

IN SEARCH OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY FOR SECUROCRACY

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Recently the influence of 'securocracy' (security-related bureaucracy) in the Russian political system has somewhat decreased. Vladimir Putin brought many security officers into high positions in the civil service. Consequently they stepped out of shade and started to deal with public politics. Although Putin's team remains intact, today its members not so much represent the securocracy rather than act as regular politi-

Ministry of the Interior and more so the Armed Forces today is excessive. We can only state that individual members of Putin's team still hold high positions in office and carry certain weight and influence.

Meanwhile, the security agencies come in for severe criticism. In 1990, most flak was caught by the FSB and its counter-espionage division in particular. As a result both suffered appreciable damage. Today something very similar is happening to the *milit-sia* ('police' in Russian). I don't mean to say it shouldn't be criticized at all, but when folks in the Ministry of the Interior have no clear idea as to what future awaits their department and how it will be reformed, it certainly doesn't strengthen the security of a state. It is obvious that now those promoting securocracy should keep a low profile.

There is no correlation between the diminishing of securocracy and the strengthening of the political system. The latter is achieved primarily by the strengthening of institutions. If the securocracy discharges its functions well then it strengthens the political system. And it is of no consequence whether security agencies swell their ranks or reduce their numbers. Today the major problem is that the securocracy doesn't show the efficacy that is required.

What is demanded from the political system most is modern-

to follow the philosophy that took shape in the Soviet era. We still have an essentially 'Soviet' *milit-sia* and counter-espionage service. It's harder to judge the efficiency of the intelligence services due to all the secrecy that obscures its operations. Generally speaking the ideology that governs and informs the work of the security agencies remains greatly out-dated – even more so since life has changed dramatically in the past 20 years. The agencies as they are simply do not fit in today's world. Neither the FSB nor the Ministry of the Interior can keep pace with the change, which in turn results in corruption. As a result of seeing scores of 'civilians' getting rich, those employed by security agencies begin to chase money instead of upholding law and order.

Improving the efficiency of security agencies is a complex task. To complete it we need to thoroughly reconsider the roles and functions of the agencies in question. For example should they protect private property or put it though the wringer? Should they perceive private business as an 'enemy from within' as they do now? To produce such a governing doctrine one certainly needs to think big. But it must be produced anyway. Perhaps it should be delivered not by the security agencies themselves but rather by some external – 'civilian' – institution. This is what I believe will finally happen. Meanwhile, the securocracy still follows the Soviet doctrine, resulting in terrible deformations.

Tightening the screw through securocracy in a state of emergency is quite another question. It stands to reason that any crisis is a prime time for security agencies. When stability is gone, people naturally expect that men in

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cians. Their mentality of course retains its peculiar properties. Nonetheless it would be unfair to say that the role of the FSB, the

ization, which implies a well-trained and in every sense modern bureaucracy. Meanwhile, security agencies sometimes tend

uniform will bring it back. After all, they are responsible for maintaining law and order, so tackling a crisis is their business.

There is of course the possibility that someone might use the recent Moscow subway bombing to tighten security measures. But it's actually too early to consider such a possibility. A terrorist attack is an awesome thing. But to say it has destabilized the country is to pay the terrorists too great a compliment. Although people have suffered immeasurable stress and trauma the situation is stable. The securocrats — the investigative authorities, emergency personnel and the police — should pull themselves together and simply do their job. And there is no evidence whatsoever that we need to draw any far-reaching conclusions along political lines.

Further liberalization of the political system notwithstanding, **the vertical security structure that emerged in past decade should stay. After all it's one of the most powerful resources the government can rely on.** There is no society, no country without a law enforcement agency — no matter what one calls it: police, *militsia* or whatever.

Intelligence and counterintelligence may vary in efficiency from country to country but no state can prosper without law enforcement. Likewise there should be a vertical power structure and smoothly working bureaucratic machine. But the problem in Russia is that the contemporary *militsia* still works along antiquated Soviet lines. They now hate business people the way they used to hate profiteers. *Militsiamen* are still not sure whether they should protect private property, and if yes then how should they go about it? Or maybe they shouldn't and rather 'stay alert' and perceive private interest as a nesting ground for criminal elements? The work of law enforcement agencies will be normalized no sooner than every law enforcement officer be given an intelligible job description and likewise unequivocally instructed as to how he should treat civilians. **Unfortunately we have a society in which everyone suspects the other of being a thief.** People — no matter how well-meaning — are being searched on routine shopping trips and forced to prove they *haven't* stolen anything. Society in turn does exactly what it's expected to do: people steal if they have a chance. So the problem runs much deeper than sheer inefficacy of the police service. It has to do with our political culture — or rather our culture in general.

The Russian bureaucratic machine can by no means be expected to work reliably in a state of emergency. Likewise, so long as corruption stays, this element of unreliability will not be eradicated either. So long as money determines the way an official acts there won't be true undivided authority. You can't do that! (Except of course if you know who to bribe). No security agency can function that way. It inevitably endangers security. ■

Exclusively for RJ

BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OVER SECURITY FORCES WILL GUARANTEE CHANGE IN RUSSIA



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Bureaucrats in Russia can probably be considered a separate social stratum. **Those bureaucrats who do all the leg work are the middle class, but the top, long-serving echelons of a bureaucracy are its 'upper class.'** We can also look at income and property as the factors that determine such 'placement.' Dmitry Medvedev is a rational bureaucrat. Whether or not he is an ideal bureaucrat I will leave to Russians to decide.

The 'bureaucratic mentality' is widespread. It is particularly popular in France, for example, where there has emerged a French ideal for the leading bureaucrat, championed by the likes of Giscard D'Estaing. He has been seen to epitomize the French version of a top-level bureaucrat, e.g., in his ability to speak authoritatively with statistics for hours.

The bureaucratic mentality may stem from the prevalence of rule and routine within a bureaucracy. It changes people inevitably. Also important in creating a bureaucratic mentality is the opinion of older bureaucrats, who are important to younger bureaucrats for issuing rewards in such forms as pay and promotion. There are, of course, personality types who also honor and

emulate bureaucratic manners and thinking. Thus, a bureaucracy's ideology grows out of its culture and, of course, its material and psychological demands. To be sure, a bureaucracy can often be a very 'comforting' place to be.

Russia definitely seems to have a 'veneration' of sorts for the State. This seems lacking in America. However, such a veneration supposedly exists in France as well, where people feel that state bureaucracy will protect them from each other.

Any true reform in Russia requires the creation of a new sort of state bureaucracy, at least in certain key sectors, especially with the police and security forces. The Russian military probably requires serious changes as well but at least it doesn't try to rule in its own right. But to what degree Russian reformers actually want to transform the bureaucracy I do not know.

And who is the main opponent of bureaucracy in Russia? Objectively, business will ultimately work to avoid and 'cut down' the bureaucratic system. ■