Chapter 1

THE WAR IN EUROPE

During the anxious gray winter days immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin D. Roosevelt confronted the most serious crisis of his Presidency. Now engaged in a rapidly expanding war on two major fronts—one against Nazi Germany in Europe, the other against Imperial Japan in the Pacific—he welcomed British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill to Washington on December 22, 1941, for 3 weeks of intensive war-related discussions. Code-named ARCADIA, the meeting's purpose, as Churchill envisioned it, was to "review the whole war plan in the light of reality and new facts, as well as the problems of production and distribution."[1] Overcoming recent setbacks, pooling resources, and regaining the initiative against the enemy became the main themes. To turn their decisions into concrete plans, Roosevelt and Churchill looked to their senior military advisors, who held parallel discussions. From these deliberations emerged the broad outlines of a common grand strategy and several new high-level organizations for coordinating the war effort. One of these was a U.S. inter-Service advisory committee called the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[2]

ARCADIA was the latest in a series of Anglo-American military staff discussions dating from January 1941. Invariably well briefed and meticulously prepared for these meetings, British defense planners operated under a closely knit organization known as the Chiefs of Staff Committee, created in 1923. At the time of the ARCADIA Conference, its membership consisted of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan F. Brooke (later Viscount Alanbrooke), the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal. They reported directly to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet and served as the government's high command for conveying directives to commanders in the field.[3]

Prior to ARCADIA nothing comparable to Britain's Chiefs of Staff Committee existed in the United States. As Brigadier General (later General) Thomas T. Handy recalled the situation: "We were more or less babes in the wood on the planning and joint business with the British. They'd been doing it for years. They were experts at it and we were just starting."[4] The absence of any standing coordinating mechanisms on the U.S. side forced the ARCADIA participants to improvise if they were to assure future inter-Allied cooperation and collaboration. Just before

adjourning on January 14, 1942, they established a consultative body known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), composed of the British chiefs and their American "opposite numbers." Since the British chiefs had their headquarters in London, they designated the senior members of the British Joint Staff Mission (JSM) to the United States, a tri-Service organization, as their day-to-day representatives to the CCS in Washington. Thereafter, formal meetings of the Combined Chiefs (i.e., the British chiefs and their American opposite numbers) took place only at summit conferences attended by the President and the Prime Minister. Out of a total of 200 CCS meetings held during the war, 89 were held at these summit meetings.[5]

U.S. membership on the CCS initially consisted of General George C. Marshall, Chief of the War Department General Staff; Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. Though Arnold's role was comparable to Portal's, he spoke only for the Army Air Forces since the Navy had its own separate air component.[6] Shortly after the ARCADIA Conference adjourned, President Roosevelt reassigned Stark to London as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, a liaison job, and made King both Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. In this dual capacity, King became the Navy's senior officer and its sole representative to the CCS.[7] To avoid confusion, the British and American chiefs designated collaboration between two or more of the nations at war with the Axis powers as "combined" and called inter-Service cooperation by one nation "joint." The U.S. side designated itself as the "Joint United States Chiefs of Staff," soon shortened to "Joint Chiefs of Staff."

THE ORIGINS OF JOINT PLANNING

Though clearly a prudent and necessary move, the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a long time coming. By no means was it preordained. When the United States declared war on the Axis powers in December 1941, its military establishment consisted of autonomous War and Navy Departments, each with a subordinate air arm. Command and control were unified only at the top, in the person of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his constitutional role as Commander in Chief. Politically astute and charismatic, Roosevelt dominated foreign and defense affairs and insisted on exercising close personal control of the Armed Forces. The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff effectively reinforced his authority. Often bypassing the Service Secretaries, he preferred to work directly with the uniformed heads of the military Services. From 1942 on, he used the JCS as an extension of his powers as

Commander in Chief. The policy he laid down stipulated that "matters which were purely military must be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and himself, and that, when the military conflicted with civilian requirements, the decision would have to rest with him."[8] In keeping with his overall working style, his relations with the chiefs were casual and informal, which allowed him to hold discussions in lieu of debates and to seek consensus on key decisions.[9]

Below the level of the President, inter-Service coordination at the outset of World War II was haphazard. Officers then serving in the Army and the Navy were often deeply suspicious of one another, inclined by temperament, tradition, and culture to remain separate and jealously guard their turf. Not without difficulty, Marshall and King reached a modus vivendi that tempered their differences and allowed them to work in reasonable harmony for most of the war.[10] Their subordinates, however, were generally not so lucky. Issues such as the deployment of forces, command arrangements, strategic plans, and (most important of all) the allocation of resources invariably generated intense debate and friction. As the war progressed, the increasing use of unified theater commands, bringing ground, sea, and air forces under one umbrella organization, occasionally had the untoward side-effect of aggravating these stresses and strains. According to Sir John Slessor, whose career in the British Royal Air Force brought him into frequent contact with American officers during and after World War II, "The violence of inter-Service rivalry in the United States in those days had to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their war effort."[11]

Inter-Service collaboration before the war rested either on informal arrangements, painstakingly worked out through goodwill as the need arose, or on the modest achievements of the Joint Army and Navy Board. Established in 1903 by joint order of the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Joint Board was responsible for "conferring upon, discussing, and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters calling for the co-operation of the two Services."[12] By the eve of World War II, the Board's membership consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and Director of the Naval War Plans Division.[13]

The Joint Board's main functions were to coordinate strategic planning between the War and Navy Departments and to assist in clarifying Service roles and missions. Between 1920 and 1938, the board's major achievement was the production of the "color" plans, so called because each plan was designated by a particular color. Plan Orange was for a war with Japan.[14] But after the Munich crisis in the autumn of 1938, with tensions rising in both Europe and the Pacific, the board began to consider a wider range of contingencies involving the possibility of a multifront

war simultaneously against Germany, Italy, and Japan. The result was a new series of "Rainbow" plans. The plan in effect at the time of Pearl Harbor was Rainbow 5, which envisioned large-scale offensive operations against Germany and Italy and a strategic defensive in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers allowed transfer of sufficient assets to defeat the Japanese.[15]

To help assure effective execution of these plans, the Joint Board also sought a clearer delineation of Service roles and missions. A contentious issue in the best of times, roles and missions became all the more divisive during the interwar period owing to the limited funding available and the emergence of competing land- and sea-based military aviation systems. The board addressed these issues in a manual, *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* (*JAAN*), first published in 1927 and revised in 1935, with minor changes from year to year thereafter. The doctrine incorporated into the *JAAN* called for voluntary cooperation between Army and Navy commanders whenever practicable. Unity of command was permitted only when ordered by the President, when specifically provided for in joint agreements between the Secretaries of War and Navy, or by mutual agreement of the Army and Navy commanders on the scene. For want of a better formula, the *JAAN* simply accepted the status quo and left controversial issues like the control of airpower divided between the Services, to be exploited as their respective needs dictated and resources allowed.[16]

After 1938, with the international situation deteriorating, the Joint Board became increasingly active in conducting exploratory studies and drafting joint strategic plans (the Rainbow series) where the Army and the Navy had a common interest. For support, the board relied on part-time inter-Service advisory and planning committees. The most prominent and active were the senior Joint Planning Committee, consisting of the chiefs of the Army and Navy War Plans Divisions, which oversaw the permanent Joint Strategic Committee and various ad hoc committees assigned to specialized technical problems, and the Joint Intelligence Committee, consisting of the intelligence chiefs of the two Services, which coordinated intelligence activities. Despite its efforts, however, the Joint Board never acquired the status or authority of a military command post and remained a purely advisory organization to the military Services and, through them, to the President.[17]

While the limitations of the Joint Board system were abundantly apparent, there was little incentive prior to Pearl Harbor to make significant changes. The most ambitious reform proposal originated in the Navy General Board and called for the creation of a joint general staff headed by a single chief of staff to develop general plans for major military campaigns and to issue directives for detailed supporting plans to the War and Navy Departments. First broached in June 1941, this proposal was referred

to the Army and Navy Plans Divisions where it remained until after the Japanese attack. Public reaction to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, allegedly the result of faulty inter-Service communication, flawed intelligence, and divided command, led Admiral Stark in late January 1942, to rescue the joint general staff paper from the oblivion of the Plans Divisions and to place it on the Joint Board's agenda. Here it encountered strong opposition from Navy representatives, its erstwhile sponsors. Upon further reflection, they declared it essentially unworkable. Their main objection was that such a scheme would require a corps of staff officers, which did not exist, who were thoroughly cognizant of all aspects of both Services. Army representatives favored the plan but did not push it in light of the Navy's strong opposition. Discussion of the matter culminated at a Joint Board meeting on March 16, where the members, unable to agree, left it "open for further study."[18]

By the time the Joint Board dropped the joint general staff proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were beginning to emerge as the country's de facto high command. This process resulted not from any directive issued by the President or emergency legislation enacted by Congress, but from the paramount importance of forming common cause with the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of mutual interest and the strategic conduct of the war. As useful as the Joint Board may have been as a peacetime planning mechanism, it had limited utility in wartime and was not set up to function in a command capacity or to provide liaison with Allied planners. Though still in its infancy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff system was already exercising a pervasive influence on American military planning, thanks in large part to the easy and close collaboration that quickly developed between General Marshall and the senior British representative, Sir John Dill.[19] As the CCS system became more entrenched, it demanded a more focused American response, which only the organizational structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could provide.

The Joint Chiefs held their first formal meeting on February 9, 1942, and over the next several months gradually absorbed the Joint Board's role and functions.[20] To support their work, the Joint Chiefs established a joint staff that comprised a network of inter-Service committees corresponding to the committees making up the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Initially, only two JCS panels—the Joint Staff Planners (JPS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)—had full-time support staff, provided by remnants of the Joint Board. Most of those on the other joint committees served in a part-time capacity and appeared on the duty roster as "associate members," splitting their time between their Service responsibilities and the JCS. A few officers, designated "primary duty associate members," were considered to be full-time. Owing to incomplete records, no one knows for sure how many officers served on the Joint Staff at any one time during the war. Committees varied in size,

from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which had only three members, on up to the Joint Logistics Committee, which once had as many as two hundred associate members.[21] Money to support the Joint Chiefs' operations, including the salaries for about 50 civilian clerical helpers, came from the War and Navy Departments and an allocation from the President's contingent fund.[22]

Figure 1–1.

JCS Organization Chart, 1942



JNW Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment
JMTC Joint Military Transportation Committee
JPWC Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
JPWSC Sub-Committee of JPWC
OSS Office of Strategic Services
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

JISC Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
JSC Joint Security Control
JPS Joint Staff Planners
JUSSC Joint US Strategic Committee
JCB Joint Communications Board
MAB Munitions Assignments Board in Washington

Joint Agencies Supplying US Members for Combined Committees of Similar Purpose

Joint Agencies Having No Combined Counterpart

US Officers Functioning at Combined Level Only

Note: Only Major Organization Entities Shown.

Initially modeled on the CCS system, the JCS organization gradually departed from the CCS structure to meet the Joint Chiefs' unique requirements. During 1942 the Joint Chiefs added three subordinate components without CCS counterparts—the Joint New Weapons Committee, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The first two were part-time bodies providing advisory support to the Joint Chiefs in the areas of weapons research and wartime propaganda and subversion. The third was an operational and research agency that specialized in espionage and clandestine missions behind enemy lines. Though the OSS fell under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it

had its own director, William J. Donovan, who reported directly to the President.[23] Between 1943 and March 1945, the JCS organization expanded further to include the Army-Navy Petroleum Board and separate committees dealing with production and supply matters, postwar political-military planning, and the coordination of civil affairs in liberated and occupied areas.

Wartime membership of the Joint Chiefs was completed on July 18, 1942, when President Roosevelt appointed Admiral William D. Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. The inspiration for Leahy's appointment came from General Marshall, who suggested to the President in February 1942 that there should be a direct link between the White House and the JCS, an officer to brief the President on military matters, keep track of papers sent to the White House for approval, and transmit the President's decisions to the JCS. As the President's designated representative, he could also preside at JCS meetings in an impartial capacity.[24]

President Roosevelt initially saw no need for a Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Likewise, Admiral King, fearing adverse impact on Navy interests if another officer were interposed between himself and the President, opposed the idea. It was not until General Marshall suggested appointing Admiral Leahy, an old friend of the President's and a trusted advisor, that Roosevelt came around.[25] The Admiral, who had retired as Chief of Naval Operations in 1939, was just completing an assignment as Ambassador to Vichy, France. The appointment of another senior naval officer was perhaps the only way of gaining Admiral King's endorsement, since it balanced the JCS with two members from the War Department and two from the Navy.

A scrupulously impartial presiding officer, Leahy never became the strong representative of JCS interests that Marshall hoped he would be. In Marshall's view, Leahy limited himself too much to acting as a liaison between the JCS and the White House. Still, he played an important role in conveying JCS recommendations and in briefing the President every morning.[26] In no way was his position comparable to that later accorded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In meetings with the President or with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Leahy was rarely the JCS spokesman. That role usually fell to either General Marshall, who served as the leading voice on strategy in the European Theater, or Admiral King, who held sway over matters affecting the Pacific.

Though considerable, the Joint Chiefs' influence over wartime strategy and policy was never as great as some observers have argued. According to historian Kent Roberts Greenfield, there are more than 20 documented instances in which Roosevelt overruled the chiefs' judgment on military situations.[27] While the chiefs liked to present the President with unanimous recommendations, they were not

averse to offering a "split" position when their views differed and then thrashing out a solution at their meetings with the President. During the first year or so of the war, the President's special assistant, Harry Hopkins, also regularly attended these meetings. Rarely invited to participate were the Service Secretaries (Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox) and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, all of whom found themselves marginalized for much of the war. But despite their close association, the President and the Joint Chiefs never developed the intimate, personal rapport Churchill had with his military chiefs. Between Roosevelt and the JCS, there was little socializing. Comfortable and productive, their relationship was above all professional and businesslike.[28]

Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned as the equivalent of a national military high command, their status as such, throughout World War II, was never established in law or by Executive order. Preoccupied with waging a global war, they paid scant attention to the question of their status until mid-1943 when they briefly considered a charter defining their duties and responsibilities. The only JCS member to evince strong interest in a charter was Admiral King, who professed to be "shocked" that there was no basic definition of JCS duties and responsibilities. In the existing circumstances, he doubted whether the JCS could continue to function effectively. Admiral Leahy took exception. "The absence of any fixed charter of responsibility," he insisted, "allowed greater flexibility in the JCS organization and enabled us to extend its activities to meet the changing requirements of the war." He pointed out that, since the JCS served at the President's pleasure, they performed whatever duties he saw fit; under a charter, they would be limited to performing assigned functions. Initially, General Marshall sided with Admiral Leahy but finally became persuaded, in the interests of preserving JCS harmony, to support issuance of a charter in the form of an Executive order.[29]

The Joint Chiefs approved the text of such an order on June 15, 1943, and submitted it to the President the next day. The proposed assignment of duties was fairly routine and related to ongoing activities of advising the President, formulating military plans and strategy, and representing the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[30] Still, the overall impact would have been to place the JCS within a confined frame of reference, and arguably restrict their deliberations to a specific range of issues. Satisfied with the status quo, the President rejected putting the chiefs under written instructions. "It seems to me," he told them, "that such an order would provide no benefits and might in some way impair flexibility of operations."[31] As a result, the Joint Chiefs continued to manage their affairs throughout the war without a written definition of their

functions or authority, but with the tacit assurance that President Roosevelt fully supported their activities.

THE NORTH AFRICA DECISION AND ITS IMPACT

While the ARCADIA Conference of December 1941–January 1942 confirmed that Britain and the United States would integrate their efforts to defeat the Axis, it left many details of their collaboration unsettled. The agreed strategic concept that emerged from ARCADIA was to defeat Germany first, while remaining on the strategic defensive against Japan. Recognizing that limited resources would constrain their ability to mount offensive operations against either enemy for a year or so, the Allied leaders endorsed the idea of "tightening the ring" around Germany during this time by increasing lend-lease support to the Soviet Union, reinforcing the Middle East, and securing control of the French North African coast.[32]

To augment this broad strategy, the CCS in March 1942 adopted a working understanding of the global strategic control of military operations that divided the world into three major theaters of operations, each comparable to the relative interests of the United States and Great Britain. As a direct concern to both parties, the development and execution of strategy in the Atlantic-European area became a combined responsibility and, as such, the region most immediately relevant to the CCS. Elsewhere, the British Chiefs of Staff, working from London, would oversee strategy and operations for the Middle East and South Asia, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington would do the same for the Pacific and provide military coordination with the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in China.[33]

British and American planners agreed that the key to victory was the Soviet Union, which engaged the bulk of Germany's air and ground forces. "In the last analysis," predicted Admiral King, "Russia will do nine-tenths of the job of defeating Germany."[34] Keeping the Soviets actively and continuously engaged against Germany thus became one of the Western Allies' primary objectives, even before the United States formally entered the war.[35] Within the JCS-CCS organization that emerged following the ARCADIA Conference, developing a "second front" in Western Europe quickly emerged as a priority concern, both to relieve pressure on the Soviets and to demonstrate the Western Allies' sincerity and support. Unlike their American counterparts, however, British defense planners were in no hurry to return to the Continent. Averse to repeating the trench warfare of World War I, and with the Soviet Union under a Communist regime that Churchill despised, British planners proved far more cautious and realistic in entertaining plans for a second front.

The Joint Chiefs assumed that initially their main job would be to coordinate the mobilization and deployment of a large army to Europe to confront the Germans directly, as the United States had done in World War I. As General Marshall put it, "We should never lose sight of the eventual necessity of fighting the Germans in Germany."[36] By mid-March 1942, the consensus among the Joint Chiefs was that they should press their British allies for a buildup of forces in the United Kingdom for the earliest practicable landing on the Continent and restrict deployments in the Pacific to current commitments. But they adopted no timetable for carrying out these operations and deferred to the War Department General Staff to come up with a concrete plan for invading Europe. At this stage, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a new and novel organization, composed of officers from rival Services who were still unfamiliar with one another and uneasy about working together. As a result, the most effective and efficient strategic planning initially was that done by the Service staffs, with the Army taking the lead in shaping plans for Europe and the Navy doing the same for the Pacific.[37]

The impetus for shifting strategic planning from the Services to the corporate oversight of the JCS was President Roosevelt's decision in July 1942 to postpone a Continental invasion and, at Churchill's urging, to concentrate instead on the liberation of North Africa. Personally, Roosevelt would have preferred a second front in France, and in the spring of 1942 he had sent Marshall and Harry Hopkins to London to explore the possibility of a landing either later in the year or in 1943. Though the British initially seemed receptive to the idea and endorsed it in principle, they raised one objection after another and insisted that the time was not ripe for a landing on the Continent. Pushing an alternate strategy, they favored a combined operation in the Mediterranean.[38] Based on the production and supply data he received, Roosevelt ruefully acknowledged that the United States would not be in a position to have a "major impact" on the war much before the autumn of 1943.[39] Eager that U.S. forces should see "useful action" against the Germans before then, he became persuaded that North Africa would be more feasible than a landing in France. The upshot in November 1942 was Operation *Torch*, the first major offensive of the war involving sizable numbers of U.S. forces.[40]

While not wholly unexpected, the *Torch* decision had extensive ripple effects. The most immediate was to nullify a promise Roosevelt made to the Soviets in May 1942 to open a second front in France before the end of the year.[41] A bitter disappointment in Moscow, it was also a major rebuff for Marshall and War Department planners who had drawn up preliminary Continental invasion plans. One set, called SLEDGEHAMMER, was for a limited "beachhead" landing in 1942; another, called BOLERO-ROUNDUP, was for a full-scale assault on the northern coast of France

in mid-1943.[42] Unable to contain his disappointment, Marshall told the President that he was "particularly opposed to 'dabbling' in the Mediterranean in a wasteful logistical way."[43] In Churchill's view, however, an invasion of France was too risky and premature until the Allies brought the U-boat menace in the Atlantic under control, had greater mastery of the air, and American forces were battle-tested. In the interests of unity, Churchill continued to assure his Soviet and American allies that he supported a cross-Channel invasion of Europe in 1943. But as a practical matter, he seemed intent on using the invasion of North Africa to protect British interests east of Suez and as a stepping stone toward further Anglo-American operations in the Mediterranean that would "knock Italy out of the war."[44]

Churchill's preoccupation with North Africa and the Mediterranean reflected a time-honored British tradition that historians sometimes refer to as "war on the periphery," in contrast to the more direct American approach involving the massing of forces, large-scale assaults, and decisive battles. Limited in manpower and industrial capability, the British had historically preferred to avoid direct confrontations and had pursued strategies that exploited their enemies' weak spots, wearing them down through naval action, attrition, and dispersion of forces. In World War I, the British had departed from this strategy with disastrous results that gave them the sense of having achieved a pyrrhic victory. Committed to avoiding a repetition of the World War I experience, Churchill and his military advisors preferred to let the Soviets do most of the fighting (and dying) against Germany, while Britain and the United States concentrated on eviscerating Germany's "soft underbelly" in the Mediterranean. Although Churchill fully intended to undertake an Anglo-American invasion of Europe, he expected it to follow in due course, once Germany was worn down and on the verge of defeat.[45]

Following the planning setbacks they experienced in the summer of 1942, the Joint Chiefs sought to regroup and regain the initiative, starting with a clarification of overall strategy. Their initial response was the creation in late November 1942 of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), an elite advisory body dedicated to long-range planning. Composed of only three senior officers, the JSSC resembled a panel of "elder statesmen," representing the ground, naval, and air forces, whose job was to develop broad assessments on "the soundness of our basic strategic policy in the light of the developing situation, and on the strategy which should be adopted with respect to future operations." In theory, Service affiliations were not to interfere with or prejudice their work. The three chosen to sit on the committee—retired Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick of the Army, Major General Muir S. Fairchild of the Army Air Corps, and Vice Admiral Russell Willson—served without other duties and stayed at their posts throughout the war.[46]

Early in December 1942, the JSSC submitted its first set of recommendations, a three-and-a-half-page overview of Allied strategy for the year ahead. In surveying future options, the committee sought to keep the war focused on agreed objectives. Assuming that the first order of business remained the defeat of Germany, the JSSC recommended freezing offensive operations in the Mediterranean and transferring excess forces from North Africa to the United Kingdom as part of the buildup for an invasion of Europe in 1943. The committee also urged continuing assistance to the Soviet Union, a gradual shift from defensive to offensive operations in the Pacific and Burma, and an integrated air bombardment campaign launched from bases in England, North Africa, and the Middle East against German "production and resources."[47]

Here in a nutshell was the first joint concept for a global wartime strategy, marshaling the efforts of land, sea, and air forces toward common goals. All the same, it was a highly generalized treatment and, as such, it glossed over the impact of conflicting Service interests. At no point did it attempt to sort out the allocation of resources, by far the most controversial issue of all, other than on the basis of broad priorities. Challenging one of the paper's core assumptions, Admiral King doubted whether a landing in Europe continued to merit top priority. King maintained that, with adoption of the *Torch* decision and the diversions that operation entailed, the Anglo-American focus of the war had shifted from Europe to the Mediterranean and Pacific. King wanted U.S. plans and preparations adjusted accordingly, with more effort devoted to the Pacific and defeating the Japanese.[48] Meeting with the President on January 7, 1943, the Joint Chiefs acknowledged that they were divided along Service lines. As Marshall delicately put it, they "regarded an operation in the north [of Europe] more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one."[49] Despite nearly a year of intensified planning, the JCS had yet to achieve a working consensus on overall strategic objectives.

THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE AND JCS REORGANIZATION

Faced with indecision among his military advisors, Roosevelt gravitated to the British, who had worked out definite plans and knew precisely what they wanted to accomplish. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, he gave in to Churchill's insistence that the Mediterranean be accorded "prime place" and that a move against Sicily (Operation *Husky*) should follow promptly upon the successful completion of Operation *Torch* in North Africa.[50] To placate the Americans, the British agreed to establish a military planning cell in London to begin preliminary preparations for

a cross-Channel attack. But with attention and resources centered on the Mediterranean, a Continental invasion was now unlikely to materialize before 1944. Knowing that a further postponement would not go down well in Moscow, Roosevelt proposed—and Churchill grudgingly agreed—that the United States and Britain issue a combined public declaration of their intent to settle for nothing less than "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers.[51]

A further result of the Casablanca Conference—one with significant but unintended consequences for the future of the Joint Chiefs—was the endorsement of an intensive combined bombing campaign against Germany. This decision fell in line with the recent recommendations of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and was widely regarded as an indispensable preliminary to a successful invasion of France. Under the agreed directive, however, first priority was not the destruction of the enemy's military-industrial complex, as some air power enthusiasts had advocated, but the suppression of the German submarine threat, which was taking a horrific toll on Allied shipping.[52] Still, American and British air strategists had long sought the opportunity to demonstrate the potential of airpower and greeted the decision as a step forward, even as they disagreed among themselves over the relative merits of daylight precision bombing (the American approach) versus nighttime area bombing (the British strategy). The impact on the JCS was more long term and subtle. Previously, as the senior Service chiefs, Marshall and King had dominated JCS deliberations. Now, with strategic bombing an accepted and integral part of wartime strategy, Arnold assumed a more prominent role of his own, becoming a true coequal to the other JCS members in both rank and stature by the war's end.[53]

For the Joint Chiefs and the aides accompanying them, the Casablanca Conference was, above all, an educational experience that none wanted to repeat. Traveling light, the JCS had kept their party small and had arrived with limited backup materials. In contrast, the British chiefs had brought a very complete staff and reams of plans and position papers. Admiral King found that whenever the CCS met and he or one of his JCS colleagues brought up a subject, the British invariably had a paper ready.[54] Brigadier General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the Army's chief planner, had a similar experience. At each and every turn he found the British better prepared and able to outmaneuver the Americans with superior staff work. "We came, we listened and we were conquered," Wedemeyer told a colleague. "They had us on the defensive practically all the time."[55]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff returned from the Casablanca Conference with less to show for their efforts than they hoped and determined to apply the lessons they learned there. In practice, that meant never again entering an international conference so ill-prepared or understaffed. To strengthen the JCS position, General

Marshall arranged for Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Army Chief of Staff, to oversee a reorganization of the joint committee system, with special attention to developing more effective joint-planning mechanisms. The main bottleneck was in the Joint Staff Planners, a five-member committee that had fallen behind in its assigned task of providing timely, detailed studies on deployment and future operations. The new system, introduced gradually during the spring of 1943, reduced the range and number of issues coming before the Joint Staff Planners and transferred logistical matters to the Joint Administrative Committee, later renamed the Joint Logistics Committee.[56]

Under McNarney's reorganization, nearly all the detailed planning functions previously assigned to the Joint Staff Planners became the responsibility of a new body, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), which functioned as a JPS working subcommittee. Thenceforth, the JPS operated in more of an oversight capacity, reviewing, amending, and passing along the recommendations they received from the Joint War Plans Committee. The JWPC drew its membership from the staffs of the chiefs of planning for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Staff. Under them was an inter-Service "planning team" of approximately 15 officers who served full time without other assigned duties. The directive setting up the JWPC reminded those assigned to it that they were now part of a joint organization and to conduct themselves accordingly by going about their work and presenting their views "regardless of rank or service."[57]

The first test of these new arrangements came at the TRIDENT Conference, held in Washington in May 1943 to develop plans and strategy for operations after the invasion of Sicily during the coming summer. By then, King had grudgingly resigned himself to the inevitability of a cross-Channel invasion and agreed with Marshall that further operations in the Mediterranean should be curbed. King viewed the British preoccupation there as a growing liability that had the potential of preventing the Navy from stepping up the war against Japan. Based on naval production figures, King estimated that by the end of 1943, the Navy would begin to enjoy a significant numerical superiority over the Japanese in aircraft carriers and other key combatants. To take advantage of that situation, the CNO proposed a major offensive in the Central Pacific and secured JCS endorsement just before the TRIDENT Conference began. But with the British dithering in the Mediterranean and a firm decision on the second front issue still pending, King could easily find his strategic initiative jeopardized.[58]

At TRIDENT, for the first time in the war, the Joint Chiefs obtained the use of procedures that worked to their advantage. Namely, they insisted on an agenda and some of the papers developed by the Joint War Plans Committee in lieu of those offered by the British, who had controlled the "paper trail" at Casablanca.[59] As often

as possible during TRIDENT, King tried to shift the discussion to the Pacific. But the dominating topic was the choice between continuing operations in the Mediterranean or opening a second front in northern France. With President Roosevelt's concurrence and with Marshall doing most of the talking, the Joint Chiefs pressed the British for a commitment to a cross-Channel attack no later than the spring of 1944. The deliberations were brisk and occasionally involved what historian Mark A. Stoler describes as "some private and very direct exchanges." Six months earlier British views would probably have prevailed. But with improved staff support behind them, the JCS were now more than able to hold their own.[60]

A crucial factor in the Joint Chiefs' effectiveness was a carefully researched feasibility study by the JWPC showing that there would be enough landing craft to lift five divisions simultaneously (three in assault and two in backup), making the cross-Channel operation feasible.[61] Forced to concede the point, the British agreed to begin moving troops (seven divisions initially) from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. While accepting a tentative target date of May 1, 1944, for the invasion, the British sidestepped a full commitment by insisting on further study. The JCS also wanted to limit additional operations in the Mediterranean to air and sea attacks. But out of the ensuing give-and-take, the British prevailed in obtaining an extension of currently planned operations against Sicily onto the Italian mainland, in Churchill's words, "to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be best."[62]

A significant improvement over the Joint Chiefs' previous performance, TRIDENT demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of Joint Staff work over reliance on separate and often uncoordinated Service inputs. From then on, preparations for inter-Allied conferences became increasingly centralized around the Joint Staff, with the Joint War Plans Committee the focal point for the development of the necessary planning papers and inter-Service coordination.[63] The emerging dominance of the JCS system was largely the product of necessity and rested on a growing recognition as the war progressed that at the high command level as well as in the field, joint collaboration was more successful than each Service operating on its own.

PREPARING FOR *OVERLORD*

Even though the Joint Chiefs secured provisional agreement at the TRIDENT Conference to begin preparations for an invasion of France, it remained to be seen whether the British would live up to their promise. Reports from London indicated that Churchill was "rather apathetic and somewhat apprehensive" about a firm commitment to invade Europe and that he would press next for an invasion of Italy, followed by operations against the Balkans.[64] Even though a campaign on the

Italian mainland would delay moving troops and materiel to England for the invasion, Churchill had made a convincing argument that Italy would fall quickly and not pose much of a diversion. With U.S. and British forces currently concentrated in Sicily and North Africa, the JCS acknowledged that it made sense to take advantage of the opportunity before moving forces en masse to England. Still, they were adamant that the operation be limited and not go beyond Rome, lest it jeopardize plans for the invasion of northern France.[65]

At the first Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirmed their intention to attack Italy and attempted to reconcile continuing differences over a landing on the northern French coast, now code-named Operation *Overlord*. Despite pledges made at the TRIDENT Conference, Churchill and the British chiefs procrastinated, prompting several heated exchanges and some "very undiplomatic language" by Admiral King, who considered the British to be acting in bad faith.[66] At one point the CCS cleared the room of all subordinates and continued the discussion off the record. The sense of trust and partnership appeared to be eroding on both sides. While professing their commitment to *Overlord*, the British objected to an American proposal to give the invasion of France "overriding priority" and wanted to delay the repositioning of troops as agreed at TRIDENT so campaigns in the Mediterranean could proceed without serious disruption. Working a compromise, the Combined Chiefs agreed to make *Overlord* the "primary" Anglo-American objective in 1944, but couched the decision in ambiguous language that left open the possibility of further operations in the Mediterranean.[67] Once back in London, Churchill assured the War Cabinet that the QUADRANT agreement on *Overlord* notwithstanding, he would continue to insist on "nourishing the battle" in Italy as long as he remained in office.[68]

At that stage in the war, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff still viewed themselves as the "predominant partner" in the Western alliance. Yet it was a role they were less equipped to play with each passing day. By mid-1943, with the mobilization and stepped-up industrial production initiated since 1940 beginning to bear fruit, the United States was steadily overtaking Britain in manpower and materiel to become the preeminent military power within the Western alliance. One consequence was to give the U.S. chiefs a larger voice and stronger leverage within the CCS system, much to the consternation of the British.[69] Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as evidenced by the discussions at TRIDENT and QUADRANT, were becoming more and more confrontational. Clearly frustrated, Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, lamented that he and his British colleagues were no longer able "to swing those American Chiefs of Staff and make them see daylight."[70]

With tensions mounting between the American and British military chiefs over *Overlord*, a showdown was only a matter of time. It finally came at the Tehran Conference in late November 1943, the first "Big Three" summit of the war. During the trip over aboard the battleship *Iowa*, the Joint Chiefs had the opportunity to discuss among themselves and with the President the issues they should raise and the approach they should take, so when the conference got down to business, the American position was unambiguous. Stopping in Cairo to meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese leader, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff took time out to review the status of planning for the invasion of France. Though Churchill again paid lip service to *Overlord*, calling it "top of the bill," he also outlined his vision for expanding military operations into northern Italy, Rhodes, and the Balkans. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs, feeling that now was not the time to debate these issues, simply turned a collective deaf ear.[71]

At Tehran, with the Soviets present, the Joint Chiefs left no doubt that launching *Overlord* was their first concern, then sat back while the senior Soviet military representative, Marshal Klementy Voroshiloff, interrogated Brooke and his British colleagues on why they wanted to devote precious time and resources on "auxiliary operations" in the Mediterranean.[72] In the plenary sessions with Roosevelt and Soviet leader Marshal Josef Stalin, Churchill fell under intense pressure to shelve his plans for the Mediterranean and to throw unequivocal support behind the invasion. To improve the prospects of success, Stalin offered to launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front in conjunction with the landings in France. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered, Churchill grudgingly acknowledged that it was "the stern duty" of his country to proceed with the invasion. At long last, the British commitment to *Overlord* had become irrevocable. Though the JCS were elated at the outcome, the British chiefs were visibly distraught and immediately began picking away at the invasion plan's details as if they could make it disappear or change the decision.[73]

Confirmation that *Overlord* would go forward signaled a major turning point in the war. The beginning of the end in the West for Hitler's Germany, it also affirmed the emergence of the United States as leader of the Western coalition, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly ensconced as the senior military partners. Even the supreme commander of the operation was to be an American. Though General Marshall had wanted the job, it went instead to a former subordinate and protégé, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who presided over what became one of the most truly integrated and successful international command structures in history. All the same, with the United States contributing the larger share of the manpower and much, if not most, of the materiel to the operation, British involvement took on a diminished appearance. Except for a brief gathering in London in early June 1944

timed roughly to coincide with the D-Day invasion, the JCS had little need for further full-dress meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In fact, they did not see their British counterparts again until, at Churchill's insistence, they reassembled at a second Quebec Conference in September 1944. A year later, with the war over, the CCS quietly became for the most part inactive. Though it met occasionally over the next few years, its postwar contributions were never enough to make much difference, and on October 14, 1949, by mutual agreement, it was finally dissolved.[74]

The decision to proceed with *Overlord*, giving it priority over all other Anglo-American operations against Germany, marked the culmination of grand strategic planning in the European theater. Once the troops landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944, it was up to Eisenhower and his British deputy, General Bernard Law Montgomery, and their generals to wage the battles that would bring victory in the West. Had it not been for the JCS and their determination to see the matter through, the invasion might have been postponed indefinitely, and the results of the war could have been quite different. In a very real sense, the Tehran Conference and the *Overlord* decision marked the Joint Chiefs' coming of age as a mature and reliable organization. Out of that experience emerged a decidedly improved and more effective planning system within the JCS organization and a better appreciation among the chiefs themselves of what they could accomplish by working together. A turning point in the history of World War II, the *Overlord* decision was thus also a major milestone in the progress and maturity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WARTIME COLLABORATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

In contrast to the many contacts and close collaboration the Joint Chiefs enjoyed with their British counterparts through the Combined Chiefs of Staff system, their access to the Soviet high command remained limited throughout World War II. The "Grand Alliance," as Churchill called it, brought together countries—the United States and Great Britain, on the one hand, the Soviet Union, on the other—which, until recently, had viewed one another practically as enemies. Divided prior to the war by politics and ideology, they found it expedient in wartime to concert their efforts toward a common objective—the defeat of Nazi Germany—and little else. While idealists like Roosevelt hoped a new postwar relationship would emerge from the experience, promoting peaceful coexistence between capitalist and Communist systems, realists like Churchill remained skeptical. All agreed that it was a unique and uneasy partnership that was difficult to manage.

The bond holding the Grand Alliance together was, from its inception, the unique relationship among its "Big Three" leaders—Roosevelt, Churchill, and

Stalin—who remained in regular direct contact throughout the war. As a rule, Stalin managed high-level contacts himself and discouraged his generals from becoming overly friendly with their Western counterparts. Churchill followed a similar practice. While professing friendship and cooperation, he showed little inclination to share military information with the Soviets or to take them into his confidence. Although Roosevelt was more forthcoming, he too recognized that, at bottom, the Grand Alliance was a marriage of convenience and declined to bring Stalin in on the biggest secret of the war—that the United States was building an atomic bomb—perhaps because he knew that Soviet espionage agents had passed that information along to Moscow sometime in 1943.[75]

Given the ground rules that tacitly governed the Grand Alliance, East-West military collaboration followed a loose and haphazard course. Though they tried from time to time, JCS planners could find little common ground for creating anything comparable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to help coordinate East-West military operations.[76] Occasionally, they floated proposals to exchange observers at the field command headquarters level. But there was not much interest from the British and even less from the Soviets.[77] The collaboration that developed derived either from ad hoc arrangements or initiatives mounted through the military missions assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow and tended to be more concerned with logistical matters and lend-lease aid than with coordinating the conduct of the war.

Despite the difficulties inherent in dealing with the Soviets, Roosevelt was determined to demonstrate American goodwill and solidarity of purpose. Brushing aside Churchill's penchant for caution, he exhorted the Joint Chiefs to explore ways of helping the Soviets, even if it meant diverting scarce war resources from other urgent tasks. Yet whatever the JCS could do was limited. As a practical matter, the Eastern Front was too distant and remote for most of the war for them to contemplate stationing substantial military forces there. Nor was it clear whether U.S. forces would have been welcome, given Stalin's aversion to foreign influences.[78] Small deployments of aircraft were another matter, however, and from mid-1942 on, the JCS found themselves peppered with proposals from various sources, including the White House, to provide the Soviets with supply planes and to establish an Anglo-American combat air force in the Caucasus. At the time, German forces had resumed the offensive and for a while there was a glimmer of interest from Stalin. But as the Soviet military position improved, Stalin's enthusiasm waned and the project died.[79]

While the Western powers poured large quantities of material assistance into the Soviet Union, Stalin insisted that the best help they could provide was opening

a second front in Western Europe to draw off some of the pressure on the Red army in the East. Churchill maintained that, by concentrating on North Africa, Italy, and the Mediterranean, the Western Allies were already accomplishing much the same thing. Unconvinced, the JCS regarded these operations as sideshows that were perhaps annoying to the Germans but a drain on Allied resources and indecisive by nature. Moreover, the longer the Allies delayed a landing in France, the more opportunity it gave the advancing Russian forces to expand and consolidate Moscow's political influence across Europe.[80]

After the QUADRANT Conference of August 1943, with the prospects for *Overlord* on the rise, the JCS redoubled their efforts to improve contacts and collaboration with the Soviet high command, initially to enlist their promised assistance in diverting German units away from the Normandy invasion area and eventually to prod them into the war against Japan. With these objectives in mind, they sought to upgrade their liaison capabilities with the Soviets and in the fall of 1943 named Major General John R. Deane to head a new joint American military mission in Moscow, reporting directly to the JCS.[81] At the same time, President Roosevelt named W. Averell Harriman, who had been instrumental in setting up the lend-lease program, to replace the ineffectual Admiral William H. Standley as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Until recently the U.S. secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Deane was familiar with the current state of thinking in Washington and the status of Allied war plans. At the time he arrived, he recalled, collaboration with the Soviets was "a virgin field" and military coordination "almost nonexistent."[82] Though he found the Soviets to be guarded in their dealings with Westerners, he saw no reason to doubt their commitment to the war and "felt certain" they would enter the conflict against Japan once Germany was defeated.[83]

During the year and a half he spent in Moscow, Deane experienced one frustration after another and kept the Joint Chiefs up to date on every agonizing detail. Though there were a few modest successes, a shuttle bombing agreement of questionable military value foremost among them, he never detected any serious interest on the Soviets' part in establishing a full military dialogue or partnership. Indeed, as the war progressed and as victory over the Germans became more certain, Deane noticed a progressive falling off of Soviet cooperation—so much so that by December 1944 he was expressing serious apprehension over the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Everyone will agree on the importance of collaboration with Russia," Deane told Marshall. "It won't be worth a hoot, however, unless it is based on mutual respect and made to work both ways."[84] Impressed by Deane's sobering assessments, Marshall passed them along to the White House without any discernible effect.[85]

Deane's sentiments reflected a growing sense of unease about the Soviets that permeated JCS deliberations from late 1943 on. The Joint Chiefs got their first close-up look at Stalin and his generals at the Big Three Tehran Conference in November 1943 and came away with mixed impressions. Though judged to be tough-minded and determined, the Soviet generals also appalled members of the JCS with their superficial appreciation of modern military science, most notably their lack of understanding of the difficulties of amphibious operations. As far as Stalin and his generals were concerned, a cross-Channel attack was like fording a river.[86] But with a war yet to be won and the Joint Chiefs eager to nail down a Soviet commitment to join the fight against Japan, they were not inclined to judge the Soviets too harshly.[87]

This view began to change during the early part of 1944, as rumors spread that the Soviets, now on the verge of expelling German troops from their territory, might seek a separate peace. Also around the same time, the JCS received a barrage of reports from Harriman and Deane in Moscow and OSS sources, warning of waning Soviet interest in military collaboration with the West owing to diplomatic friction over the political makeup of Eastern Europe after the war.[88] With *Overlord* only a few months away, the chiefs' concern was considerable, to say the least. About the only immediate source of leverage was to curb shipments under the lend-lease program, which General Marshall described as "our trump card . . . to keep the Soviets on the offensive in connection with the second front."[89] President Roosevelt, however, strongly opposed any avoidable disruptions in assistance, lest they adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations or the conduct of the war. In September 1944, with *Overlord* a fait accompli, he vetoed any immediate changes in the program.[90]

The Joint Chiefs adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward their Soviet allies for the duration of the war in Europe. By the time of the Yalta Summit Conference in February 1945, they had come to the conclusion, as General Marshall put it, that closer liaison with the Soviet general staff would be "highly desirable" but not absolutely essential.[91] Where the JCS still wanted the Soviets engaged was in Manchuria to keep the Japanese Kwantung army there from reinforcing the home islands against a U.S.-led invasion.[92] Accordingly, they urged President Roosevelt to use his influence with Stalin to overcome what they characterized as Soviet "administrative delays" that were thwarting the implementation of "broad decisions" about U.S.-Soviet collaboration.[93] But with U.S. forces now moving relentlessly across the Pacific, JCS planners were increasingly skeptical whether access to Soviet air and naval bases in Siberia—a requirement once thought to be crucial to an invasion of the Japanese home islands—would make any difference.

The diminished need for Soviet bases and other support was soon reflected in President Harry S. Truman's "get tough" approach toward the Soviets following Roosevelt's death in April 1945. With a U.S. victory in the Pacific now more probable than ever, Truman was less forbearing than Roosevelt in putting pressure on Moscow to live up to its wartime political agreements facilitating free elections in Eastern Europe.[94] Worried that the new President might go too far, Leahy and Marshall reminded him that the wartime agreements Roosevelt had reached were subject to interpretation and that JCS planning still assumed Soviet participation in the war against Japan. With these caveats before him, Truman soon moderated his criticism of the Soviets. Yet owing to the sharp tone and substance of some of his complaints about Soviet behavior, the wartime alliance showed clear signs of breaking down.[95]

That closer wartime cooperation and collaboration between the Joint Chiefs and the Soviet high command could have helped to avoid this outcome is highly unlikely. Stalin's main concerns throughout the war in Europe were to eradicate the threat posed by Nazi Germany and to solidify as much of his control as possible over Eastern Europe, making it in effect a cordon sanitaire between the Soviet Union and the West. With these objectives in mind, the level of cooperation that Stalin sought (and was prepared to accept) was always more specific than general and invariably revolved around the issues of additional aid and the opening of a second front in France. While the JCS did what they could to promote better Soviet-American relations, their options were limited and became even more so as the war progressed. Eventually, the JCS came to see cooperation and collaboration with Moscow as a one-way street. As a rule, General Marshall recalled, the Soviets were "delicate . . . jealous, and . . . very, very hard to preserve a coordinated association with."[96] Regarded by Churchill and others as a marriage of convenience to begin with, the Grand Alliance was probably lucky that it lasted as long as it did and certainly was not destined to survive much beyond the end of the war.

NOTES

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2 Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 686–687.

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Mission. He died in November 1944 and was succeeded by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

4 Quoted in Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941–1945* (New York: Harper, 2009), 71.

5 Memo by Combined Chiefs of Staff, January 14, 1942, "Post-Arcadia Collaboration," ABC-4/CS4, *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2003, on CD-ROM). (Hereafter cited as *World War II Conference Papers*); Jackson and Bramall, 224; "Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) committee," in I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot, eds., *The Oxford Companion to World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 254.

6 Admiral King turned down a suggestion to have the Navy's senior aviation officer, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, join the group. King believed Towers' presence was unnecessary since naval air units were fully integrated into the operating fleets King commanded.

7 Jeffrey G. Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 4, 13–17.

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10 See Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 105–106.

11 John Slessor, *The Central Blue: The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF* (New York: Praeger, 1957), 494.

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14 See Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); and Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

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17 Cline, 44–47; Davis, I, 27–59.

18 Davis, I, 239–252.

19 Roberts, 76–78.

20 JCS Minutes, 1st Meeting, February 9, 1942, RG 218, CCS 334 (2-9-42); Davis, I, 229.

21 Davis, II, 506–08.

22 Memo, McFarland to King, January 4, 1945, "H.R. 5604, To Provide for the Permanent Establishment of the JCS and Joint Secretariat," CCS 334 (12-80-44).

23 Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981), 117–153, 427–428.

24 Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 298–301.

25 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), 414.

26 Forrest C. Pogue, "The Wartime Chiefs of Staff and the President," in Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek, eds., *Soldiers and Statesmen* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1973), 71.

27 Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration* (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 1982 reprint), 51–52.

28 Pogue, "Wartime Chiefs," 72–73. Marshall recalled that the first time he visited Hyde Park, NY, Roosevelt's home, was for the President's funeral in April 1945.

29 William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 102; Davis, II, 439–445.

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31 Letter, FDR to Leahy, July 16, 1943, JCS 415.

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33 Cline, 101–102.

34 Quoted in Larrabee, 187.

35 See Mark A. Stoler, *The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 14–22.

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45 See Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939–1945," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 677–702; and Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 141.

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63 Cline, 222.

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87 Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 311–313.

88 Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 182–183.

89 Memo, Marshall to Roosevelt, March 31, 1944, quoted in Matloff, *Strategic Planning, 1943–44*, 497.

90 Letter, Roosevelt to Marshall, September 9, 1944, JCS 771/8.

91 Argonaut Conference, Minutes of Meeting Held in the President's Sun Room, Livadia Palace, February 4, 1945, box 29, Map Room File, Roosevelt Library.

92 Matloff, *Strategic Planning, 1943–44*, 500–501.

93 Memo, JCS to President Roosevelt, January 23, 1945, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers—the Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 396–400.

94 John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 198–243.

95 Pogue, 578–581; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 237–238.

96 Marshall interview, quoted in Pogue, 574.