Ever since the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, international events and circumstances have led to periodic revivals of interest in the ideas and concepts of classical geopolitical theorists. As the Wehrmacht surged into the vast expanses of Soviet Russia and Imperial Japan sought to carve out a greater East Asia and Pacific empire, Western strategists and even popular media outlets such as Time magazine “discovered” the “Heartland” theory first propounded by British geographer Halford Mackinder in his 1904 address to the Royal Geographical Society entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History,” revised and expanded in his 1919 masterpiece Democratic Ideals and Reality, and further revised and updated in a 1943 Foreign Affairs article, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace.”

Any U.S. military officer or civil servant yearning to earn the sobriquet “grand strategist” must understand the ethos of the countries of Latin America. While many bodies of water are of great interest to the people of the United States and its government, the Rio Grande River is a vital interest. 

Dieppe reminds us the West values the lives of its troops and illustrates other fundamentals about Westerners, yet the August 1942 raid remains controversial and filled with ambiguity. This article does not seek to clarify each puzzle but to draw attention to some enduring facts of war. Many of the quandaries and predicaments the Allies experienced before, during, and after the raid are not unique to Operation Jubilee; thus it remains relevant for today’s military planning, combined joint operations, and postdisaster accountability. Ten factors for the operation’s failure are considered. Moreover, it was a combined joint operation, so everyone could blame everyone else. Discounting such labyrinths, Operation Jubilee is still a rewarding source of reflection for military planners and practitioners.