The story of the Bala Morghab district of Badghis Province in 2008–2009 reveals lessons derived from the tribulations of the friction of coalition warfare at the tactical and operational levels, the gaps between policy and operations, the contradictions of winning hearts and minds, and the challenges of day-to-day survival. The overall strategy of the International Security Assistance Force was "shape, clear, hold, and build." The Bala Morghab experience demonstrates that the most critical aspect of this strategy in a counterinsurgency environment is shaping—knowing, understanding, and motivating the people who are about to be affected, coupled with promoting local ownership of the process. Not to engage with local leaders well in advance of policy implementation is a recipe for failure. Building trust among the local population in legitimate leaders will itself build capacity and minimize the influence of insurgents. Finally, half-measures of the whole-of-government approach in the absence of unity of purpose will fail. Until the coalition understands how to influence the decisive terrain in the valley, and until the Afghan government addresses the needs of the average citizen in a way that marginalizes the current powerbrokers, there will be little progress.