Nuclear weapons obsolescence only works if adversaries buy off on it too, which North Korea is not doing. The North’s significant strides place it on an inevitable course to threaten the peninsula and beyond. The West cannot rely on universal renunciation of the nuclear option nor dares it unilaterally disarm and risk ceding tremendous power to unfriendly forces. However reluctantly, the U.S.-ROK alliance must establish an adaptive plan including tangible measures to recharge its extended nuclear deterrence capability. The measures must be linked to milestones Pyongyang crosses in its inexorable reach to arm itself with nuclear weapons and exploit the leverage they bestow. A return to nuclear reliance is distasteful to some, yet to call it unnecessary is wishful thinking

Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan present obstacles that may never be overcome, but greater possibility is suggested by a regional approach. Yet its full implementation has been elusive. A review of the interests and concerns of Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Central Asian republics, China, and Russia show that a stable outcome is not universally desired. Each player has its own issues from paranoia, to economic competition, to a desire to thwart U.S. influence, along with numerous others. All the critical parties must be educated about the consequences of failure to stabilize Afghanistan. Russia and China need to understand that the U.S. strategy complements their own economic and security interests, and a restoration of Central Asian trade would benefit everyone

Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector were logistical triumphs that combined the efforts of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and NATO in essentially “come as you are” operations. Events unfolded too rapidly for major force deployments from the continental United States and called for shifting staff structures and alignments. The operational forces mainly belonged to ESEUCOM and operated from that command’s area of responsibility, but they were employed by USAFRICOM. Matters were further complicated by the transition to a NATO-led operation. Logistical support thus required coordination, flexibility, and cooperation, and the tailored response to the myriad challenges are emblematic of the future we can expect. These operations can be mined for a variety of lessons for logistics planning, doctrine, and execution especially with regard to the no-notice nature of the initial efforts, complexity of the logistics enterprise, and issues associated with USEUCOM-USAFRICOM-NATO coordination