

A Recurrent, Variable and Complex Challenge: The Uncertain Trajectory of Stabilization and Reconstruction in U.S. Security Strategy

By Kari Möttölä

Despite the apparent strength of their case, the community of planners, veterans, think-tankers and civic activists working in external security and humanitarian missions are puzzled and frustrated with the past and present performance of the United States in such missions, and anguished about the future.² It is not that the United States has not taken action in foreign conflicts, regional instabilities or humanitarian catastrophes. It is not that the response to fragile or failed states has not been a key agenda item in U.S. foreign and security policy throughout the post-Cold War era. Where America as a polity has come short is in failing to recognize, as a permanent national security interest, the need to design and pursue a *strategic policy* on stabilization and reconstruction. While the concept may be debatable and the capability may be constrained by developments, what those devoted to the cause call for is a policy with a sustainable balance between ends and means and commensurate to the responsibility of U.S. global leadership.

Kari Möttölä is Special Adviser at the Unit for Policy Planning and Research, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, in March-May 2012.

The Reality Check: Obstacles and Challenges

A number of paradoxes seem to be blocking progress. On the civilian side, the Department of State (DOS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are combining diplomacy and development to pursue and lead an innovative policy of soft or smart power. Although there is a will, critical shortcomings endanger a stronger policy in conflict response and humanitarian assistance.

Entrenched bureaucratic rivalries within the DOS and USAID weaken the governance of external relations. Embedded divisions of competence and authorities complicate effective DOS leadership in the whole-of-government mode. Reservations about nation-building among the political elites and a lagging narrative for the general public dilute reforms. In Congress, the reluctance to favor the DOS hinders funding increases while even among the more sympathetic members an effective ownership of the cause is missing.

On the defense side, having taken over complex stability operations without sufficient preparation in the midst of wars of the 1990s and 2000s, and frustrated over the burden of what should have been a civilian responsibility, the U.S. military is ready to swear “never again.” The Pentagon has even made some of its own funds available for civilian operations. Joint national security funding, which would give leeway for civilian needs, is a no-go among the interest-driven congressional budget committees.

Moreover, under fiscal austerity, even with the drawdown of wars, no peace dividend is forthcoming to redistribute money from military to civilian branches. The Department of Defense (DOD) is diverting planning and resourcing away from stability operations to traditional defense tasks and combating societal threats such as cyber-vulnerability and terrorism. Where there is a resource, there may not be a will.

In the context of grand strategy, stronger U.S. attention to conflict management will be

contingent on the priorities of the second Obama administration. At stake will be the goals of democracy promotion and transformative development assistance and the tools of low-intensity operations, primarily civilian, and demanding high-intensity interventions with a major military component.

Finding a Way Forward: Concept, Capability and Policy

What is the way forward to an effective and adaptive U.S. policy of conflict, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and comprehensive crisis management? If the contingent reasons are political and transient, should the focus be on waiting for better times in realignments among players? If the critical factors are structural and permanent, would the solution be institutional reforms or lowering objectives to match the resources available?

It has been observed that a “third generation” of U.S. operations is emerging, after the post-Cold War decade of humanitarianism and multilateralism, and the post-9/11 decade of counterinsurgency and unilateralism. As the challenge is recurring in variable forms, lessons learned should be a major factor in correcting malfunctions and directing future action. An analysis must cover three aspects of stabilization and reconstruction: the concept, the capability and the policy.

The Evolution of the Concept: Process- and End State-Driven

While the operations envisaged are complex by nature, combining military and civilian aspects, the U.S. pattern of action has evolved in an *ad hoc* manner through responses to emergent situations. Consequently, an analytically-defined and politically-adopted common concept is yet to emerge in the U.S. discourse and usage for what is widely called *stabilization and reconstruction*. Hence, for a policy of response to events, the concept of *contingency operations* is applicable and pertinent to the challenge of shaping a consistent policy.

Primarily in civilian usage, stabilization and reconstruction denotes expeditionary missions in fragile or conflict-affected societies. The concept may depict a certain phase in the sequence of actions, such as initial crisis management or post-conflict reconstruction. The analytical framework is the *conflict cycle* and, accordingly, the definition of the concept here is *process-driven*.³

In U.S. military parlance stressing the primacy of security, the concept of *stability operations* containing civilian assets integrated with counterinsurgency and irregular warfare was introduced as a type of *complex operation* pursued in recent wars.⁴

Another way of defining the concept is to call for a *holistic* approach to promote the transformation of the targeted state or society. In a prominent manual for the practice of stabilization and reconstruction, such *end states* are listed as the rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, stable governance and social well being.⁵

In the social science perspective, the holistic approach calls for fixing the security, political/governance, social and economic components of the society. All the sectorial missions are critical for success in stabilization and reconstruction. While being dynamic, sequenced, and interconnected, they cannot compensate for each other in the totality of the operation. Reconciliation support provides an additional driver towards social change.⁶

Within the comprehensive approach, the order of priority among the various components is a matter of choice. In an ideal model for practical policy, security would be introduced first, followed by economic, political and social transitions.⁷ In the area of international relations research, theories exist for each alternative: liberalization first, security first, institutionalization first or civil society first.⁸

Humanitarian emergency assistance or disaster relief should be included in the toolkit, as they concern social conditions and may affect conflict resolution. To the extent sustainable development is the ultimate goal, and most targets are fragile or

developing countries, tailored development assistance is included in the capability as well.⁹

Both conflict cycle and holistic approaches call for a broad involvement. Any single operation may not cover all components, but a sequence of actions or segments could complement each other in the long run.

in an ideal model security would be introduced first, followed by economic, political and social transitions

The idea of transferring Western-style governance to emerging or developing states is complicated by the elusive nature of contemporary state sovereignty. Areas of limited statehood within the borders of states abound and hybrid or *de facto* states challenge the traditional depiction of sovereign states as actors. Multi-level governance, while differing from the Western norm of good governance, may be a right way to go. Another factor to be taken into account in designing interventions, whether for social engineering or development purposes, is the absorption capacity of recipient societies.¹⁰

A holistic and end state approach would justify the use of state building, nation-building and peace-building as generic concepts, although for political and cultural reasons they do not sit well in the American discourse, which is more attuned to the conflict cycle approach driven by risk assessment. Consequently, defining and naming the concept – thus implying the pattern of action – remains a challenge for the analysis of U.S. policy in the cycle of crisis management, transition support, stabilization, reconstruction and state-building.

Constructing the Capability: In Search of the Whole of Government

The analysis of the capability of the United States for stabilization and reconstruction missions begins with reforms undertaken by the State

Department/USAID, and the Department of Defense as well as, in an integrated fashion, other main U.S. governmental agencies. Capability is determined by institutional and material enablers: the effectiveness of inter-agency leadership and governance and the fiscal, material and personnel resources allocated to the task; as well as by the added value produced by think tanks and non-governmental organizations.¹¹

The complex nature of changes in targeted states and societies underlines the need for tools and mechanisms that are adaptive, as well as the need to hedge against changes and provide options in the course of the undertaking. A key question is how the balance between military and civilian tools in the U.S. arsenal of national power will be shaped by the evolution and recalibration of foreign, security and defense policies in the transforming global order.

Will a “civilian surge,” which seems to be preferred by both civilian and military planners, take place? A stronger civilian-military capability is driven by an agenda that includes improved strategy and planning, implementation infrastructure, and training and education as well as increased funding. In the current discourse, it seems the civilian sector is being built up towards an open-ended objective, whereas the military sector is being built down to find a closure or limit to its role in stability operations.

Civilian Capability

A civilian surge with a strong investment in institutional resources is promised in the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), produced by the State Department in 2010. It aims to elevate civilian power alongside military power as an equal pillar of foreign policy, taking a qualitative step in the area of conflict prevention and crisis response.¹²

As for stabilization and reconstruction as forms of soft power, the QDDR did not begin from scratch. Pioneering executive, legislative and institutional steps were taken by the Clinton and

George W. Bush administrations on both the civilian and military fronts.¹³ While recognized as a well-argued and structured document but not a path-breaking guideline, the QDDR was received with disappointment and disbelief among the think tank and NGO community.

Firstly, the report was not in tune with fiscal or political reality. The Department of State and USAID face a mismatch between available resources and a growing demand for contingency operations. The QDDR identifies two types of civilian contingency operations: (i) conflict response with conflict management, mitigation and resolution; conflict prevention; security and justice sector assistance; and stabilization, reconstruction and recovery; and (ii) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The civilian agencies will encounter declining funding and continuing requirements for missions, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, even after – and as a consequence of – the military withdrawals.¹⁴

No plan for the additional funding required for the reforms was attached, and the report seemed to have no impact on budget cuts affecting State and USAID. In addition, targeted extra funding for State-led operations from two sources (Congressional funds, mostly for the generation of the Civilian Response Corps, and the Section 1207 authority DOD funds channeled for DOS field missions and projects) had peaked. They were reduced or winding down by the time the follow-on institutional reforms suggested in the QDDR took effect.

Secondly, the QDDR model of two parallel lead-agencies (State for operations responding to political and security crises and USAID for response to humanitarian crises and natural disasters) did not go far enough towards creating a machine which would draw on, and bring together, all the relevant instruments of U.S. civilian power for stabilization and reconstruction.

Both high expectations and nagging doubts were centered on the launching of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), a

singular product mandated by the QDDR, established in the human security pillar of bureaus and offices under the new Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. Even with the Assistant Secretary acting as the principal advisor to the Secretary of State on the related issues, the CSO was not to become a tool in executing State Department leadership over the whole administration on conflict engagements, if the drafters of the QDDR ever had such a vision for inter-agency power concentration. Neither would the CSO have at its disposal a dedicated civilian surge capability that could be sent to a conflict spot early to make a difference on the ground. Rather than being in control of the government policy in crisis, the CSO will be at best a repository of expertise.

Established in 2011, the CSO will “focus” on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities (reconstruction being dropped from the title). It succeeds and absorbs the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), established in 2004 with a broader mandate to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize” U.S. civilian capacity. The CSO has taken a pragmatic and incremental approach to its role, by looking for, and acting where, it can make a strategic difference in the complex of institutional actors, as reflected in the definition of how it intends to perform its mandate: “by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace.”

Instead of acting as a coordinating hub, the CSO is carving for itself an expert role in providing situation awareness for conflict prevention, and contributing to analysis and planning conducted in regional bureaus and embassies, cooperating also with regional military commands, at their request or on its own initiative. In addition, the CSO runs a small number of small-scale civilian operations (in 2012 in Kenya, Burma/Myanmar, Northern Central America and Syria), inherently aimed to be short-range and turned over to other agencies such as USAID.

It is indicative of the tentative nature of the CSO that its head declared that the new unit had to find its place and prove its added value within its first 12 months; and that its operations, contributing particular expertise in a flexible manner, would be a legitimate measure in such stock-taking, in addition to what the CSO might bring in its planning role.¹⁵ As a facilitator of innovative and proactive action, the CSO is matched against the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) mandated to bringing similar added value to the stabilization and reconstruction operations of USAID, which have a long history and easily overlap with those of the State Department.¹⁶

CSO is matched against the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) mandated to bringing similar added value to the stabilization and reconstruction operations of USAID

As for absorbing the Civilian Response Corps, which was to be the main instrument of the S/CRS and at one time was envisaged to have 2,500 reserve and active staff¹⁷, the CSO is working with a small active core of federal employees and has put the future of the instrument as a whole on hold.¹⁸

The stormy if aborted term of S/CRS contradicts the approach adopted by the CSO. Established in 2004, the S/CRS entered the scene during the pioneering decade when both civilian and military components of the U.S. policy were placed on a legal, institutional and practical footing in the midst of two major expeditionary missions, which the United States entered unprepared for a comprehensive approach combining military with civilian components.

Despite voices of doubt and opposition, the military was put in charge of relief and reconstruction operations in Iraq (with most civilian operatives being contracted), duties typically within the scope of State and USAID. In Afghanistan,

the Pentagon hastily set up a civilian operation.¹⁹ Pressed by events into adopting a sustainable basis for contingency operations, the DOD issued Defense Directive 3000.05 (2005, reissued as DOD Instruction 3000-05 in 2009), which made conducting (“with proficiency equivalent to combat operations”), supporting and leading stability operations “a core U.S. military mission.”²⁰

In parallel, Presidential Directive NSDP44 (2005) moved to place the planning and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations under the leadership of the State Department and integrate them with military contingencies when relevant and appropriate. Created to perform the ambitious mandate, codified, together with a civilian corps, in law (FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act), S/CRS struggled from the beginning. With its funding for operations peaking and ebbing within a couple of years, S/CRS was never deployed in Iraq or Haiti, and was marginalized within State’s turf-conscious bureaucracy.²¹

Further uncertainty is caused by the location of the CSO within the group of functional units dealing with human security. The new bureau is not hierarchically above the influential regional bureaus or the powerhouse bureaus dealing with political-military affairs, with the former directing policies on the ground in conflict areas and the latter dealing with the DOD and sharing control over funds used in cooperation with the military.²²

In favorable circumstances, the complex of human security bureaus and offices would be a formidable presentation and instrument of U.S. soft power.²³ The long-term vision of the QDDR makers was to have an integrated source for funding expeditionary missions with human security as a mainstream component.

Unconsolidated, the QDDR design for State Department leadership will have to hedge against visions and proposals where high-level inter-agency management and coordination is transferred to the NSC. In other alternative models operational responsibility for foreign assistance and deploying civilian experts would reside at USAID, with State

confined to diplomacy and policy planning, or a single new inter-agency structure would be established to command and carry out contingency operations.²⁴

Military Capability

By the time of the adoption of stability operations as a new core function, the U.S. military had produced a mixed legacy from missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where civilian components were integrated to support the surge of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.²⁵ The military-led complex operations had created and enhanced new types of expertise and experience.²⁶

The imbalance between military and civilian capabilities led DOD to call for increased resources for civilian partner agencies. A major NDU study recommended to the Obama administration the acceleration of efforts to build the capacity of civilian agencies by providing additional resources, creating new authorities and reforming interagency structures.²⁷

While the military would gain in prestige and power from its role in complex operations, voices were raised warning of the risk of an expeditionary military with one-sided focus in stability operations, resulting in fewer ground forces available for early high-intensity combat, and a leadership cadre intellectually unprepared for a large-scale conventional conflict.²⁸

With an institutional conflict of interest emerging between major combat and stability missions in defense policy, new strategic decisions adapted the open-ended approach reflected in Directive 3000.05 to the change underway in domestic and external priorities. Driven by war fatigue and fiscal austerity, and pressure to implement geopolitical reassessment, the Pentagon strategic guideline of 2012 seemed to lock in a new direction by stating unequivocally that, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”²⁹ Although the U.S. military will be ready to conduct “limited” counterinsurgency and other stability operations

“if required,” the rise and fall of the dominance of military-driven complex operations took barely five years.³⁰

As the rebalancing to the Pacific will be focused on strengthening and deploying naval and air forces, which are comparatively spared from budget cuts, the army will suffer most. There will be fewer ground forces, except for special operations forces, available for stability operations in such a high-technology military. Consequently, proponents of peace operations are ready to conclude that the new strategic policy will inevitably lead to a decreased U.S. investment in, and contribution to, crisis management, in particular regarding more demanding or high-intensity operations.

The 2012 strategic guideline promotes a degree of flexibility. Emphasizing non-military means as a way to reduce the demand for major force commitments, the military will work with partners in the federal government and coalition and other international partners. The lessons learned and capabilities developed in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be wasted; neither will the DOD refuse to provide deployable military capabilities for humanitarian and other relief operations.

Directive 3000.05, though re-issued as an “Instruction” (2009) will continue to guide the U.S. military in keeping up its inherent capability, which will be vital for most future civilian-military contingencies. The fiscal predicament, together with the political reorientation, may drive the civilian and military agencies to a closer, innovative partnership to ensure that government resources are used to the best effect.

Correcting Asymmetries of U.S. Power

The sharing of responsibilities and burdens in the practice of expeditionary missions among the State Department, USAID and DOD as well as other federal agencies remains open and variable. No single leading agency is in sight, unless the National Security Staff (NSS) would be put in charge, which would not likely work as its small staff lacks sufficient resources to run a major operation.

The asymmetry between State and DOD in resources and political clout is a perennial issue in American security policy.³¹ One argument claims that the reason is not civilian under-resourcing but an underperformance by the State Department, in particular in running major projects or implementing policy. The vacuum left by inadequate civilian power is filled by the military. The cause is cultural: the inability of State to create change and pursue reforms.³²

A larger share of civilian power would have to include additional resources and new authori-

the asymmetry between State and DOD in resources and political clout is a perennial issue in American security policy

ties as well as effective inter-agency governance. In view of a shared responsibility, looming fiscal constraints have brought forth the idea of a national security budget combining DOS and DOD appropriations, including funding for contingency operations, although its acceptance is unlikely.

The civilian and military components of U.S. power are at a crossroads and taking separate routes in the area of contingency operations. The civilian side is growing its muscles and searching for an effective leadership role, whereas the military side is trimming its capability for stability missions and searching for better integration with civilian tools. The two routes may meet after a period of development, reform and innovation.

In Search of Policy: Domestic and External Drivers in a State of Flux

The trajectory of stabilization and reconstruction, contingent on domestic and external drivers, is framed by the strategic orientation of the United States. The scope and pattern of international engagement will characterize the U.S. leadership and measure the sustainability of its position of primacy in a global environment where conflict, instability and fragility call for response and crisis



IOM Pakistan on Flickr

USAID/IOM relief distribution in Ghotki, Pakistan

management. The mixed legacy of the post-Cold War era highlights the widely-shared assumption that the military withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan will constitute a turning point in U.S. policy on military and civilian contingency operations. The choice is between a limited, prioritized policy or one that is open-ended and generically global.

While the military establishment is re-arranging its priorities and reshaping its preparedness, the civilian agencies are struggling to reform and sustain their capability for leading, conducting and integrating conflict response and humanitarian missions.

With drivers in a state of flux, it is challenging to distinguish and define an American template for crisis management. Whenever the United States intervenes in a crisis, the level of impact and risk is high. Moreover, the fractured nature of policy making in the U.S. political system makes predicting the future course all but impossible.

Several factors would have an adverse effect on ideational and material investments in contingency engagements. Fiscal constraints will impact both the State Department and the Department

of Defense. Domestic political gridlock continues to loom even after the re-election of Barack Obama. The lack of ownership or leadership in the Congress on nation building would need to be overcome. Lackluster public support is not helping and needs to be roused.

Of particular relevance is the overall war and engagement fatigue within the political class and the public after a decade of wars and associated stability and reconstruction efforts. In addition, the implications of the strategic reassessment underway – a rebalancing to the Pacific and an emphasis on emerging powers – may make military assets for contingency operations in zones of conflict look diversionary.

Among factors favoring engagement is the commitment of the United States to sustaining the liberal principles of the world order as a leading power.³³ The experience and readiness gained during the past decade guarantees a leading position for the U.S. While there is wide reluctance or apprehension towards repeating anything close to the Iraq or Afghanistan adventures, there is an increased interest in conflict prevention and crisis management as well as development assistance as

means of avoiding future large-scale military interventions and lowering human and material costs.

To what extent an active and reinforced U.S. engagement in democracy promotion and liberal internationalism at large will be a fundamental feature of the policy of the second Obama administration is a key question to which there is no straightforward answer.³⁴

Although state fragility remains a global structural issue, it can be debated whether threats emanating from fragile societies are sufficiently serious to call for costly intervention.³⁵ The question of rebalancing responsibilities between liberal Western and emerging powers is being raised as a matter of burden sharing justified by global power shift.³⁶

The consequences of a diminished prioritized or selective U.S. pattern of interventions would be an order – by default or by design – where multilateral institutions or emerging powers may fill the void. In any case, the United States would need to rely more on like-minded partners – foremost among them the European Union and NATO – and improve its interoperable civilian capability.³⁷

There will be ongoing pressures from civilian government agencies and NGOs to continue an open-ended commitment (by design) to stabilization and reconstruction with comprehensive nation building as an end state. Within the military, however, there are growing pressures to reallocate resources, which may (by default) reduce, redirect or restructure any comprehensive civilian-military activity. Moreover, disappointments and frustrations in the areas of resources and funding, as well as the complexity of nation-building and democratic transition, highlighted by the Arab Awakening, have brought forth a discussion of lowering expectations to “more for less” from the conditionality doctrine of “more for more.”

As a result, a shift in the use of U.S. national power from military to civilian in the area of stabilization and reconstruction would be a policy change with structural preconditions and strategic consequences.

Features in the American political culture pertaining to external engagements of choice make it difficult to envisage an established doctrine of stabilization and reconstruction. Since the Vietnam experience, U.S. interventions have witnessed scant continuity in institutional readiness and a rare use of lessons learned, leading to a pattern of starting anew instead of building on a permanent concept and capability. In the American system of governance, with administrations entering office with a bias against nation building, the policy remains contingent on external events and their presentation in the domestic media and in public. Ultimately, the foreign policy philosophy of each president may be crucial in the line of action chosen.

Conclusion

While remaining true to the ideological framework of liberal internationalism, President Barack Obama’s pragmatic, cost-conscious foreign policy is expected to reflect an inclination to limit foreign engagements. An operative doctrine of “the light footprint” contains ingredients, which can produce a workable innovation out of the patchwork of civilian and military contributions for conflict prevention and crisis management.

As military-driven interventions are treated with caution to prevent mission creep and costly escalation, a broader space opens for civilian missions, rebalancing the relative share of responsibility between the two pillars of government. Moreover, humanitarian catastrophes or other high-impact events may lead the country into action with all the capabilities at its disposal.

To be credible, the new model would have to be accompanied with a strict control of commitments and consequences.

Even while following a holistic philosophy, civilian operations would be rigorously prioritized in the complexity and uncertainty of the global environment. Likewise, even if not excluded, the contribution of military assets would be strongly limited to avoid high-intensity options and rely on partners and coalitions.

In the unlikelihood of a civilian surge, and in light of the contraction of the military commitment to large-scale complex operations, the probable U.S. response to future stabilization and reconstruction challenges, and commitment to U.S. leadership in this area, will be modest. **PRISM**

Notes

¹The author wishes to thank my colleagues at the SAIS Conflict Management Program, P. Terrence Hopmann, I. William Zartman and Daniel Serwer, as well as numerous colleagues and experts whose names remain unmentioned. Statements of fact and opinion are those of the author and do not imply endorsement by the Finnish Government or my American interlocutors.

²Reflecting sentiments in the workshop held in Washington, DC on May 15, 2012, where the author participated, to assess the case for reconstruction and stabilization 10 years after the landmark report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Play to Win*, Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), January 2003); and the launch of the report based on the workshop, July 9, 2012: Johanna Mendelson, *Inevitable Conflicts, Avoidable Failures: Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012).

³Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), II.

⁴Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, Eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009), 1-10; Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kruger, "Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations," in: Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*, 11-32.

⁵*Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, United States Institute of Peace, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 2-8. While prepared primarily for civilian actors by the U.S. Institute of Peace, which uses the concept of peace operations, and works to mitigate conflicts and reduce costs of interventions, the manual is more widely used by the U.S. Army than the State Department, which is driven by practical knowledge rather than by formal models.

⁶Paul K. Davis, Ed., *Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011). The broad study was commissioned from RAND by the Department of Defense, indicating that the military is in tune with the holistic approach.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Bernd Ladwig and Beate Rudolf, "International Legal and Moral Standards of Good Governance in Fragile States," in Thomas Risse, Ed., *Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 199-231; Ulrich Schneekener, "State Building or New Modes of Governance? The Effects of International Involvement in Areas of Limited Statehood," in Risse, Ed., *Op. Cit.*, 232-261.

⁹Noam Unger and Margaret L. Taylor with Frederick Barton, *Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2010).

¹⁰Thomas Risse, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview," in Risse, Ed., *Op. Cit.*, 1-35; Lars Brozus, "Applying the Governance Concept to Areas of Limited Statehood: Implications for International Foreign and Security policy," in Risse, Ed., *Op. Cit.*, 262-280; Robert D. Lamb, *Political Governance and Strategy in Afghanistan*, A report of the CSIS program on crisis, conflict, and cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2012); see also the project plan on, *Global Statelets Initiative*, Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), arguing that instead of state-building the incremental use of hybridity of states may be less costly and more effective.

¹¹The United States Institute of Peace, an agency of the public sector financed by the Congress but not part of the executive branch might be placed in a grey area between government and civic society.

¹²United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, *Leading Through Civilian Power*, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Washington, DC, 2010).

¹³Richard G. Lugar, "Stabilization and Reconstruction. A Long Beginning", *PRISM* 1, no. 1 (2009), 3-8.

¹⁴Nora Bensahel and Patrick M. Cronin, *America's Civilian Operations Abroad: Understanding Past and Future Requirements* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2012) on the plethora of civilian missions of various kinds, mainly small-scale.

¹⁵"Conflict and Stabilization Operations: A Conversation with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rick Barton," (Brookings Institution, April 17, 2012), available

at <<http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/04/17-conflict-stabilization>>.

¹⁶ Ambassador Rick Barton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization since 2012, was earlier in his career the founding director of the OTI.

¹⁷ As high as 5,000, in Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸ Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

¹⁹ For a critical testimony, see Dov S. Zakheim, *A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

²⁰ Department of Defense Instruction, Number 3000.05, September 16, 2009.

²¹ Caroline R. Earle, "Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in Stability Operations," *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2012), 37-50; Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., "No More Adhocracies: Reform in the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2012), 3-18; for an especially critical account, see John Herbst, "Failed States and the International Community 10 Years After 9/11: A Shifting Paradigm?," in: Eva Gross et al., Eds., *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), 9-13. Carlos Pascual, the first director of S/CRS, and John Herbst, the last director, both left the office expressing disappointment and frustration.

²² Earle, *Op. Cit.*

²³ On the concept of human security, which is widely used in European scholarship, see Mary Kaldor, "Human Security in Complex Operations," *PRISM* 2, no. 2 (2011), 3-14. In addition to conflict and stabilization, the human security pillar in the DOS structure includes: counterterrorism; democracy, human rights and labor; international narcotics and law enforcement; population, refugees and migration; trafficking in persons; and global criminal justice.

²⁴ James A. Schear and Leslie B. Curtin, "Complex Operations: Recalibrating the State Department's Role," in: Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*, 93-114; Unger, et al., *Op. Cit.*; Bowen, *Op. Cit.*

²⁵ Bowen; Earle; Christopher J. Lamb, and Martin Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan," *Strategic Forum*, no. 248 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2009); Lamb, Robert D.; Zakheim, *Op. Cit.*

²⁶ Christopher J. Lamb, et al., "MRAPS, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform," Institute for National Strategy Studies, *Occasional Paper* 6 (Washington, D.C.: National University Press, 2009); Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, "Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation," Institute for National

Strategy Studies, *Strategic Perspectives*, no. 4 (Washington, D.C.: National University Press, 2011), about successes based on practical innovation and civilian-military integration.

²⁷ Binnendijk and Curtin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*

²⁸ Terry J. Pudas and Catherine Theohary, "Reconsidering the Defense Department Mission," in: Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*, 65-92.

²⁹ *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012). The reference to stability and counterinsurgency operations is placed as the second last of the list of primary missions of U.S. Armed Forces.

³⁰ Fred Kaplan, "The End of the Age of Petraeus," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no.1 (2013), 75-90.

³¹ Stephen Glain, *State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011).

³² Kori N. Schake, *State of Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State Department* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2012).

³³ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).

³⁴ Martin S. Indyk, et.al. *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012). For the debate between proponents of strategies of "pull back", "lean forward", and "lean back", see John Arquilla, "America in Recline," *Foreign Policy*, January 28, 2013, available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/28/america_in_recline>; and President Obama's reasoning about interventions in an interview in *New Republic*, January 27, 2013, available at <<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-president#>>.

³⁵ Stewart M. Patrick, *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³⁶ *The Use of Force, Crisis Diplomacy and the Responsibilities of States*, Center on International Cooperation (New York: New York University, May 2012); Stephen D. Krasner, "International Support for State-building: Flawed Consensus," *PRISM* 2 no. 3 (2011), 65-74.

³⁷ The United States is the initiator of an informal network of governments and international organizations aimed at enhancing civilian capacity globally and increasing interoperability among international actors (International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative, ISPI).



USAID Firms Project's Agriculture Marketing Reforms