

NATIONALISMS OF THE RULING CLASS

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De facto, the Russian authorities are not implementing a single nationalist-oriented project. This is related to the lack of a certain ideological unity in the ranks of the Russian authorities. The Russian authorities have several ideological options, which, one way or another, can be described as nationalistic, as well as a few ideological options, which cannot possibly be described as nationalistic. The Russian ruling class is a rather complicated composite. Though the numbers I am about to suggest are estimates, I would present the following picture of the ideological range of the Russian ruling class.

I believe that **chauvinistic nationalism** in Russia is professed by not more than 10-15% of those who belong to the 'expanded elite of the Russian authorities'. In this particular case we are talking about approximately two million people, who are engaged in the state sector and in non-governmental structures as well.

Different variants of **moderate civil nationalism**, aimed at the cre-

ation of the political nation (undoubtedly, on the basis of ethnic Russians), are professed by about one fourth of this elite. Some variants of the virtually non-nationalistic direction observed in the ideology of the ruling class are supported by 35%. These people basically adhere to the Soviet model of nationalism, because when it comes to the concept of Russians and the concept of the Soviet people, people, to put it directly, have in mind approximately the same concept.

As for the remainder, they generally adhere to anti-nationalistic variants. One group adheres to a strictly **anti-nationalistic ideology**, which is totally incompatible with any ideology. This is the so-called European elite, who have recently become categorically anti-nationalistic. There is also a fashionable theory that these, provisionally speaking, *young professionals* tend to form a special nation of their own throughout the whole world. These 'citizens of the world' (which, in Russia, people unsuccessfully call *young Russians*, young professionals or new Russians) represent either a fictitious or an existing space that is occupied by rich and successful people. Evidently, this is a non-nationalistic group, because it is unclear how thoughts about any nation actually fit to their activities whatsoever.

The *global Russians* who fall into the second category do harbour **certain national objectives**.

External nationalistic projects are practically not suggested, since we have a certain confirmed monopolistic project, which is a hybrid of the Soviet-Russian civil nationalism, on the one hand, and of the *global Russians* I have mentioned, on the other hand. That's exactly what is being offered to the population as a kind of quasi-nationalistic platform, though in a form that is rather indigestible.

The processes related to national self-determination and the building of a civil nation should be measured in terms of periods of 15, 20, and 30 years. What the Russian ruling elite thinks about nationalism now actually needs to be extrapolated to a period of at least 15-30 years in the future. The best way to do this is to apply it to the national composition of our schools. Looking at schoolchildren and at how they build their relationships, you realise that the generation that is currently growing in large cities and that will end up governing the country in 30 years' time, actually experiences so very few of the problems described in the current nationalism-oriented programs. Thus, the problems that are currently at the centre of these debates will simply seem amusing or absurd.

I actually believe that we will be extremely surprised as soon as the year 2030 if, of course, we live to see this wonderful day. We will be surprised as to how the very definition of nationality will be changed, and to the extent that it will be transformed and distant from the definition we know today, which is based on blood relations.

Whether it is good or bad, the changes that have occurred in Russia are comparable to the great mixing of the population that took place, on the one hand, in the period 1918-1922 (due to the Civil War and military communism), and, on the other hand, in 1941-1947 (as a result of processes related to World War II). The thesis about the commonness of the Soviet people appeared not only because it was made up by the Central Committee of the CPSU, but also because of the fact that the respective national mixing had occurred. It is also occurring now. I am more than sure that most of today's children will simply not be able to identify their nationality when they grow to be my age. ■