The Nation and its allies face a strategic turning point that necessitates the optimization of joint and multinational airborne joint forcible entry (JFE) capabilities to meet future security challenges. The security environment has been shaped more by surprise than inevitability, and the future presents “a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate”—thus the ability for the United States and its multinational partners to respond quickly with assured access to introduce the capabilities required to secure its interests.

From 2004-2012, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted 387 inspections and audits of U.S.-funded projects and programs that supported stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. Most of SIGIR’s reviews focused on large-scale projects or programs. In a recent special report, SIGIR accomplished a novel study examining a particular part of the rebuilding effort. That report reviewed the remarkably diverse spectrum of programs and projects executed in a crucial geographic area in Iraq, the Rusafa Political District, delving into who built what and at what cost

The military apparatus is not only guilty of preparing for the last war but of reputedly aping the practices of Napoleon. To shake that stigma and meet the three imperatives of “improving efficiency, saving taxpayer dollars, and taking care of our people,” organizational reform is the blanket concept. Yet due to the sheer size of DOD, a natural disinclination to change, and top-to-bottom control, America is out of step with a flattening world. Leaders must recognize the harm the current structure does to organizational performance and behavior of personnel. One approach is “temporal separation” replacing stovepipes as the foundation of staff design. It would increase access to leadership, enlarge the span of control, and bring a healthy decentralization