A number of politicians, U.S. military leaders, and academics have called for a Middle East Marshall Plan—a massive, transformative aid program analogous to the one implemented in Europe after World War II. Although the idea is appealing, there is no way to bring anything remotely resembling the Marshall Plan to the Middle East, and attempts to launch one are likely to cause some undesirable side effects. The sociological, cultural, and structural conditions in postwar Europe were favorable for implementing a large-scale aid program; the opposite is true in today's Middle East. Germany had competent government personnel and relatively low levels of corruption, while in many Middle Eastern nations, corruption is endemic and pervasive. Many Middle Eastern states lack the industrial bases, infrastructure, educated populations, and strong support for science and technology, corporations, business, and commerce institutions that were reconstructed in Germany after World War II. Instead of attempting to create a large-scale transformative program, the United States should scale back to less demanding ambitions, focus on security instead of regime change, work to create favorable trade conditions, and allow for humanitarian aid.

Nation-building has a bad reputation. It is widely seen as an impossible fool's errand that is too expensive for today's constrained budgets. That reputation is wrong. First, nation-building is not international charity. It is a necessary and pragmatic response to failed states that threaten regional stability. Time and time again, history has shown that state failure, when left unaddressed, causes demonstrable harm to neighbors, whole regions, and occasionally the international order itself. Second, nation-building is not doomed to failure: the perception that nation building always fails is due to a few famous cases of dramatic failure. A closer look at the history and practice of nation-building illustrates that the international community has learned key lessons and improved its ability to foster stability and democracy in states confronted with violence, illegitimacy, poverty, and institutional breakdown. Finally, nation-building, while expensive, is relatively cost-effective compared to the alternatives: both isolationism and imperialism would be prohibitively expensive. As U.S. policymakers review budget and force structure in coming years, they should recognize that nation-building is a pragmatic option that can meet the needs of the hour, and it can do so successfully and cost-effectively.

The future direction of U.S. strategy against violent transnational terrorist groups abroad is increasingly founded on the "indirect approach," a strategy that emphasizes building partnerships to improve the security and governance capacity of at-risk partner states and reduce the incidence of safe havens for militants in ungoverned spaces. The indirect approach has achieved only relatively modest outcomes. While terrorist groups have been degraded and the tactical capabilities of host-nation militaries have been improved, the lasting defeat of militant organizations has remained elusive. Since the use of the indirect approach is likely to continue, policymakers should have a clear understanding of its limitations. Political strategies to leverage security force assistance are insufficiently emphasized by U.S. policymakers, and this failure undermines the legitimacy of U.S. security assistance. Rigorous assessment of outcomes from efforts to build partner capacity should be more extensively completed and disseminated among military and civilian partners. Finally, policymakers should always be cautious about expansions of American involvement that are linked to open-ended objectives and poorly defined outcomes, lest the small-scale indirect approach spiral into the very type of large-scale direct action that it is intended to avoid.