

the key to routine space access pursued by the Air Force early in the space age. The author, Roy F. Houchin II, contrasts how various Presidential administrations viewed this potential capability and entertains the possibility of the next generation bomber being a hypersonic platform. The next selection is a masterful treatise on satellite communications from 1966 to 2007, balancing technical details with historic evolution of all major U.S. programs. Its holistic analysis includes consideration of strategic requirements, user needs, costs, and benefits. The section closes with an editorial reflecting on the need for “warriors in space.” Although the essay offers thoughtful conjecture and opinion, it does not serve as a comprehensive summary of the book’s themes.

Overall, *Harnessing the Heavens* is a “must read” for anyone contemplating research on national (or international) defense issues related to space—past, present, or future. Most of the contributors accomplish the difficult task of condensing extensive material into concise, focused, and compelling prose that is readable by nonprofessionals as well as experts. Reflecting on the various articles, it is clear that even 50 years after Sputnik, the pursuit of national defense through space remains largely an ad hoc effort. **JFQ**

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**China’s Energy Strategy:
The Impact on Beijing’s
Maritime Policies**

*Edited by Gabriel B. Collins,
Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J.
Goldstein, and William S. Murray*
Annapolis:

Naval Institute Press, 2008
485 pp. \$47.95
ISBN: 978-1-59114-330-7

Reviewed by
RICHARD DESJARDINS

These are exciting times for China watchers. The People’s Liberation Army is in the midst of the most wide-ranging reforms undergone since at least the mid-1980s. China’s opening to the outside world has expanded to its military. This explains in part the increasing accuracy of our understanding of China’s military machine as well as its intentions. While much remains in the dark, discussions are much better informed, and the questions are getting more precise.

The China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College has been holding annual conferences on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since 2006. Founded in October of that year, the institute is fast becoming a center of excellence for research on all aspects of the Chinese navy. Papers presented at each conference are subsequently published in book format, with *China’s Energy Strategy* being the second work in this series.

The purpose of *China’s Energy Strategy* is to determine what role China’s growing energy needs play in shaping the development and role of its navy. Until recently, the PLAN’s main focus was believed to be on developing scenarios for invading Taiwan should Taipei unilaterally declare its independence. However, recent developments involving the navy suggest that Beijing is looking beyond Taiwan.

The literature on power politics indicates that naval development often offers a hint of the aspirations of an emerging power. Traditionally, China’s navy has been a coastal one. But the country’s emergence as an economic powerhouse is leading Western observers to query China’s intentions in the military field. As the media have reported, the economy has been growing at an average rate of 10 percent per year for more than a decade. Until the recent problems involving international finance, prospects looked good for continued healthy growth.

Such growth involving a country the size of China puts enormous strains on its existing energy supply. Even if the country benefits from being home to a large reserve of coal, it was bound to begin looking abroad for additional energy supplies. A turning point came in 1993, when China became a net importer of oil. Domestic exploration had failed to discover sizable oil fields that could have postponed China’s search beyond its border. Since then, Beijing has launched a broad and intensive campaign to secure access to oil and gas to feed its growing domestic needs. This campaign included negotiating long-term contracts in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Russia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran. China’s shopping for oil inevitably raises other major challenges, including

the impact on U.S. relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia.

The contributors to this book, however, focus on how China’s offensive to secure access to oil and gas in faraway places will impact the development of its navy. They identify a number of issues that will likely shape this development: Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions toward it, China’s approach to secure the sea lines of communication (SLOC), and internal developments that may impact China’s ability to fund the growth of its navy.

While all the contributions are excellent, several were of particular value to this reviewer, including chapters that covered the debate among Chinese analysts on U.S. intentions in the event of a conflict with China and how best to secure SLOC (Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, and Lyle J. Goldstein); the importance of energy in China’s military development and its ability to secure SLOC (James C. Mulvenon); a comparison of U.S. and Chinese vulnerabilities to disruption in energy supply (Charles W. Freeman, Jr.); the development of a strategic petroleum reserve (David Pietz); the geopolitics of natural liquefied gas markets (Mikkal Herberg); and the challenge of securing SLOC and China’s attempts to date in developing facilities in Burma and Pakistan (James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara). Throughout the book, contributors consider various purchases of weaponry over the years and the state (as of December 2006) of the Chinese navy and the extent to which it is prepared to meet any challenges involving SLOC.

The beauty of this book comes in different forms. As the editors indicate in their introduction, the contributors do not always agree. Thus, readers will note that Bernard Cole, for instance, does not see energy as having as important a role

in shaping naval developments in China as some of the other contributors. Charles Freeman warns that if China is extremely vulnerable to an oil embargo, so is the United States.

Important statistics are also provided. For instance, it is valuable to know that domestic energy sources account for 90 percent of China's demands. Oil consumption is heavily concentrated in transportation. Collins and Erickson review developments in the creation of a national tanker fleet and what role, if any, the Chinese state plays in it.


Many contributors touch on the so-called Malacca dilemma, named for the strait that joins the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. This point of vulnerability in China's access to oil has forced Beijing to consider many alternative options: digging a channel across the Thai peninsula, building a pipeline across Burma to Yunnan Province, or constructing pipelines in the north from Russia and various Central Asian republics.

Saad Rahim discusses China's diplomacy with Saudi Arabia. Fully cognizant of Saudi Arabia's close relationship with the United States, Rahim shows how China has moved cautiously to involve Saudi Arabia in its energy development, hoping that a Saudi stake in China's energy industry would turn it into an ally in the event of war. There is also a discussion of blockade strategies from a historical perspective and how China could be affected (Bruce Elleman).

Whether the issue is the Malacca Strait scenario, China's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, Beijing's charm offensive in Saudi Arabia, potential situations involving a confrontation with the United States over predominance in the western Pacific, or the impact of Chinese incursions into Central Asia on Sino-Russian relations, this

collection of essays provides the latest scholarship. Further enhancing the book's value is that the contributors are all actively involved in shaping this multifaceted debate in their respective institutions. The emergence of Chinese naval power is bound to remain a top security issue for the United States in the foreseeable future. This reviewer could not exaggerate the importance of this book in understanding the issues shaping the development of the Chinese navy. **JFQ**

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The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War
Edited by Williamson Murray and Jim Lacey

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009
368 pp. \$90
ISBN: 978-0-5215-1719-5

Reviewed by
JOHN T. KUEHN

Shortly after the United States launched Operation *Enduring Freedom* to change the Taliban regime in Kabul in response to 9/11, Sir Michael Howard wrote a rather dark and pessimistic editorial on the outlook for the intervention in Afghanistan. History appears

to have finally caught up with his assessment and the implications of how difficult making peace really is. With *The Making of Peace*, Williamson Murray and Jim Lacey have made an extremely welcome contribution to the plethora of good scholarship being published that attempts to better understand the continuum between war and peace.

Murray and Lacey turned to Sir Michael and his ubiquitous scholarship to put this collection of essays (including several by the editors) into context with a preface. In 2006, Murray and Howard had teamed in much the same way to look at the importance of history to military professionals in *The Past as Prologue*. A year later, Howard did a similar favor for the editors of *Clausewitz in the Twenty-first Century*. The point has almost been reached where if an anthology has a preface or foreword by Howard, the book is definitely worth purchasing.

As with all good books, the title implies the major thesis: that the making of peace is a process dependent on ruling elites, the nature of the state, and the political and cultural context of the immediate postwar period. One theme common to all the essays is how difficult and undervalued the process of forging a lasting and stable peace is. Another is that much of what Carl von Clausewitz had to say about the dynamics that influence war can be applied to the processes of establishing and maintaining peace. Howard's preface makes clear that all such attempts to forge something that lasts face considerable philosophical challenges. Citing Western philosophers Saint Augustine, Thomas Hobbes, and Immanuel Kant, Howard implies that the task is perhaps impossible. But he also gives us the sense—as do these essays—that to undervalue (or,

in today's usage, *underresource*) the effort intellectually and politically is to guarantee that bugaboo of modern times: the flawed peace that leads to even more destructive and sustained conflict. Therefore, like war, one must closely study peace and its maintenance in order to better ameliorate the effects of war, which the philosophers seem to have concluded is endemic to the human condition (and rightly so, in this reviewer's opinion).

Murray's introductory essay revisits Howard's themes and informs them with relevance for today. He is particularly critical of the West's ahistoricism and how it leads to the adoption of convenient myths about why wars start and end, myths that in turn contribute greatly to the problem of making peace (p. 23). Next come 12 essays in generally chronological order whose common theme is the difficulty of making a lasting peace. The authors are much the same group deployed to such good effect in *The Past as Prologue*. The phrase may seem clichéd, but they are all acknowledged experts in their chosen fields of study: from Paul Rahe on the ancients to Frederick Kagan and Colin Gray on recent times. Of particular interest, and comprising a recurring major theme, is the tenuous larger lesson that Richard Hart Sinnreich teases from his discussion of the justly famous Congress of Vienna in 1815. He attributes the breakdown of general peace to some common factors that transcend the specifics of the historical moment: "When in the fullness of time that self-discipline finally vanished under the pressures of militant nationalism, societal boredom, the disappearance of historical memory, and political and military arrogance, so also did the peace of Europe and the world" (p. 159). Replace *nationalism* with any number of current *-isms* (for example, jihadism) and