When in human history has an armed force ever enjoyed the quality of logistical support that our forces in Iraq do today? The U.S. military possesses the capacity, budget, organization, and doctrine to keep personnel in the field well stocked with food, water, ammunition, vehicle parts, and anything else they need to accomplish their mission. Although our processes are not perfect, most would agree that our efforts to supply our fielded forces deserve high praise, especially when comparing the current system either to foreign armed forces' capabilities or to our own historical record.

On February 4, 2010, nearly 2 weeks after the Obama administration unveiled a $6.4 billion arms deal with Taiwan, a Chinese article posted on an online Chinese Communist Party–connected daily newspaper site, as well as on many Chinese blogs and military news sources, suggested banning the sale of rare earth elements (REEs) to U.S. companies as retribution. There was already ample Western concern about potential diminishing access to supplies of REEs, particularly after a 2009 draft report written by China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology called for a total ban on foreign shipments of terbium, dysprosium, ytterbium, thulium, and lutetium, and a restriction of neodymium, europium, cerium, and lanthanum exports.

In June 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced the creation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), a new subunified command to be led by the director of the National Security Agency (NSA). While the press colored the announcement with Big Brother undertones and hints of civil liberties surrendered, the real story lies in the intriguing legal landscape of USCYBERCOM and what it could mean for the security, efficiency, and economy of the military's networks. The Department of Defense (DOD), the largest single consumer of Federal information technology dollars, has struggled for decades to bring a singular voice and management process to its communications infrastructure.