

drop *Europe* from the sentence, and it describes accurately a view of the world today. In other words, loss of the historical memory of the brutality and catastrophe of general war is the biggest threat to the maintenance of a general peace.

Sinnreich's concluding essay synthesizes many of these themes and extrapolates from Howard's opening discussion. Like Howard, he finds three general "approaches" in the historical record examined for making the peace: "universal governance" through collective security (for example, the United Nations), "strategic equilibrium" through balance of power, and, lastly, "progressive democratization" based on the flawed notion that democratic governments are not bellicose (p. 360). All these approaches have one thing in common: none of them ultimately work. These essays give the impression that prospects for any of them gaining the upper hand as the approach of choice are pretty dim. As usual, and as expected, these historians give us no intellectual shortcuts to the hard job of making peace, and the work of diplomats and peace-makers will remain a seemingly Sisyphean task.

To the reader looking for something substantive on the period between the Peloponnesian War and the Peace of Westphalia following the Thirty Years War, this book will be a disappointment. This gap, and the Western focus, is perhaps the book's most obvious shortcoming. It fails to address just what went into the making of the *Pax Romana* and the long, brutish, but relatively peaceful *Pax Pontifex* of the Catholic Church. Also missing are essays on the sustained periods of peace during the various Chinese dynasties (from which we might learn much) and the complete absence of war for nearly 250 years in the

Tokugawa Shogunate of Japan. But these are mere quibbles, given the high quality of the essays. In his introductory essay, Murray argues (somewhat casually) that the Chinese and Roman experiences are anomalies and that the Western focus of the book is intentional because we must first understand ourselves. However, at some point we must understand others, so one would thus hope for a second volume that taps scholars for these other civilizations and periods.

Military and diplomatic historians, and perhaps students at senior war colleges, will need no prodding to examine this important work, but it would be a shame if they were the only audience. This book *needs* as broad a readership as possible; otherwise, the ahistoricism that currently informs Western and even global politics (particularly the United States) will continue to contribute to the undervaluation of the challenges in making peace and the overvaluation of the efficacy of war as a means to policy ends.

JFQ

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Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division

The Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) will host the 45th Joint Doctrine Planning Conference (JDPC) May 12–13, 2010, in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. This conference not only synchronizes the JDDC, but also launches some of the groundbreaking discussions leading the way in matters that affect today's doctrine. (For the latest news on JDPC, follow the JDEIS link below.) During the last JDPC, two major topics discussed were the revision of Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and development of a new joint publication, JP 3–15.1, *Joint Counter-IED Operations*.

JP 1 provides fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States, links joint doctrine to the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy, and describes the military's role in the development of national policy and strategy. JP 1 is the link between policy and doctrine. In short, it describes the Department of Defense as an institution and how it aligns within the broader context of the U.S. Government to achieve the Nation's objectives. One key to fully exploiting our remarkable joint military potential, not currently written in JP 1, is how we *develop* the joint force.

While the United States has been developing the joint force, the many and diverse parts of this process are not yet holistically and cohesively articulated, the result being a myriad of individual policies and communities in isolation. JP 1 should provide the strategic framework that aligns the Chairman's long-term vision with the development of the joint forces. While currently in revision, JP 1 will correct this omission by answering two fundamental questions regarding joint force development: what it is and what process is used to develop the force. These questions will serve to frame the discussion and development of this topic.

Answering the first question, what it is, entails three steps. Using the reverse planning rubric, the first step is to determine the endstate or goal of joint force development, next discern its components, and finally craft an initial working definition to structure development of the process. Broadly speaking, the end result of joint force development is to provide government agencies and personnel the guidance to build and maintain a joint force capable of conducting current and future joint operations across the range of military operations. To do this, warfighters must be educated and trained to "think, plan, and act" jointly first. Although not all-inclusive, critical components of joint force development will include concept development, doctrine, education, training, and exercises. Using the endstate as our foundation and arranging its resident components, a proposed definition of joint force development emerges:

A deliberate, iterative, and continuous process of planning and developing the current and future joint force through advancement of transformational joint concepts which are refined into relevant

doctrine, promulgated through career long education and training, validated through a robust exercise program, resulting in decisive, adaptable war plans.

The intent of this new JP 1 chapter is to foundationally establish the roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for developing the joint force to provide all Services, combatant commands, and combat support agencies the authoritative guidance to build and maintain a joint force. This guidance will also serve to inform the U.S. Government, nongovernmental organizations, and allied nations.

The revision process for JP 1 began in January 2010 and is planned for completion by year's end. This accelerated revision timeline is imperative as JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, are both currently under revision. The primacy of JP 1, as the Capstone publication, should influence, inform, and ground discussions throughout the array of the joint hierarchy, especially JP 3-0 and JP 5-0. Once accomplished, proper revision order will be achieved, allowing a cohesive narrative among these three key joint publications.

The other major outcome of the JDPC was the approval of JP 3-15.1. Battlefield employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has become a more prevalent tactic in recent years, and this trend is expected to continue as our adversaries seek to counter our efforts abroad. Additionally, it was identified that current joint doctrine provides little detail for the conduct of counter-IED operations, the planning for and execution of these kinds of operations, or the roles and responsibilities of the staffs. Lacking this overarching guidance, the Army and Marine Corps have developed their own doctrine. This joint publication will set the conditions for a joint approach to this ever-growing threat by providing joint doctrine for planning and executing joint counter-IED operations. JP 3-15.1 will outline responsibilities, provide command and control considerations, discuss organizational options, detail the counter-IED process, and attack the network methodology, as well as introduce models for coordinating with counter-IED supporting organizations. The first draft is currently in staffing and the expected signature date is August 2011.

For access to joint publications, go to Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Web portal at <https://jdeis.js.mil> (dot.mil users only). For those without access to dot.mil accounts, go to Joint Electronic Library Web portal at www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

JPs Revised or Under Review

JPs Approved in Calendar Year (CY) 2009

- JP 1-05, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*
- JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*
- JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*
- JP 3-09.3, *Close Air Support*
- JP 3-13.2, *Psychological Operations*
- JP 3-14, *Space Operations*
- JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*
- JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*
- JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*
- JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*
- JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*

JPs Scheduled for Approval in CY 2010

- JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*
- JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*
- JP 3-02.1, *Amphibious Embarkation and Debarcation Operations*
- JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*
- JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*
- JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*
- JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*
- JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*
- JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*
- JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*
- JP 3-52, *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*
- JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*
- JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*
- JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine*
- JP 4-09, *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*
- JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C³ Systems Support in Joint Operations*



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Strategic Forum 252

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

John P. Caves, Jr., argues that the United States needs to modernize and ensure the long-term reliability and responsiveness of its aging nuclear deterrent force and infrastructure. He opens with a hypothetical scenario that brings home the profound implications that a future crisis of confidence in its nuclear deterrent would have for U.S. security. Without a reliable nuclear deterrent, the United States cannot otherwise safely reduce its nuclear weapons, responsibly ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, deter and contain challenges from resurgent nuclear near-peers, and effectively dissuade allies and partners from acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

Strategic Forum 251

U.S.-Cambodia Defense Relations: Defining New Possibilities

Lewis M. Stern reviews the recent history of U.S.-Cambodia defense relations, showing how Cambodia's lax border controls, widespread corruption, and active arms trade have made that country a staging ground for numerous activities that challenge the safety and well-being of the region. He argues that U.S. interests would be well served by a stepped-up program of cooperation with Cambodia in areas such as counterterrorism, peacekeeping, counternarcotics, disaster response, and stability operations. U.S. early investment in Cambodia's future—beginning with support for the regional peace process—would provide a useful foundation for cooperation and have a beneficial impact on Southeast Asia as a whole.

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