A sound military theory must draw on the history of the conduct of war in all aspects. Historical examples and lessons learned clarify or provide evidence in support of statements and theoretical constructs. But a vision of future war is needed, too. A useful theory should fully consider the effect of present and coming technologies, yet it must not rely on those exclusively. A sound theory must be general and adaptable, focusing on timeless ideas rather than fleeting ones. It should isolate war’s patterns and be clearly stated. The only test of its usefulness is its application in war. It must be altered or abandoned when it departs from reality.

The U.S. military has long used various business models in managing its bureaucracy and budget and planning its force. During the 1960s, however, the Pentagon used a business model extensively in its conduct of the war in Vietnam, ultimately leading to disaster. Despite this, since the late 1990s, the U.S. military has increasingly embraced the notion that business models can and should be applied to the conduct of war.

The commander’s intent is the key element in providing a framework for freedom to act and thereby enhance and foster initiative by subordinate commanders during the execution of their assigned missions.