Ongoing engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have resurrected one of the most important and challenging questions facing political and military leaders in the United States and other nations: how to set objectives, conduct operations, and terminate wars in a manner that achieves intended political outcomes. The collective track record leaves much to be desired, and results of even the most recent conflicts would argue that we have not yet learned the necessary lessons from wars in the 20^th century to prevent making many of the same mistakes and suffering similar consequences in the 21^st century.

I think it is important to remember that the 9/11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan by al Qaeda when the Taliban controlled the bulk of the country and that the initial training of the attackers was carried out in Afghanistan in al Qaeda camps prior to them moving on to Germany and then to U.S. flight schools. And it is a vital national security interest for our country that Afghanistan not once again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda or other transnational extremists of that type.

The collection and use of lessons is neither a new phenomenon nor a new need. What is new is the quantity and velocity of current and historical lessons available to commanders and soldiers in almost real-time. Despite these recent advances, there is no indication that we have reached a plateau in our ability to collect and share lessons. The authors argue for the centrality of Lessons Learned structures and techniques for accelerating learning, knowledge and adaptation in complex operations both for civilian and military organizations. Focusing on the military environment and touching on recent civilian lessons learned efforts, the authors conduct an historical review of structures and techniques, highlighting the on-going “learning competition.”