Defense Secretary Robert Gates sees an active role in developing and reviewing plans as one of his core responsibilities. Similarly, his successor will have to immerse himself in the DOD planning process. There are barriers to the Secretary’s involvement but also benefits beyond simply the production of plans. Today’s iterative plan development and review process, functioning under the Adaptive Planning rubric, is a significant improvement over pre–Goldwater-Nichols practices as well as those of the 1990s and early 2000s. It would be easier for combatant command planners if the Secretary did not take a hands-on approach, but it would come at a cost to national security. The process found under Adaptive Planning cannot succeed without the Secretary’s involvement now and going forward.

American diplomats begin their careers by taking an oath of office to support the Constitution, but they embark with their own philosophies. Professional diplomacy requires a specific philosophy of diplomacy and a commitment to America that draws on a number of thinkers and practitioners and is built on optimism, belief in justice and honesty, and a sober outlook complemented by acceptance of pluralism. The resulting worldview could be called “optimistic realism,” which acknowledges that strategic and deliberate initiative will bring the desired results as long as diplomats recognize the limits on where, when, and at what speed these results can be achieved.

War and warfare and their preparation militate against crisp strategy. Yet the strategist is charged with articulating how the use of arms will bring about desired outcomes. Toward that end, the strategist should employ every acting and interacting element within a general theory of strategy. Strategic effect is the elusive result of the strategist’s effort, but strategic function is lasting and universal and independent of the vagaries of time and place. While unpredictability makes strategists of great stature a rarity, for most strategists of at least average gifts it is sufficient to be adequate. Practitioners are left with the optimistic notion that excellence is generally not a prerequisite to victory. They need only achieve sufficient control over the enemy’s decisions.