This paper is intended to elicit Wittgenstein’s position regarding platonism reformulated into 1 – the analytical investigation of the conditions for a meaningful language, and 2 – the deepening of a problem generated by the illusory conception that it is possible to cap­ture the ultimate atomic elements of the meaning of a linguistic complex. That’s the way one can indeed understand that Wittgenstein has presented a critique of the tradition of ontology. The fact that he endorsed a “quasi-realism” approach to “objects” (Br. McGuin­ness) contrasts with the future Vienna Circle at a time the latter was still under the spell of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, close to a Russellian kind of logical atomism. It is not surprising that later on, Wittgenstein’s own “platonism” in its Fregean version be­came a target in the anthropological framework of a broader self-criticism for the belief in referential entities, or “objectual fetichism” (in A. Gargani’s terms). This anthropologi­cal turn nonetheless did not conquer the harder epistemological public of readers looking for logical truth. Yet, it presents some interesting features articulated to a “philosophy of praxis” that make “forms of life” the core of a possible critical grammar adjusted to a po­litical engagement. Such an articulation that has been so much put into question among a number of theoreticians of social theory in Frankfurt and even later in France (e.g. Alain Badiou’s critique of Wittgenstein), seems to be on the contrary the opening of a new and fruitful way to consider contradictions between Frankfurt and Vienna in con­nection with social praxis.