The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) outlines reforms to close this capacity gap. Even if implemented, QDDR reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to address the root problems of bureaucratic rivalries and strained resources or timely enough to ensure a seamless transition in Iraq. DOS and USAID must take calculated steps to address the underlying bureaucratic, corporate cultural, and structural considerations by clarifying roles and responsibilities, clearly defining the mandate, articulating a strategic framework for developing and applying capacity, and demonstrating that capacity. Furthermore, the approach to garner congressional support must be refocused, and together DOS and USAID must improve the case for the mission and the cost of maintaining a standing civilian response capability. Building a robust DOS and USAID capacity for stabilization and reconstruction ultimately will enhance both efficiency and effectiveness, as the skills required largely reside in the civilian arms of foreign affairs.

The Barack Obama administration's policy on Afghanistan negotiations differs from that of its predecessor in that it is open to greater debate of prospects and issues, and it senses that an effort at the proper time might have a useful and positive impact. In parallel with the efforts by former Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, a study was conducted under the leadership of former Algerian Foreign Minister and United Nations Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and co-chaired by the author of this article. This study, sponsored by the Century Foundation think tank, sought to answer these main questions about negotiations in Afghanistan: should negotiations be undertaken, and if so, when? What should be the scope of the problems to be resolved? How should the process be started, maintained, and concluded? Also examined were the questions of who should lead and participate, and how these delicate relationships among parties should be addressed. The study concluded that negotiations must be part of an overall U.S. strategy of stabilization for Afghanistan. Furthermore, U.S. leadership in the negotiation process is essential, with Pakistan and other regional neighbors as key participants. Getting negotiations started, which may be best accomplished with a facilitator, could be as difficult as keeping the process going and bringing it to a useful and successful conclusion. The central issue will be the future governance arrangements for Afghanistan. The time is ripe, the study found, for seeking to negotiate peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency theory, once celebrated as having pulled Iraq back from the brink, is now in crisis due to its record in Afghanistan. Considering both the contribution of counterinsurgency theory to military thinking and its limitations as a concept, it remains valuable, even if the term "counterinsurgency theory" once again is cast aside. The theory provides not a strategy or campaign plan but rather a collection of insights and principles. The value of the theory depends on what is expected from it. Some insights based on counterinsurgency theory appear commonsensical but nonetheless challenge dominant misconceptions about the nature of war. The lessons of recent counterinsurgency campaigns must therefore be retained for future military interventions—and prompt greater caution among military strategists and policymakers about such undertakings. Careful study and research are needed to determine how best to apply this theory to future operations, and it is fair to say that it is better at raising the right questions than in providing the answers.