Conventional wisdom holds that the most important challenge for state development is the creation of effective institutions. The major objective for external actors engaged in state-building is to enhance capacity in target states. This perspective, which tacitly takes the ideal typical Weberian state as the ultimate objective, is deeply flawed. The Weberian ideal, in which a fully autonomous state effectively governs its own territory, is unattainable for many poorly governed or failed states. Governance may improve, but it will be problematic. The central state may not be able to provide security across its territory or even have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. External actors may share executive authority.

In the post conflict environment, disbanded armed groups and militias maintain a “clan” affiliation with their ex-fighting colleagues. Generally marginalized from the rest of society and accustomed to violent conflict resolution, their crime rates frequently escalate after the official end of war. Where the police are not sufficiently effective and resources are limited, these ex-combatant nonstate actors may have a part to play as local law enforcement groups in unarmed crime prevention and investigation. This article analyzes arguments for and against donor support and development of such nonstate actors as providers of public goods and services.

Transnational crime and criminal networks have grown to such proportions that they have become a global problem. Large-scale crime, terrorism, insurgency, and piracy are blending into transnational criminal networks, capable of holding ground and challenging the power of the state, and threatening the basic fabric of society. Overcoming transnational crime requires the United States to merge domestic and international strategies. Domestically, the U.S. must do more to enable local police to integrate their effort and to develop, analyze, and share intelligence on narco-gangs and the cartels.