Across the decades of the Cold War, Beijing faced dire threats to its security, first from the United States, then from the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) together, and finally from the Soviet Union alone. In addition, the People’s Republic inherited boundaries from the Republic of China regime that it defeated on the Chinese mainland in 1949. Those boundaries derived from the creation of national boundaries out of what before 1911 had been the frontiers of an empire—the Manchu Qing empire, which established hegemony over a vast stretch of East and Central Asia in the 18th century that included China itself. As such, the PRC inherited a roster of maritime territorial disputes with many of its neighbors. In that respect, Beijing shares similar security concerns with other nation-states that have emerged out of the international relations of empires in modern times, such as India and Indonesia.

Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military force in pursuit of its national interests in security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing has deployed a calculus of threat and retaliation signals, first to deter an adversary from taking actions contrary to Beijing’s interests by threatening use of Chinese military force, and then, once deterrence has failed, to explain and justify Beijing’s resort to military force. Beijing has carefully sustained this calibrated hierarchy of official protests, authoritative press comment, and leadership statements despite the sweeping changes in the PRC’s place in the international order, the proliferation of foreign policy instruments at its disposal, and the dramatic evolution in the Chinese media over the decades.

Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military force in defense of China’s security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing implemented a calculus of threat and retaliation signals intended first to deter an adversary from taking actions contrary to Chinese interests by threatening the use of military force and, if deterrence failed, to explain and justify Beijing’s resort to military force. This deterrence calculus was applied in each of the major instances in which Beijing has resorted to military force—in Korea in 1950, in the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1961–1962, in the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1968–1969, and in China’s attack on northern Vietnam in 1979. It was also applied in instances in which Beijing’s effort at deterrence apparently succeeded and China ultimately stopped short of using military force. Examples include China’s responses to the intensifying American combat effort in Vietnam in 1965–1968 and to the 1991 debates in Taipei about delimiting the Republic of China’s sovereignty claims