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Тамара Длугач
Загадки трансцендентального идеализма (Марбургская школа кантианства)
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Длугач Тамара Борисовна,
д.ф.н., главный научный сотрудник
Института философии РАН,
109240, г. Москва, ул. Гончарная, 12, стр. 1.
E-mail: dlugatsch@yandex.ru.

Автор ставит своей целью рассмотреть и объяснить развитие трансцендентального идеализма в Марбургской школе кантианства. В качестве главного понятия философии Германа Когена анализируется понятие бесконечно-малой реальности (Infinitesimalrealität), которое признаётся новейшим понятием как математики, так и философии. С этих позиций критикуются эмпирическое созерцание и чистое мышление в кантовской системе. В отличие от Канта Г. Коген признаёт независимость мышления от ощущений и помещает «реальный» предмет, противостоящий мысленному предмету, внутрь мышления. Исходным пунктом ревизии Канта становится понятие априорности ощущений, введенное Кантом. В связи с этим Кант включает в процесс познания интенсивную величину. Коген развивает это направление анализа и определяет бесконечно-малую величину как исходный пункт мышления и бытия, но понятие бытия замещается понятием реальности, Она определяется также как первоисточник мышления. Развитие познания осуществляется через взаимодействие понятий и суждений, что дает непрерывное развитие науки.

 

 

Dlugatch Tamara Βorisovna
DSc in Philosophy, Chief Research Fellow at the Institute
of Philosophy of Russian Academy of Sciences,
12/1 Goncharnaya Str., Moscow, 109240, Russia.
E-mail: dlugatsch@yandex.ru
.

Riddles of the Transcendental Idealism (The Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism)

Summary. Tamara Dlugatsch сonsiders and explains the development of transcendental idealism on the example of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. She analyzes the notion of infinitely small reality as the main concept of philosophy of Hermann Cohen which is considered as the latest concept of both mathematics and philosophy. Assuming that feelings give rise to thinking, Cohen says that thinking ceases to be clean. If you want to leave it clean, it is necessary to interpret the role of feelings and contemplation differently. Feelings do not give knowledge, they only indicate that we confront with something; but what is this something? Only thinking tells about it, asking about it. The answer is related to the inclusion of the first principle of the concept of thinking into the theory of cognition. After all, if thinking gives the answer, it must have material for this answer. Such material requires a basic concept of the first principle of thinking. Cohen finds it in the notion of an infinitely small quantity. He considers it as achievement not only of modern mathematics, but modern philosophy either. Cohen is based on Kant, who included a priori on the basis of the infinitely small reality into the feeling. For Kant infinitely small reality is a model of being, which is associated with a feeling. Being can be arbitrarily small, but while there is a feeling, it is saved meaning that being is not exhausted by any cognition, that the object of the concept is always wider than the concept of the object. Here Kant introduces the concept of reality: it substitutes being within the thinking. It is not the thing in itself, but something that is opposite to the mental thing within the mind. Kohen developes this concept, because he refuses from the thing itself. Infinitely small quantity as the reality becomes for him the only being, opposite to thinking, but it exists in the thinking. The concept of infinitely small reality is reqiured specially for this. Then it turns out that the thinking already contains a kind of being, thinking doesn`t need to take it from somewhere else. It is given at the point of transition into thinking. Cohen expresses in the representation of the relationship between the concepts and judgments the process of expression of reality in cognition. The concept asks the question, judgment answers it. Here Cohen discourses in line of modern science, in the way it is interested in relationship of things (forces), but not the things in itself.



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