In the last issue of JFQ, I provided some thoughts and observations on the ebb and flow of the bands of readiness (individual and unit). It described some differences with soldiering in a predominantly garrison environment compared to a decade of military life in a back-and-forth deployed or combat/field setting—a lifestyle and environment that a large majority of our force has been shouldering since the winter of 2001. It is no secret that our enduring deployment cycle and focus on current conflicts have caused some degradation and receding of core competencies and skill sets, impacting traditional roles, missions, and even methods of operating. Said another way, the heavy emphasis on prepping for the next deployment has provided misalignment to some of the simple tenets of soldiering and survival in an otherwise extended garrison or unit setting

In JFQ 65, Air Force historian Phillip S. Meilinger wrote a provocative and informative article (“Admirals Run Amok: The Danger of Inter-Service Rivalry,” 2^nd Quarter 2012) about the Navy’s institutional response during the unification efforts of the Truman administration and airpower advocates after World War II. This hastened a trend that resulted in the bulk of the defense budget going to the new U.S. Air Force by the end of the Korean War. One is always tempted to ask, “Why this topic, why this time?”