By Stewart Patrick
Oxford University Press, 2011
352 pp., $29.95
ISBN: 978–0–19975–151–8

Imagine a debate erupting in the United States over how much the government should invest in cancer research. (Such a debate might well emerge from the budget cutting that we are going to face over the next few years.) One school of thought argues that we should continue to fund the research generously because men have about a 1 in 2 chance of developing cancer at some point in their lives, and women have a 1 in 3 chance. Impressive statistics, says the other side, but while millions may contract cancer, the actual number of cancer deaths is estimated to be less than 600,000 in 2011. Millions of Americans may suffer and we should make them comfortable, but cancer is not an existential threat to America. We need not continue funding the search for a cure.

Low per capita income is linked to economic instability and state insecurity in postconflict societies. While domestic state capacity is the long-term goal, low-income societies emerging from conflict do not have the luxury to wait. Thus, given the current limitations of state performance, the immediate security solutions for low per capita income countries need to focus on host-government reform policies and alternatives for delivering basic services, rather than long-term state capacity-building. Even with low government capacity, certain economic policies can be put in place to improve per capita income and stimulate employment creation and other public goods. Establishing incentives for practical local economic reform policies, creating an environment that supports private economic investment, and enhancing the delivery of basic social services by the host government contribute to security and stability as they also ultimately contribute to building state capacity.

The story of the Bala Morghab district of Badghis Province in 2008–2009 reveals lessons derived from the tribulations of the friction of coalition warfare at the tactical and operational levels, the gaps between policy and operations, the contradictions of winning hearts and minds, and the challenges of day-to-day survival. The overall strategy of the International Security Assistance Force was "shape, clear, hold, and build." The Bala Morghab experience demonstrates that the most critical aspect of this strategy in a counterinsurgency environment is shaping—knowing, understanding, and motivating the people who are about to be affected, coupled with promoting local ownership of the process. Not to engage with local leaders well in advance of policy implementation is a recipe for failure. Building trust among the local population in legitimate leaders will itself build capacity and minimize the influence of insurgents. Finally, half-measures of the whole-of-government approach in the absence of unity of purpose will fail. Until the coalition understands how to influence the decisive terrain in the valley, and until the Afghan government addresses the needs of the average citizen in a way that marginalizes the current powerbrokers, there will be little progress.