The Arctic Ocean north of Alaska has historically been guarded by ice. Recent reductions in the ice shield have opened the sea to greater access and a variety of uses that are being eyed by international players, particularly the eight Arctic nations. This geopolitical shift calls for heightened attention to U.S. military resources in Alaska. A realigned subunified command is needed that is empowered, resourced, and structured to implement and coordinate a national and DOD Arctic strategy within the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility. The existing joint headquarters in Alaska is not optimally organized to meet anticipated security needs. Conflict in the Arctic or Alaska is unlikely but not impossible, and with the suggested Alaskan Command as DOD’s primary operational-level headquarters for the Arctic, the Nation will be poised to more effectively pursue its regional interests.

For the Services’ requirements and acquisition authorities to embrace Air Sea Battle, and to define the systems and architecture that will provide “networked, integrated, attack-in-depth” capabilities and ensure the force can operate in this new environment, three main areas must be dealt with: countering the missile threat, operating in a highly contested electromagnetic environment, and providing long-range strike against time critical targets in contested battlespace. The most vital need is for OSD and the Services to immediately define and fund our network architecture and systems to enable us to fight as a truly networked force. As we develop our future systems, they must be designed with common functionality to develop an attack-in-depth capability to counter the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) threat. This is especially critical in the deep battlespace patrolled by unmanned aircraft and surrogates and calls for a flexible, hardened network enabling rapid dissemination of data and near real-time targeting.

South Korean support for reunification dwindles, especially among the young. Reasons include the sixty years since the division with the resulting weakening of family and other ties, the comparative wealth of the south, communications and transportation advances that have aligned young Koreans more with the West, North Korea’s 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, and the North’s continuing pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities in defiance of world opinion. The strongest obstacle is the fiscal cost; reunification seems to equal a future of poverty. The South’s decisionmakers must portray costs as investments and stress the eventual economic benefits. Washington should support the Lee administration’s initiatives and others of like intent and be prepared for surprise developments that could bring opportunities sooner than expected.