Janusz Salamon 
dr. Faculty of Social Sciences,
Charles University. Czech Republic,
116 36,Prague1, Ovocný trh 5;
e-mail: janusz.salamon@gmail.com

The paper outlines an original solution to the problem of ‘doxastic pluralism’ understood asirreducible pluralism of beliefs (doxa) in the areas where knowledge (episteme) is in princi-ple unavailable. The problem is explored on the example of religious doxastic pluralism,with implications for all types of ‘agathological beliefs’ (beliefs about the good:to agathonin Greek), which – as value-laden beliefs – do not lend themselves to verification or falsifi-cation by scientific methods. The ‘agatheistic account of doxastic pluralism’ is presented assuperior to John Hick’s conceptualisation of doxastic pluralism. The Hickian pluralism iswedded to the Kantian critique of metaphysics and his epistemology of transcendental ideal-ism and while it proclaims that different religious beliefs are ‘diverse responses to the Tran-scedent’ or to ‘the Real’, it is arguably unable to show how various assertions about the Realcan be justified and thus how doxastic commitment of belief-holders can be explained.Agatheism conceives of the object of religious commitment as the highest good and linksboth the metaphysical and epistemic aspects of religious doxastic practices with the activityof ‘agathological imagination’, conceiving various religious beliefs as grounded in humanconceptualisations of the highest good towards which human agathological consciousness isdirected of no choice of our own (that is a phenomenologically given fact).