ÈÍÒÅËÐÎÑ > Vol. 5, No 1. 2014 > The Organized Crime - Peace Operations Nexus

Wibke Hansen
The Organized Crime - Peace Operations Nexus


10 îêòÿáðÿ 2014

Since the al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001, and along with the debate about transnational security threats emanating from fragile states, transnational organized crime has entered the international security policy agenda. Various national and international security policy documents – such as the U.S. National Security Strategy (2002), the European Security Strategy (2003), the UN’s report on “Threats Challenges and Change” (2004), and NATO’s new strategic concept (2010) subsequently emphasized the threat posed by organized crime (OC). Many of these documents point to the linkages between organized crime and fragile states. The UN’s “Threats, Challenges and Change” highlighted in particular the linkages between organized crime and conflict noting that, “responses to organized crime during and after conflict have been decentralized and fragmented.” More recently, the impact of organized crime on peace, security and stability has received increasing attention in the Security Council. In 2010, the Council considered transnational organized crime, piracy and trafficking in drugs and human beings as “evolving challenges and threats to international peace and security.” On numerous occasions, the Council has voiced concern about emerging linkages between terrorism and organized crime. In a 2012 Presidential Statement it noted that transnational organized crime “negatively impact[s] the consolidation of peace in countries emerging from conflict.” The Council furthermore highlighted the challenges that organized crime – whether drug trafficking, illegal resource exploitation or piracy – poses in a number of countries currently supported by peace operations, including Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and the sub-region, as well as, more recently, Mali. In light of this increased attention – most notably with regard to the linkages between crime and fragility as well as crime and conflict – it is astonishing that there has not yet been a commensurate debate on the implications of organized crime for stabilization (peace-building and state-building) processes and indeed peace operations, one of the international community’s primary tools for stabilizing fragile or conflict-ridden states. Serious research on the subject matter is only just beginning.


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