I have thought a great deal about my experiences in Iraq. I believe that some of the insights that I developed during that time can benefit future military leaders as they are thrust into senior leadership positions in new and different missions in this era of persistent conflict. As always, some lessons are new; others are old ones relearned. I began to share these insights with the Army general officer corps and joint flag officers attending CAPSTONE shortly after I assumed the position of Army chief of staff.

As I returned to Iraq at the end of June, I weighed our challenges and opportunities. After two governments in 2 years and a protracted government formation period for the third, we finally had an Iraqi constitution and a permanent and democratically elected Iraqi government based on that constitution. It was, at least nominally, a government of national unity, and it would need some time to establish itself, particularly with the sectarian tensions that it faced in the aftermath of the Samarra attacks. We continued to make progress with the ISF. The Iraqi army had held together fairly well through the sectarian violence, although we were starting to see the impact of political influence—political leaders threatening military leaders who took action against members of their factions—on the willingness of the army to take operational risks. The national police’s effectiveness had been limited by absenteeism, lack of leadership, and, in some cases, direct involvement in sectarian violence. They would have to be completely reorganized to be effective. The local police were a mixed bag and still lagged the army in development. The initial operation that we mounted in Baghdad with the new government, Operation Together Forward, had, from its mid-June start, reduced violence in general and in the five areas of Baghdad where the sectarian violence was the worst. Unfortunately, al Qaeda had lashed out in late June with a series of suicide attacks that would continue into July, driving retaliatory attacks by Shia death squads that further inflamed the situation. The combination of the two—suicide attacks and death squad executions—had led to a spike in violence against civilians that we would have to contain. The situation was further complicated by continuing evidence of Iranian training and equipment support to Shia militias.

We entered 2006 knowing that it was going to be a year of political transition as the Iraqis formed and seated a permanent government and this new government began to govern. We remained hopeful that we could continue to make progress during this period; however, based on our previous experience with Iraqi government transitions, we knew it was going to be hard work. That was the message that I carried to Washington shortly after the first of the year. I spent Christmas in Iraq visiting and congratulating soldiers on their accomplishments in 2005, and then departed for consultations in Washington.

I reported that, in general, we were pleased with the accomplishments of the last 18 months, but the elections had not yet produced the representative government that was key to long-term success. Ambassador Khalilzad felt that the elections had a polarizing effect in the country. The Sunni population felt disenfranchised as a result of the constitutional referendum and the election outcome, and their perception of increased Iranian influence on what was, almost certainly, to be a government formed by largely Shia political parties compounded these feelings—and fed the insurgency. I cautioned not to expect any immediate positive impacts on the security situation and warned that political wrangling over amending the constitution and the provincial elections could even push things in a more negative direction.