Since the advent of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the requirements for and approaches to joint training and education have morphed across the joint learning continuum. Goldwater- Nichols was hailed as “one of the landmark laws in American history” by then-Congressman Les Aspin. The act aimed to enhance joint operational effectiveness and spawned standards for joint officer management, joint doctrine, and joint training and education policies.

The substantial increase in the employment of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other arenas has intensified the debate about the moral and legal nature of the targeted killing of people who are said to be civilians. As I see it, the United States and its allies can make a strong case that the main source of the problem is those who abuse their civilian status to attack truly innocent civilians and to prevent our military and other security forces from discharging their duties.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) have routinely exercised authority to reorganize and break apart attached forces under the guise of operational control (OPCON). This exercise has become common practice because of misinterpretations of joint doctrine. Specifically, many officers believe that the authority to direct the internal organization of an attached force is contained within the jointly defined authorities of operational control. This belief is fallacious. Joint doctrine does not delineate the authority to internally organize an attached command or force as an authority inherent to OPCON.