept foresees a significant increase in NATO's deterrence capability. One of the main tenets of that ambition is to develop a ballistic missile

defense (BMD) capability to pursue NATO's core task of collective defense. The Lisbon declaration states, "We will . . . develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defense, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. BMD will be one element of a broader response to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles."<sup>2</sup>

This is a significant shift. The former emphasis on protecting military units and facilities based on theater missile defense has shifted to the protection of NATO members' territories and populations based on territorial missile defense, signaling a broader, more comprehensive approach to security.

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In addition to the Cold War-era threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, NATO faces threats today that were not present during that era including terrorist activities, cyber attacks against communication systems, threats against energy security, and piracy activities along sea trade routes. What also makes these new threats unique is that they no longer originate with rational actors such as the Soviet Union and therefore cannot be easily deterred. They come from irrational actors—governmental or nongovernmental—who use asymmetrical tactics and are willing to die; thus, they are increasingly hard to counter. They come from actors who will not differentiate between military and civilian targets. NATO's incentive to establish missile defense systems and its shift from protecting military bases to protecting populations and full territories is meant to counter these threats.

This represents another major transformation within the Alliance's posture. The focus is shifting from deterrence by mutually assured destruction or extended deterrence to deterrence by denial.<sup>3</sup> The extended deterrence guarantee during the Cold War was meant to deter an attack on U.S. Allies with the message that such an attack would not be left unpunished, and would be met with nuclear weapons if necessary. In deterrence by denial, the message is that the United States and NATO will prevent an attack from reaching its target and, therefore, its political and military goal.

### The Missile Defense Shield

President Ronald Reagan initially envisioned a missile defense shield project during the Cold War called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI was to use space technology to protect the United States from a nuclear attack. However, this project caused a crisis between the United States and Soviet Union in the 1980s, and it was eventually abandoned due to cost and to important steps taken in nonproliferation.

During President George W. Bush's term, the project came back on the agenda, and this time protection from Iran and North Korea was the goal. This plan foresaw the stationing of U.S. Patriot air-defense missiles in Poland and the planned deployment of supporting radar in the Czech Republic. Agreements were signed with both countries in 2008. This project was

suspended because it caused a rift both in U.S.-Russia and in NATO-Russia relations.<sup>4</sup>

President Barack Obama took a different approach to the project in an effort to avoid the previous problems. First, it was turned into a NATO project, which was to reduce the cost burden on the United States and divert emphasis away from the United States. Second, instead of the long-range antiballistic missile defense system, the project would take a phased approach and start with short- to mid-range defense missiles that could be launched from land or sea. It would evolve by 2020 to its ultimate capability of protecting the U.S. homeland from an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the long term.<sup>5</sup> This would protect the United States and its NATO Allies from any attack by North Korea, Iran, or Syria. Third, the NATO declarations regarding this project have all indicated a desire to cooperate with Russia in order to mitigate its concerns.

On September 17, 2009, as part of this phased approach, President Obama signed the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) document, which foresaw a missile defense system in a four-phase adaptive approach, with each phase building and improving on the technology of the previous one.

### The Phased Approach

The European Phased Adaptive Approach, as originally adopted, entailed a short-term and immediate goal to defend against threats from tactical and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and expanded by phases to protecting from medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and to eventually protect against ICBMs. The first three phases involve the protection of U.S. Allies in Europe against ballistic missile threats. The fourth phase, which was initially foreseen for 2020—then delayed to 2022—would protect the U.S. homeland against ICBMs, hitting them while they are in the Middle East or Europe. In March 2013, this phase was canceled after a decision to restructure missile defense plans and allegedly shift resources to protect against threats from North Korea.<sup>6</sup>

**Phase One (Accomplished in the 2011 Timeframe).** This phase deployed missile defense systems that were already available. It included the Standard Missile

3 (SM-3), a ship-based missile system used by the U.S. Navy and a part of the sea-based Aegis BMD System. This ship system uses an interceptor called Block IA, which is designed to intercept short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This phase also includes the deployment of the Forward-based Mode Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance System (AN/TPY-2) to address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe. Currently, the AN/TPY-2 radar is hosted in Malatya's Kürecik district in southeast Turkey and is operational. An Aegis BMD cruiser armed with SM-3 Block IA missiles was deployed to the Mediterranean, off the coast of Spain, on March 7, 2011, and has a home port in Rota, Spain. The Command Center in Ramstein, Germany, is also operational.

**Phase Two (2015 Timeframe).** This phase will see an upgrade of the technology on the Aegis ships in the Mediterranean and the addition of a land-based Aegis BMD (Aegis Ashore) system in Romania. These systems will have the SM-3 interceptor Block IB, which will have more advanced sensors, expanding the defended area. SM-3 IB will also offer improved capability against maneuvering ballistic missiles or warheads. With Block IB, the Navy will gain the ability to defend against short- and medium-range missiles and some IRBMs. This technology is currently in the testing phase.

**Phase Three (2018 Timeframe).** After development and testing are complete, this phase will see the deployment of the more advanced and more maneuverable SM-3 Block IIA variant to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats. Phase three will see an addition of an Aegis Ashore BMD in Poland.

**Phase Four (Planned for the 2020 Timeframe, but Later Abandoned).** After planning, development, and testing were complete, this phase was to deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIB to help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range missiles and potential future ICBM threats to the U.S. homeland. This would deploy at sites in Romania, Poland, and in the Mediterranean.

### How the System Works

The system is made up of two components: early warning and surveillance radar systems and interceptor missiles. Positioning the radar in Turkey provides an effective

**Chart. European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense**

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV (canceled March 2013)
Timeframe	2011	2015	2018	2020
Capability	Deploying today's capability	Enhancing medium-range missile defense	Enhancing intermediate-range missile defense	Early intercept of MRBMs, IRBMs and ICBMs
Threat	To address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe and deployed U.S. personnel and their families.	To expand the defended area against short- and medium-range missile threats to southern Europe.	To counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats to include all of Europe.	To cope with MRBMs, IRBMs, and potential future ICBM threats to the United States.
Components	AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in Kürecik, Turkey; C2BMC in Ramstein, Germany; Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 IA off the coast of Spain	AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in Kürecik, Turkey; C2BMC in Ramstein, Germany; Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 IB off the coast of Spain; Aegis Ashore with SM-3 IB in Romania	AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in Kürecik, Turkey; C2BMC in Ramstein, Germany; Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 IIA off the coast of Spain; Aegis Ashore with SM-3 IB/IIA in Romania and Poland	AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in Kürecik, Turkey; C2BMC in Ramstein, Germany; Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 IIA off the coast of Spain; Aegis Ashore with SM-3 IIB in Romania and Poland
Technology	Exists	In testing	Under development	In conceptual stage when canceled
Locations	Turkey, Germany, ships off the coast of Spain	Turkey, Germany, ships off the coast of Spain, Romania	Turkey, Germany, ships off the coast of Spain, Romania, Poland	Turkey, Germany, ships off the coast of Spain, Romania, Poland

Key: Aegis Ashore = Land-based component of the Aegis BMD System; AN/TYP-2 (FBM) = Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance, Model 2 (Forward-based Mode); BMD = ballistic missile defense; C2BMC = Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile; MRBM = medium-range ballistic missile

Note: As its national contribution to NATO's BMD, the Netherlands announced in November 2011 that it planned to upgrade four air-defense frigates with extended long-range missile defense early warning radars. Separately, France announced its own plans to develop an early warning system for the detection of ballistic missiles.

early warning advantage since its proximity to Iran—considered to be the main threat in the region—would allow for the destruction of any ballistic missile from Iran the moment it is launched. The radar in Turkey will also identify the trajectory of the missiles and relay the data to Aegis ships. The missiles on the ships will instantly launch against Iranian missiles, neutralizing the threat in its earliest stage. It will take a matter of seconds for the system to work.

At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the NATO missile defense system was officially declared to have reached interim operational capability. The command of the radar in Turkey was officially transferred from the United States to NATO. This control arrangement will apply only to the radar system in Turkey; the systems in Poland, Romania, and on U.S. warships will remain under U.S. control.

**Threat from Iran**

The strategic concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010 states, “The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members are threatened. . . . NATO will . . . develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic

missile attack as a core element of our collective defense, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.”

The official line, as stated in NATO speeches and documents, is that the system is designed to protect against missiles in 30 countries. The May 2012 document adopted in Chicago also does not single out any particular country or state: “Ballistic missiles pose an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Over 30 countries have, or are acquiring, ballistic missile technology that can eventually be used to carry not just conventional warheads, but also weapons of mass destruction.”<sup>27</sup>

Regardless of what official NATO documents state, however, it appears that the system is mainly aimed against the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and its developing ICBM capabilities. Former U.S. documents state that Iran is perceived as the main threat. For example, the 2009 White House EPAA document included a threat assessment that stated that the EPAA was based on an assessment of the Iranian missile threat. The emphasis on Iran was also possibly a way to deflect Russian concerns. The document stated:

*We have repeatedly made clear to Russia that missile defense in Europe poses no threat to*

*its strategic deterrent. Rather, the purpose is to strengthen defenses against the growing Iranian missile threat. There is no substitute for Iran complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. But ballistic missile defenses will address the threat from Iran’s ballistic missile programs, and diminish the coercive influence that Iran hopes to gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities.*

Iran is a significant concern to NATO members. It has the largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and the threat from its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is now assessed as developing more rapidly than previously projected. A nuclear Iran would create a proliferation spiral across the Middle East, effectively ending international nonproliferation efforts. As a sponsor of terrorism, Iran would be able to transfer nuclear materials to its terrorist proxies, threaten Israel, and seek to dominate the energy rich Persian Gulf.<sup>8</sup>

**Russia’s Response**

The strategic concept laid out at the Lisbon Summit included a segment on revitalizing NATO-Russia relations and cooperation with Russia. The Chicago Declaration reaffirmed NATO’s assurance

to Russia, stating that the project was not oriented against Russia, nor did the project have the capability of undermining Russia's strategic deterrent.<sup>9</sup> However, no matter how much the Alliance tries to calm Russian concerns, or refrains from naming a specific threat, its Phase Four would have capability against some of Russia's strategic forces. This is factored into Russian concerns and threat calculations, which are based on capability, not intentions.<sup>10</sup> Even though this phase was canceled in March 2013, it is unclear whether Russian concerns have eased completely.

Moscow opposes the planned missile defense system; it is worried that the system could threaten the country's own nuclear missiles and undermine its deterrence capability. Nicolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, claims the Russians assess that Iran is still far from long-range missile capability. Hence, they think the real target of the missile defense system is Russia, not countries that have or are acquiring ballistic missile technologies as is being publicly declared.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, Russia perceives that merely the presence of the missile defense shield increases the risk of Iran being attacked, weakening one of Russia's allies in the region.

Russian Ministry of Defense officials want legal and written guarantees that U.S. missile defense systems will not be directed against Russian strategic missiles. Moreover, while Russia wants to operate a joint system in which both sides would have control over any decision to launch interceptor missiles, NATO wants to have two separate but coordinated command and control systems that share information.<sup>12</sup> NATO rejected Russia's plan in June 2011 when Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated at the Missile Defense Conference in London, "We cannot outsource our collective defense obligations to non-NATO members."<sup>13</sup>

These issues remain unresolved. In early May 2012, officials from NATO, the United States, and Russia met in Moscow at a Missile Defense Conference for 2 days of talks in an effort to find common ground. On May 3, 2012, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov stated that the United States and Russia had not been able to find a mutually acceptable solution and that the situation was practically at a "dead-end."<sup>14</sup> There has not been much progress since.

Russian officials have stated that Russia reserves the right to strike NATO's radars unless it is given the clear written guarantees it wants. After the meeting, General Nikolai Makarov, chief of the Russian defense staff, remarked, "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens." Makarov also stated that if the European shield was built, Russia would respond by putting more powerful warheads on its own ballistic missiles.

Russia's military has also announced plans to develop a new ICBM capable of carrying multiple warheads and other components designed to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. On May 23, 2012, Russia tested a new missile that would have the capability to break the NATO defense system. The timing was significant in that it came days after NATO's Chicago Summit, during which the Alliance formally announced the achievement of the first phase of the system. This missile is believed to be more difficult to detect and easier to maneuver. It is also thought to potentially have individual warheads that can change course to avoid being shot down.<sup>15</sup>

### View from the Front Line

NATO is Turkey's anchor in the West. It is what institutionalizes Turkey's ties with the West and forms the basis of its Western and European identity. In the last decade, however, Turkey's foreign policy, which included better relations with Iran and Syria and worsening relations with Israel, raised questions about whether it was deliberately distancing itself from the West and was still a trustworthy NATO Ally. Such talks of a shift in orientation from West to East were ignited primarily because Ankara's initial approach to Tehran's nuclear program was significantly different from that of its Western Allies. It focused less on Iran's capabilities and more on its intentions, believing it would never be the target of Iranian nukes. Accordingly, in June 2010, Turkey voted against further sanctions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council, causing a serious crisis in its relations with the United States and Europe and fueling discussions about the West having lost Turkey.<sup>16</sup> The deterioration in Turkey's relations with Israel following the May 2010 flotilla incident added fuel to the fire.

This was the atmosphere in which Turkey attended the November 2010 meeting

in Lisbon. The United States and NATO had decided that Iran was the main threat to world peace and stability. The strategic concept included a BMD project that would employ military tools to deter Iran from becoming a regional nuclear power. When confronted with the BMD project, Ankara had two options. Either it would approve it and reaffirm its position within the Alliance, or reject it and raise serious questions about its position in NATO, altering its relations with both NATO and the United States. Turkey chose to approve the strategic concept. (In an effort to do some damage control in its relations with Iran, it sought to ensure that the documents refrained from identifying Iran as the threat against which the shield would be deployed. It got what it wanted, but this has not convinced Iran.)

In September 2011, Turkey went a step further and agreed to host the radar station as part of the BMD project. In this context, Turkey's decision is not only military or technical but also political. It has clarified the country's long-term strategic orientation and cemented its position in NATO. In fact, in a May 21, 2012, article in the *Chicago Tribune*, Nicholas Burns, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, claimed that NATO members should offer a greater leadership role to Turkey and consider a Turkish Secretary-General to lead the Alliance within the next decade.<sup>17</sup>

What were Turkey's calculations when it not only accepted the project, but also agreed to host the radar? First, it appears it has changed its assessment of Iran's nuclear program. It is adopting a more realistic approach regarding Iran, shifting its focus from the peaceful or hostile intentions of Iran's nuclear program to the importance and necessity of balancing a nuclear Iran's rising regional influence. If Iran becomes a nuclear power, the strategic advantage would change the power balance in the Middle East, a region where Turkey wants increased influence. Second, the uncertainty of events in the Middle East following the Arab Spring demonstrates that Turkey cannot remain friendly with regimes like neighboring Iran and Syria, and this has increased the importance of NATO for Turkey. In early 2013, Turkey's requests for and deployment of Patriot missiles from NATO to protect against potential threats from Syria have also highlighted its dependence on the Alliance.



### Iran's First Target Will Be Turkey

Turkey's decision to host the NATO BMD radar system in the southeastern part of its country, 435 miles west of the Iranian border, has caused a serious headache in its relations with Iran.<sup>18</sup> Iranian officials have bashed Turkey's plans to host the radar for the NATO missile shield, which they perceive as a U.S.-led plot to protect Israel in case Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities and is faced with a counterattack by Iran.

country in mind and has expressed its opposition to identifying Iran explicitly as a potential attacker. It has also vehemently opposed sharing any intelligence gained from the radar with Israel. Nevertheless, the BMD project will automatically create a security umbrella that will protect Israel against Iran's ballistic missiles. Accordingly, Turkey will be in a position of protecting Israel. Yet Turkish officials have harshly criticized Israel, which has increased the

### Surrounded by Missiles

In addition to statements from Iran that Turkey will be its first target in the event of an attack, Turkey faces missiles from Russia and Syria. With Russia and NATO in a deadlock as to how to cooperate on the NATO BMD program, Russia has deployed an antimissile radar system to southern Krasnodar in June 2013, which can monitor missile launches from Turkey.<sup>24</sup>

Ankara is concerned that it will end up in the middle of a disagreement between Washington and Moscow about strategic nuclear weapons. This will again present a challenge to Turkey in balancing its own strategic interests. On the one hand, it will be hosting an important part of the NATO BMD, while, on the other, it places great importance on its fledgling political, economic, and especially energy ties with Russia.

In addition to Russia and Iran, Turkey is concerned about Syrian missiles due to the latest tensions between the countries. Turkey fears that the Syrian regime may arm its long-range Scud missiles with chemical warheads and direct them at Turkey.<sup>25</sup>

### Collective Defense

NATO's vision is to become an alliance that strengthens collective security through measures intended to counter the new threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Its focus is shifting from protecting military units to protecting populations and territories, suggesting a broader mission. It is also changing its posture from deterrence by mutually assured destruction to deterrence by denial against a broader array of potential threats. This includes a BMD shield that will eventually cover Europe and the United States.

The shield is problematic for Iran and Russia. The very presence of the missile defense shield could increase Iran's perceived risk of being attacked, prompting a preemptive strike. Iran's threat to target Turkey's radar has already soured relations.

Turkey's decision to host the NATO BMD radar is significant. It is an indication of the role Turkey intends to play within the Alliance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It puts an end to debates about a "shifting axis" and its relevance in NATO and clarifies the country's long-term strategic orientation. It is significant that Turkey made this decision knowing it would jeopardize its relations with Syria, Iran, and Russia. It has gone

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## *Turkey cannot appear to be supporting Israel's strategic defense while at the same time taking an adversarial stance against Israel*

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Therefore, despite the absence of the mention of Iran in official NATO documents, Iran perceives placement of the radar in Turkey to be a hostile act and now considers Turkey a "front line partner" in this "U.S.-led plan." Consequently, it has threatened to make the radar in Turkey its first target in the event of an attack. Iranian Brigadier General Hacizade stated:

*We have prepared ourselves. If there is an attack on Iran, our first target will be the missile shield systems in Turkey, and then we'll turn to other targets. . . . The missile shield to be placed in Turkey is there not because NATO wants it to be, but because the U.S. wants to protect Israel. They are trying to deceive the entire international community, starting with the Turks, into thinking that NATO wants to do this. In today's world, the Zionist regime [Israel] conducts its acts with the U.S., and the U.S. conducts its acts as NATO. However, we believe that the Turks are knowledgeable enough to prevent such a conspiracy. The Muslim Turkish people will destroy this system when it's time.*<sup>19</sup>

In mid-December 2011, Hussein Ibrahim, the acting president of the Iranian Parliament's Foreign and National Security Commission, echoed these sentiments, stating that Iran would retaliate by striking the radar site in Turkey should Iran be attacked.<sup>20</sup>

### Protecting Israel against Iran?

To assuage Iran's concerns, Turkey has had to take some balancing measures. It has repeatedly stated that the radar system is not being positioned with any particular

government's popularity domestically and in the Middle East.<sup>21</sup> The radar's placement in Turkey has now caused a debate in the Middle East regarding claims that Turkey is protecting Israel and has been insincere in its statements against Tel Aviv.<sup>22</sup>

In February 2012, during NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen's visit to Ankara in honor of Turkey's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO membership, Turkish officials obtained his assurances that intelligence would not be shared with Israel. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also stated that "NATO's resources and facilities can only be used among NATO members and within the NATO Alliance. . . . We will never allow any NATO facility to be used by a third party. I am making this very clear. If the third party is Israel, then our position is even clearer."<sup>23</sup>

Regarding its staunch refusal to share intelligence with Israel, the main question is why Turkey would insist on withholding intelligence that could destroy a nuclear warhead in the air and potentially prevent incredible civilian loss. The government has not given a satisfactory answer to this question. The most likely reason is that it would like to create some kind of consistency and balance within its Middle East policies. It cannot appear to be supporting Israel's strategic defense while at the same time trying to gain influence in the Middle East by taking an adversarial stance against Israel. This stance has included statements about the possibility of military conflict with Israel. With the reinstatement of relations between Israel and Turkey in spring 2013, it remains to be seen whether this stance will soften.

from seeking to resolve all its problems with its neighbors by means of a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy to being faced with missiles from three sides. As the country on the front line, Turkey will likely have to continue to play a balancing act between its geopolitical need to coexist with its neighbors, Iran and Syria and nearby Russia, and its role within NATO. **JFQ**

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “NATO Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,” November 19, 2010, available at <[www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68580.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm)>. NATO’s Lisbon Summit document identifies the Alliance’s core tasks and principles as collective defense (reaffirming Article 5, to assist each other against attack), crisis management (using political and military capabilities to manage developing crises to prevent them from escalating and to protect Alliance members’ security), and cooperative security (partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations, contributing actively to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Sitki Egeli and Serhat Güvenç, “NATO’nun Füzle Savunma Sistemi ve Türkiye” [NATO Missile Defense System and Turkey], *Ortadoğu Analiz* 4, no. 40, April 2012, 19–30.

<sup>4</sup> The White House, “A ‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,” Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy, September 17, 2009, available at <[www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe)>. The fact sheet states, “The new distributed interceptor and sensor architecture does not require a single, large, fixed European radar that was to be located in the Czech Republic; this approach also uses different interceptor technology than the previous program, removing the need for a single field of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense recommended that the United States no longer plan to move forward with that architecture.”

<sup>5</sup> In March 2013, the final (or fourth) planned phase was abandoned.

<sup>6</sup> Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Missile Defense Announcement,” The Pentagon, March 15, 2013, available at <[www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759)>.

<sup>7</sup> NATO, statement, Ballistic Missile Defence, May 18, 2012, available at <[www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49635.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm)>.

<sup>8</sup> “Meeting the Challenge: Stopping the Clock,” Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) Report on U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development (Washington, DC: BPC, February 2012), 56.

<sup>9</sup> NATO, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, May 20, 2012, available at <[www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_87597.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm)>.

<sup>10</sup> Theodore Postol and Yousaf Butt, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS), FAS Special Report No. 1, September 2011, available at <[www.fas.org/pubs/\\_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf](http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf)>.

<sup>11</sup> Aaron Stein, “Turkey-Russia Relations and Missile Defense,” *SES Türkiye* (Istanbul), October 19, 2011, available at <[http://turkey.setimes.com/en\\_GB/articles/ses/articles/features/departments/world/2011/10/19/feature-01](http://turkey.setimes.com/en_GB/articles/ses/articles/features/departments/world/2011/10/19/feature-01)>.

<sup>12</sup> Alexander Vershbow, deputy secretary-general of NATO to the Moscow Missile Defense Conference, address, “NATO’s vision for missile defense cooperation with Russia,” May 3, 2012, available at <[www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_86832.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_86832.htm)>. The idea is to establish two NATO-Russia missile defense centers where NATO and Russian officers would work together. The first, the NATO-Russia Missile Data (MD) Fusion Centre, would pool data from NATO and Russian sensors to form a common diagnosis of possible third-country missile launches. This would be fed into the second, the NATO-Russia MD Planning and Operations Center. There, NATO and Russian officers would develop plans for intercepting missiles that may be launched. The second center would also develop concepts of operations, rules of engagement, and preplanned responses for coordinated missile defense operations that could be implemented in the event of an actual attack. Under this arrangement, NATO and Russia would carry out missile intercepts through their separate command and control systems, but there would be cooperation throughout the intercept process.

<sup>13</sup> Tom Z. Collina, “Missile Defense Cooperation Stalls,” *Arms Control Today*, July–August 2011, available at <[www.armscontrol.org/print/4952](http://www.armscontrol.org/print/4952)>.

<sup>14</sup> Richard Weitz, “Moscow Conference Highlights NATO-Russian Gap on Missile Defense,” *World Politics Review*, May 12, 2012, available at <[www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11916/moscow-conference-highlights-nato-russian-gap-on-missile-defense](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11916/moscow-conference-highlights-nato-russian-gap-on-missile-defense)>.

<sup>15</sup> Dmitry Zaks, “Russia Tests New Missile After NATO Summit,” Agence France-Presse, May 23, 2012, available at <[www.defensenews.com/article/20120523/DEFREG01/305230003/Russia-Tests-New-Missile-After-NATO-Summit](http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120523/DEFREG01/305230003/Russia-Tests-New-Missile-After-NATO-Summit)>.

<sup>16</sup> For examples, see Joschka Fischer, “Who ‘Lost’ Turkey?” Project Syndicate, July 1, 2010, available at <[mentary/who—lost—turkey->; Daniel Pipes, “Who Lost Turkey?” \*Danielpipes.org\*, June 10, 2010, available at <\[www.danielpipes.org/blog/2010/06/who-lost-turkey\]\(http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2010/06/who-lost-turkey\)>; Nick Danforth, “How the West Lost Turkey,” \*Foreign Policy\*, November 25, 2009, available at <\[www.foreign-policy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how\\\_the\\\_west\\\_lost\\\_turkey\]\(http://www.foreign-policy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how\_the\_west\_lost\_turkey\)>; and Bernhard Zand, “The Anatolian Tiger: How the West Is Losing Turkey,” \*Der Spiegel\*, June 15, 2010, available at <\[www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-anatolian-tiger-how-the-west-is-losing-turkey-a-700626.html\]\(http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-anatolian-tiger-how-the-west-is-losing-turkey-a-700626.html\)>.](http://www.project-syndicate.org/com-</a></p>
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<sup>17</sup> Nicholas Burns, “Anchoring NATO with Leadership,” *Chicago Tribune*, May 21, 2012, available at <[www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ct-oped-0521-leadership-nato-20120521,0,3868940.story](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ct-oped-0521-leadership-nato-20120521,0,3868940.story)>.

<sup>18</sup> “Turkey agrees to host missile early warning radar for NATO,” *The Guardian*, September 2, 2011, available at <[www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/02/turkey-missile-warning-radar-nato](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/02/turkey-missile-warning-radar-nato)>.

<sup>19</sup> Michael Segall, “Iran: The Syrian Highway in the Fight Against Israel Is Still Open,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 24, 2011, available at <<http://jcpa.org/article/iran-the-syrian-highway-in-the-fight-against-israel-is-still-open/>>.

<sup>20</sup> Sinan Ülgen, “Turkey and the Bomb,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Europe, February 15, 2012, available at <<http://m.ceip.org/2012/02/15/turkey-and-bomb/9nof&lang=en>>.

<sup>21</sup> Turkey’s relations with Israel have been at a critical low since the flotilla crisis of May 2010, when the ship *MV Mavi Marmara*, led by an Islamic charity organization and participating in the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, challenged Israel’s blockade of Gaza. An Israeli raid on the *Mavi Marmara* in international waters killed 9 Turkish civilians.

<sup>22</sup> Kadri Gürsel, “NATO Nerede, Türkiye NATO’nun Neresinde?” [Where Is NATO, Where Is Turkey Within NATO?], *Milliyet.com*, October 10, 2011, available at <<http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/nato-nerede-turkiye-nato-nun-neresinde-/dunya/dunyayazardetay/10.10.2011/1448874/default.htm>>.

<sup>23</sup> “İsrail’e İstihbarat Yok” [No Intelligence to Israel], *Stargazete.com* (Istanbul), February 18, 2012.

<sup>24</sup> “Russia Switches on New Anti-Missile Radar,” Global Security Newswire, June 7, 2013, available at <[www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-switches-new-antimissile-radar/](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-switches-new-antimissile-radar/)>; “Anti-Missile Radar in S. Russia to Go on Combat Duty by Year-End,” RIA Novosti, June 19, 2012, available at <[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20120619/174129770.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120619/174129770.html)>.

<sup>25</sup> Semih Idiz, “Patriots in Turkey: Defensive, Offensive or Symblic?” *Almonitor.com*, January 22, 2013, available at <[www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/patriot-missiles-syriaturkey.html](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/patriot-missiles-syriaturkey.html)>.