The joint force cannot fight and win if it is blind. In any future contingency, success rests on a few first principles: find the enemy, maintain contact, and determine his intent. Such imperatives spell out clear requirements that any reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) organization must meet to perform across the range of military operations

When the United States began its war on al Qaeda in September 2001, the objective was to destroy the group by eliminating its leadership, dislodging the group from Afghanistan, and preventing future al Qaeda terrorist operations. Americans also hoped to reduce the appeal of al Qaeda’s message, particularly among the populations the group targeted for recruitment and support. Washington viewed these goals as representing victory in the war on terror, or at least the war on al Qaeda.

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been engaged continuously in combat. As operations subside and DOD attempts to recapitalize its forces, it faces a different yet extremely critical threat: unsustainable operations and maintenance (O&M) cost growth. O&M costs are skyrocketing, reducing funding available for recapitalization. With major budget cuts looming, DOD must address the root causes of the rising costs.