Luigi Laino 
PhD in Philosophy, Teaching Assistant.
The University of Naples Federico II,
Department of Humanistic Studies.
40 Сorso Umberto I, Naples, 80138, Italy;
e-mail: llain031@gmail.com

In the present article the author will deal with an inquiry of the ontological structure of quantum mechanics, and he will analyze the evolution of the heno-ontological equation (the identity of being one and of being) in the shape of the new arrangement prepared by the orthodox interpretation of the theory. Hence the article will particularly focus on the Copenhagen interpretation and the lack of intuition [Anschaulichkeit] in the representation of physical external objects; as far as the latter topic is concerned, the author will also consider the classic representation of Heisenberg’s philosophy given by Heelan. The author will then show the impossibility of holding the old physical body-representation which worked for classical mechanics as well, because quantum mechanics denies an absolute localizability of physical entities. A non-defective determination of localizability was in fact the very postulate which lays at the basis of the heno-ontological equation as Aristotle had envisaged it: what is not localizable, is not one being. It also has to be considered a specific lack as regards the chronological permanence of the identity of the quantum object, which appears to be constantly modified by its interaction with the devices and with other particles. Accordingly, the author will explain the peculiar definition of physical entity in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as a non-substantial entity, as a non-body, considering the argument that henceforth the actual substance, in physics, will be only the whole totality. Arguing about the latter point, the author will develop a definition of individuality which could not be extraneous to the most recent interpretations of quantum mechanics. He will indeed aim for a non strictly ontological definition of individuality, if one has to figure out the individuum as a body of daily experience. Rather than a body, the quantum individuum is almost a being whose ontological content is only relative to the transformations of a primitive context: this implies that his ontological charge cannot be considered permanent. From this point of view, one can argue that quantum mechanics is very close to the old representation of nature as being by the ancient Greek physicists, which tended to distinguish between the ontological definition of individual entities and the unity of being as a whole. Hence the article will show, through Cassirer’s review, how it is possible to depict a new setting for the relationship between one and being, as well as trying to shed some light on the basic assumptions of the ontology of Copenhagen interpretation and of modern quantum mechanics.