To sustain the world’s second largest economy and the legitimacy of the Communist Party, Beijing has instituted the "going out" policy, investing its plentiful foreign reserves overseas to engender good will and at the same time secure raw materials for its burgeoning economy, especially in Africa. It is also executing an impressive array of infrastructure projects, and the assistance is unaccompanied by Western-style lecturing and other strangling conditions. Washington should respond with simple stability enhancing projects. Moreover, it should seek partnership opportunities with China, leveraging its own soft power base. U.S. Africa Command initiatives with African militaries have been effective, and Washington can take other pragmatic steps to earn African trust, strengthen Sino-American bonds, and press for good governance and human rights.

Americans and others have misgivings about Chinese space initiatives that were further inflated by China’s 2007 antisatellite test. Others argue that Beijing’s aims are benevolent. Examining prevalent trends in China’s military thinking is the key to exposing its real motivations. China is not monolithic but has competing views. It may challenge U.S. hegemony in space as elsewhere someday, but its present capabilities in technology, doctrine, and organization suggest that is a long way off. Washington will be best served for the time being by understanding the Local War school of thought, using strategic communications not to convey belligerent messages, and carefully managing its reliance on space systems in light of China’s discovery of U.S. vulnerabilities in that realm.

There is a sense in both Koreas that reunification is inevitable, but the North and South are economically, politically, and socially incompatible. In the face of the impasse, Pyongyang shows a continuing disposition toward provocation, and its large military is a continuing threat to Seoul, which responds by further strengthening its own military. A comparison of northern and southern capabilities reveals asymmetries, some favoring one and some the other. Yet in the end, neither side seems to want a full-scale war. The decline of the North in all but military prowess and its recent regime change may force a decision, and the hope is that violence can be contained until all Koreans can decide their future at the ballot box.