The Future of U.S. Landpower: Special Operations Versatility, Marine Corps Utility
Given the projected continuing need for a land force that can engage, project, and adapt, the choice should not be between counterinsurgency and conventional forces but rather should consider demographic, fiscal, and future threat projections to find a landpower paradigm that is indirect and where possible preventive. Accordingly, future landpower needs will largely be filled by special operations forces and Marine air-ground task forces that can prevent, deter, and contain threats and thus avoid deploying large forces, which must still exist but should be kept as a last resort. Versatile small forces optimally placed will demonstrate both strategic flexibility and American resolve, enabling mission accomplishment and allowing mission expansion even in the face of demographic and budget austerity
|
16 апреля 2013
From Sea Power to Cyber Power: Learning from the Past to Craft a Strategy for the Future
Much as securing vital points at sea helped maintain U.S. economic preeminence historically, choosing and focusing on electronic strategic points of convergence could cement American influence in the cyber world. Washington cannot dictate global economic policy but it can sway it. Reliance on soft power more than hard power will reduce the direct military role while elevating strategies of mutual interest and cooperation with other players. Seven strategic points are especially vital, and with emphasis on partnership with private enterprise, purposeful fiscal policy, and targeted research and development in pursuit of them, Washington can avoid ham-fisted protectionist behavior aimed at preserving the status quo and come out ahead economically and politically, simultaneously reaping the benefits of security and expansion
|
16 апреля 2013
NATO's Level of Ambition: Beyond Strategic Reach
NATO members will face hard choices about what is possible within the next half decade. Two proposals could be helpful. The Alliance-wide strategic concept needs to more fully factor in means. Should Smart Defence prove effective, it could merit a place in the published concept rather than leaving the document vague on how things are to be paid for. The other proposal is reigning in Alliance ambitions as articulated, for instance, in the Lisbon summit. Decisions must be made on how to fund expanded reach beyond NATO borders and additional missions. Economic realities must be considered and the Secretary General should include his more clearly defined Smart Defence concepts in the published NATO strategy.
|
16 апреля 2013