Lethal autonomous robots (LARs) may provide the best counter to the asymmetric threats of the future. From China’s considerable capacity for jamming and general cyber attack to swarms of Iranian patrol boats, dangers are proliferating, and LARs can operate faster than humans and achieve lethal outcomes even where there are no communications links. LARs are apt to prove attractive to a number of players, so the United States should act at once to secure a commanding capability in fully autonomous targeting. Legal concerns do not appear to be a game-ender, so operational commanders in particular should lead in harnessing this emerging technology. With appropriate control measures, these unmanned systems will be safe, effective, and legal weapons as well as force multipliers. They have already proven their value during the Global War on Terror, and all branches of the U.S. military are poised to rely on ever-more sophisticated LARs.

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is increasing its forward presence and access to the special operations forces (SOF) of allies worldwide. There is no NATO-like arrangement in the Asia-Pacific, so U.S. SOF must maintain a steady presence through a Theater Special Operations Command. Despite existing efforts, military cooperation remains a perilous venture. A combined SOF headquarters that can organize, train, equip, and perhaps deploy special operations forces to confront armed threats and provide humanitarian assistance would give Washington a sustainable forward presence and further U.S. and regional interests. Such a headquarters and training entity might eventually bring a security community resembling NATO and could work cheek by jowl with more fully developed international SOF networks to breed novel and cost-effective approaches that will leave a small footprint and conserve resources in a time when cooperation and burden-sharing are imperative.

The world first saw the power of space to transform warfare in the 1991 Gulf War. In the years since, the U.S. military has come to depend heavily on space throughout its peacetime and combat operations. Satellites acquired by the Department of Defense (DOD) principally provide protected communications; data for position and timing, terrestrial and space weather, missile launch warning and tracking, and space situational awareness; and experiments and other research and development activities. Satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance are the domain of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).