The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) outlines reforms to close this capacity gap. Even if implemented, QDDR reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to address the root problems of bureaucratic rivalries and strained resources or timely enough to ensure a seamless transition in Iraq. DOS and USAID must take calculated steps to address the underlying bureaucratic, corporate cultural, and structural considerations by clarifying roles and responsibilities, clearly defining the mandate, articulating a strategic framework for developing and applying capacity, and demonstrating that capacity. Furthermore, the approach to garner congressional support must be refocused, and together DOS and USAID must improve the case for the mission and the cost of maintaining a standing civilian response capability. Building a robust DOS and USAID capacity for stabilization and reconstruction ultimately will enhance both efficiency and effectiveness, as the skills required largely reside in the civilian arms of foreign affairs.