Being a world leader rests on international assumptions that may be jeopardized by harsh budgets. Capabilities could disappear that friends and enemies have relied on as indications of what American behavior can be counted on. While adjustments are called for, presence must have sufficient strength to retain validity. Our force must be capable across a range of "small-footprint" efforts, and larger but shorter ones; it must also be capable of timely consolidation to confront the largest threats. But the proven model of remaining flexible and drawing on partner capabilities, which the Army will continue to pursue, will, for instance, stress engaging in the entire "cooperate-compete" relationship with China rather than only challenging Beijing militarily, an applicable approach across the globe.

The Nation's defense and security strategies seek to deter enemies, yet DOD does not define precisely what or who is to be deterred or the cost that can be met to achieve it. Accordingly, force-sizing draws on assumptions, operational concepts, and programmatic priorities that may or may not relate directly to articulate defense policies regarding tangible threats. For instance, there is overinvestment in offensive capabilities to defeat China in Air-Sea Battle when a defensive posture and A2/AD efforts with partners would be more cost-effective; simultaneously, there is underinvestment in combined arms measures for confronting such regional powers as North Korea and Syria and securing WMD in failed or failing states. DOD must array its resources against clearly identified threats and tasks.

Correctly developing the future force requires a sound understanding of how conflicts occur and are conducted under shifting international conditions and the relationship between military power and fiscal resources as the Nation pursues its security and other interests. Five specific contexts are presented as initial guides in future-force decisionmaking: contesting ideological conflict over global networks, defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities, ensuring access to and protection of the global commons, protecting forward bases and partners or controlling key terrain, and stabilizing or isolating failed and failing states and ungoverned spaces. Using these considerations as a beginning will help ensure that our choices are both deliberate and optimal and will hold essential adversary resources and values at risk.