Randall R. Correll
Chapter 26: Emerging Actors

The world of the 21st century is radically different from that of the previous century. As the new century approached, the world appeared to be a much more uncertain place. The traditional balance of power has been dramatically disturbed. Accelerating technology catalyzed economic change as new nations and international corporations competed in the interconnected global marketplace. The dramatic advances in information technology united and empowered transnational peoples and ideologies beyond the constraint of any single government. Where global powers had faded, new regional powers arose with the potential for influence in the new global economy and information grid.

Spacepower as an Instrument of Global and Regional Influence

As many nations and states reconstitute1 themselves in this new century, they pursue spacepower to help achieve their economic, political, and cultural objectives. While the traditional powers long ago developed routine space capabilities and operations of vital importance, many nations are now only beginning to add such capabilities to their repertoire of national power. In doing so, they have applied innovative, frugal, and cooperative approaches. Spacepower fits naturally within the goals and ambitions of emerging powers. Economic strength is very dependent on information technologies: this includes collecting information on geography and environment and in communicating information and political messages. Thus, the growing interest in spacepower derives from growing economic aspirations and political influence, and this will unsettle the balance of power of the formerly unchallenged global leaders. Therefore, it is instructive to consider how new and emerging space powers, referred to in this paper simply as emerging space powers, are using space to achieve their aims, especially as they build alliances with the established space powers on one hand and, on the other, with neighbors who do not yet have access to spacepower but want to acquire it.

As less developed nations grow in economic, military, and political might, the existing balance of power will be threatened and possibly weakened. Regional rivals will emerge where global superpowers formerly dominated, and new conflicts and tensions will arise. It is quite likely that the increasing activity of spacefaring nations will make space less secure in the near term. Already, certain states and transnational groups have engaged in the jamming and hijacking of satellite communications, intent on blocking or broadcasting propaganda and strategic messages. Yet once the spacepower of these emerging actors is integrated into the security apparatus of strong international partners, the peace and security of the world should be significantly enhanced.

As the United States considers the application and evolution of spacepower as part of its overall strategic influence and leadership, it should beware of challenges to its preeminence in space and should seek opportunities for beneficial cooperation. Many other nations are eager to engage the United States in diplomatic, economic, and cultural affairs, and space is an attractive tool with which to do so.

Higher Aspirations Abroad

The United States primarily thinks of security in terms of threat warning and force projection. These are very important functions, of course, and derive from our Cold War heritage, which is why many of our space systems have been highly classified systems. However, most of the world's spacefaring nations pursued space initially from commercial and civil interests and more recently have been extending their application to meet security needs. This encompasses a much broader spectrum of activities than the U.S. space security community typically addresses and offers many more options for fostering international cooperation, strengthening alliances, and building common interest in foreign affairs.

Space technology, and technology in general, is powerful in effect, but it is not inherently dangerous. 2 More importantly, space technology is now pervasive around the world. Any security strategy that relies on denying an adversary access to technology must be recognized as being unrealistic and doomed to failure. The existing space powers, with the notable exception of the United States,3 ,4 openly leverage their spacepower through international cooperation and engagement to further their economic interests and national security. The international space market is a bazaar of opportunities for emerging space powers to buy, sell, and barter important space goods and services to advance their national interest.

To underscore this point, consider the International Space Station project with participants from the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and the European Space Agency (ESA). This is by far the most immense international space project, with a cumulative budget approaching $100 billion. Its appeal is prestige on the world stage. China aspires to join, as does recently emerging space power India, but so far continues to be excluded. Emerging space powers are eager to provide an astronaut, who then generally becomes an important icon in their homelands, inspiring their youth to excel in technical studies. Participation in the program represents the cathedral of prestige, not the bazaar of everyday trade where the more pragmatic space applications are quietly being developed and traded within the international community of existing and emerging space powers. 5

We are beginning to see interesting examples of where emerging space powers are bumping up against established ones and their emerging regional neighbors. Japan, concerned about military developments in North Korea, has launched its own reconnaissance satellites suitable for collecting high-resolution images. This has alarmed the North Korean government, which calls these actions aggressive. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched what was believed to be a ballistic missile test; Pyongyang later announced it had attempted its first satellite launch. Israel has become rather expert at producing small, lightweight optical imaging systems for satellite missions. The United Arab Emirates is seeking bidders for its own civil-military communications satellite. Iran has been accused of jamming commercial communications satellites that were broadcasting allegedly seditious programming produced by Iranian expatriates in the United States. Canada has become the world's leader in many robotic and autonomous space technologies that could be used in space control satellites. A number of smaller nations have collaborated with Surrey Satellite Technologies of the United Kingdom to learn how to build and operate small satellites. China, Russia, and European nations actively seek out cooperative space projects with each other and with developing nations. India has developed its remote sensing capabilities to such sophisticated levels that it now sells data for environmental monitoring and land management to nations around the globe, including the United States.

What is important in these events is that along with the dangerous ambitions of some developing nations to have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, emerging nations also recognize the strategic and pragmatic value of being a space power. North Korea, Iran, and Israel—like many other countries—are interested in exploiting the dual-use nature of space for economic, civil, security, and international affairs.

It is difficult to accurately assess the total spending for national space programs, but table 26–1 estimates the approximate level of investment for the world's space programs.6 The estimates are based on civil space spending (not including dedicated military space spending by the United States, Russia, and China). For the remaining countries, which have dual-use space programs, the estimates also include spending on security-related applications of their space capabilities. Limited funds mandate that emerging space powers selectively prioritize modest but effective space capabilities to serve their national interests.

Table 26–1. Estimated Budgets of Leading Space Powers


Nation

2008 Budget
(USD millions)

Space Launch Capable

United States/National Aeronautics and Space Administration

17,300

Yes

European Space Agency

4,270

Yes

Japan*

3,500

Yes

China

1,700

Yes

Russia

1,540

Yes

France

970

Yes

Italy

910

 

India*

860

Yes

Germany

440

 

South Korea*

250

In development

Canada*

250

 

Brazil*

130

In development

United Kingdom

80

 

Israel*

80

Yes

 

 

 

 

 

 

* = emerging space power

It is helpful to consider space powers based on their regional dynamics and based on the level of space capability. Table 26–2 outlines a geographic region versus level-of-capability matrix. The established space superpowers include the United States, Russia, ESA, and China and are shown on the first tier of the matrix. The emerging space powers can roughly be grouped into categories based on level of capability: expanding space powers, emerging space powers, and emerging space users. Finally, the bottom of the matrix shows a tier of space-enabling entities consisting of commercial Internet companies and commercial space companies that are making the rudiments of spacepower products and services affordable and pervasive.

Table 26–2. Space Powers:  Geographic Region versus Level of Capability Matrix


 

Americas

Europe

East Asia

Middle East/Africa

South Asia

Global and Spacefaring

United States

European Space Agency

Russia
China

 

 

 

Expanding Space Powers

 

 

Japan

 

 

India

Emerging Regional Space Powers

Canada

Brazil

 

 

South Korea

Israel

Iran

 

Pakistan

Emerging Space Users

Chile
Venezuela

 

North Korea

Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Nigeria

 

Space Enabling

Google Earth (as a proxy for the commercialization of cyber-space-power)

What do the emerging space powers have to tell us about spacepower? Through necessity, they pursue innovative approaches that may prove novel or even contradictory to standard practices of the few established space powers, and thus provide interesting case studies in the fuller understanding of spacepower theory.7 An interesting historical analogy can be used in this regard. The Space Commission report of 2001 referred to the impending threat of a "space Pearl Harbor"8 where a complacent U.S. space infrastructure was vulnerable to a dramatic first strike by a peer competitor. A different analogy has been suggested: we may be more likely to experience a "space Shays' Rebellion," analogous to the early years of the United States, where dissatisfaction with the Articles of Confederation led to a new Constitution that better fit the diverse needs of the burgeoning national political and economic tableau.9 A brief survey of the diverse activities of emerging space powers will give us insight into the dynamics of spacepower as they employ it, and at the same time point out opportunities for the established space powers to better engage with emerging competitors in support of national goals and interests.

Emerging Spacepower's Upward Trajectory

The Americas

The dynamic in the Western Hemisphere is dominated by the United States and its space capabilities. North America is stable and technologically advanced, while South America is aspiring to catch up to the modern, high-tech economies of the more developed nations. In North America, Canada has excelled in several niche technologies for space applications. In South America, Brazil leads the way with a fairly mature aeronautics enterprise, but with disappointing progress thus far in space.

Canada. Canada has excelled in remote sensing with its Radarsat program that provides all-weather, day-night imaging capability. With a resolution of about 10 meters, the Radarsat-1 system is applicable for land-use studies, but not for the high-resolution images needed for many intelligence and military functions. In December 2007, Canada's Radarsat-2 follow-on was launched to orbit; it provides an improved 3-meter resolution capability and adds some security-quality applications to commercial and civil uses.

Canada also excels at space robotics, having built the robotic arm for the U.S. space shuttle and the International Space Station. Canadian participation in the September 9, 2006, space shuttle mission to the International Space Station included an astronaut, the deployment of the extension to the Canadarm robotic arm on the International Space Station, the attendance by the Canadian ambassador to the United States at the launch ceremonies, and a significant public relations program broadcast throughout Canada as they enjoyed the national pride of their significant contributions.

Canadian industrial vendors were selected to provide critical robotic technologies for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Hubble space telescope repair missions, including the final servicing mission completed in May 2009. They provided robotic manipulators for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Orbital Express satellite servicing experiment. And they provide a miniaturized laser range finder that the Air Force Research Laboratory used on its XSS–11 space rendezvous and autonomous proximity operations experiment.

That Canadian technical expertise in autonomous space operations and manipulation are best in the world should astound national security specialists. These technologies are critical elements of any potential on-orbit space control system. Such systems are often attributed to alleged U.S. space weapons programs. In fact, these technologies are not only readily available from Canada, but also the premier space organizations of the U.S. Government chose Canadian technology over that provided by U.S. developers.

The Canadian Ministry of Defense also is pursuing a small satellite called SAPPHIRE, a microsatellite weighing approximately 130 kilograms, to scan the skies for space objects and contribute data to the U.S. space object catalog. This would be a contribution under the North American Aerospace Command treaty.

In August 2008, Canada's leading aerospace company, MacDonald, Dettwiler, and Associates (MDA), successfully placed into orbit a constellation of five microsatellites call RapidEye for their customer, RapidEye AG in Germany.10 RapidEye provides multispectral data suitable for land use assessments, and with the rapid revisit rates of the five microsatellites, the constellation provides extraordinarily large area coverage (up to 4 million square kilometers per day) or provides rapid revisit. This rate makes it quite useful to detect changes in ground coverage, albeit on a 6-square-meter scale, that is useful for security purposes. Indeed, RapidEye AG, has recently signed an agreement with a U.S. company to resell the data in the U.S. market to defense, intelligence, and homeland security customers. RapidEye AG had earlier signed an agreement with Sovzond JSC of Moscow as the distributor of its data to the Russian government. This is an example of innovative collaboration between regional emerging space powers to provide a useful, affordable product to existing global space powers.

The current outlook in the Canadian space program is somewhat ambivalent: while it enjoys participation with the U.S. space program, it also increasingly chafes under U.S. control and interference. Canada's ability to do international business in the space sector is frequently complicated and challenged by U.S. export control regulators. A feeling of frustration is now motivating Canada to pursue stronger collaborative agreements with nations other than the United States.

Recent attempts by U.S. corporations to buy MDA and its Radarsat product line have caused the Canadian government to examine the importance and cost of its spacepower ambitions. This introspection has led to the emphatic declaration that Canadian investment in space capabilities will remain in Canadian hands.

Brazil. Despite having a world-class aeronautics capability with the Embraer corporation,11 Brazil has struggled to develop its space industry. As early as 1964, Brazil began development of the Sondra series of sounding rockets. Construction of their Alcântara launch site began in 1982. Alcântara is only two degrees south of the equator and provides ideal energy efficiency for launch into geosynchronous orbits. Brazil's first launch from Alcântara occurred on February 21, 1990, with the sounding rocket Sonda 2. Unfortunately, on August 22, 2003 the explosion of the developmental VLS space launcher on the launch pad killed 21 people. In a courageous and determined effort, Brazil was able to follow this disaster with a successful suborbital launch into space in October 2004.

Brazil is looking to leverage its ideal equatorial launch site location by providing commercial launch base services from Alcântara. In 2003, contracts were signed to launch the Ukrainian Tsyklon-4, with discussions under way with Russia, Israel, and China to use the site.

The Brazilian space program was transferred to the newly created Brazilian Space Agency in 1994. While the Alcântara launch site is operated by the military, there are plans to build a neighboring facility specifically for Brazil's civilian space agency. Brazil is also developing an indigenous satellite manufacturing capability, most often working closely with the United States. Difficulties over missile launch technology export controls led the Brazilian space program to expand cooperative activities with the French space program, and additionally, to recognize the benefits of signing on to the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1994.

Brazil's first satellite, an environmental data collecting satellite, was put into space in 1993 using the Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus commercial launch vehicle. A second data collecting spacecraft was placed into orbit in 1998, also by a Pegasus. Thus, Brazil is making progress on developing spacecraft manufacturing capability, while its launch vehicle capability has so far made only modest progress.

In the meantime, Brazil has been cooperating with other spacefaring nations to leverage foreign technology. Brazil has been working with China to operate remote sensing satellites for land use and environmental monitoring. The first satellites, China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS)–1 in 1999 and CBERS–2 in 2003, were built and launched by China; select data is now shared with Brazil, and operation of the satellite was turned over to Brazil 2 years after initial operations. Subsequent satellites called Earth Resources Satellite-02B and CBERS–3 will be coproduced by Brazil, helping to mature their indigenous satellite manufacturing capability.12 More recently, Brazil has reached an agreement with the French national space agency, CNES, to codevelop a Brazilian design of a small satellite bus. 13

Chile. The unique geography of Chile as it drapes along the great length of the Pacific coast of South America is a natural fit with space-delivered capabilities. Chile has pursued cooperative military space projects with the United States for reconnaissance capabilities, but the United States has been reluctant to cooperate. In 2007, the Chilean defense minister was considering a solicitation for Chile's own Earth observation satellite.

Venezuela . Venezuela is most notable as an emerging spacepower user in that its oil resources make it attractive to existing space powers eager to trade space capabilities for access to oil. Venezuela is considering the purchase of a communications satellite from China for indigenous communications services. This agreement is likely part of a portfolio of activities related to China's interest in securing access to Venezuela's oil supplies.

East Asia

There is a new space race developing in Asia between China and India. It is not yet global in scope, as was the first space race between the United States and the Soviet Union, but rather a race for regional influence. For the most part, these programs have been very pragmatic and measured. But there have been recent signs of grander ambitions through space exploration programs. This competition will attract other nations in Asia and around the world to posture for opportunities to cooperate and build common interest with China and India. In East Asia, Japan is a well-developed space power expanding into space security applications, and South Korea is using space to complement its diverse and ambitious push into high-technology infrastructure and commerce.

Japan. A survey of these nations begins with the already established but expanding space power of Japan. It has had indigenous launch capability, has built its own telecommunications satellites, and has participated in international human spaceflight programs. What is emerging is a willingness to deploy space systems to aid its national security.

Japan has continued to develop its space launch capability for commercial and civil purposes. The H–2 launcher and follow-on systems provide significant launch capability. Japan's efforts have been closely tied to participation in civil space exploration with NASA and other civil space agencies. Participation in military space activities is prevented by national law, but the test launch by North Korea in 1998 of a missile that traversed Japanese territory catalyzed the Japanese government to begin a reconnaissance satellite program for national security purposes. Japan first launched its own reconnaissance satellites suitable for collecting high-resolution images for intelligence purposes in March 2003. This has alarmed the North Korean government, which calls these actions aggressive.

Nonetheless, Japanese national security space activities continue. The information gathering satellite K2 was successfully launched September 11, 2006, by an H–2A rocket from the Tanegashima Space Center and will provide 1-meter imaging capability. Japan most recently launched an electro-optical imaging satellite in September 2006 and a radar imaging satellite in February 2007.

Besides remote sensing for reconnaissance purposes, Japan has taken steps to expand the security dimension of its space policy:

On May 21, 2008, Japan's Basic Law of Outer Space was passed, for the first time allowing the country to use space assets for defensive military purposes. The bill modified the Japanese interpretation of using space "for peaceful purposes only." The new interpretation conforms with policies of other spacefaring nations and will allow Japan's government to develop military satellites for defensive purposes. In addition, the new law will place all space-related projects into a unified program for better coordination.14

The most recent launch by the North Koreans on April 5, 2009—alleged by their government as a peaceful space launch—managed only to reenter far out in the Pacific Ocean after passing over Japan. Despite widespread international outrage and calls for action against North Korea, none have been taken thus far. In June 2009, Japan approved plans to develop its own missile warning satellites.

Japan, long the sole space power in East Asia, now has rivals. It will be interesting to see how the Japanese realign their cooperative space activities as the Chinese and Indian space programs become prominent in the region.

South Korea. In the aftermath of the Korean war and the treaty that led to the division of Korea into northern and southern states, the Republic of Korea has achieved an amazing transformation from one of the world's poorest countries to one of the leading high-tech economies featuring bullet trains, new superhighways, and extensive broadband network infrastructure.15 South Korea competes economically with the two dominant regional and global economies of Japan and China. It also has the significant security concern of an unpredictable and sometimes menacing North Korea apparently intent on developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems, along with an asserted space program.

South Korea has invested significantly in space technologies as a means in itself and as a way to inspire a high-tech workforce. 16 The space program is under the purview of the Ministry of Science and Technology and is managed by the Korean Aerospace Research Institute. South Korea plans to increase its space budget from $250 million to $500 million. With a gross domestic product per person about half that of the United States and other leading developed nations, their budget is approaching $1 billion in effective value. South Korea has already built over 10 satellites, mostly microsatellites, but with increasing size and capability as they continue to develop. South Korea soon plans to launch the Arirang-3A, a military and civilian dual-use, high-resolution satellite with optical and infrared imaging capabilities. This follows the launch of the Arirang-2 on July 28, 2006. The Arirang satellite series, also known as the KOMPSAT series, provides images with 1-meter ground resolution or better, suitable for reconnaissance purposes, which is especially important to the South Koreans to provide transparency into military capabilities and operations in North Korea. South Korea previously relied on high-resolution imagery from the United States, but continues to pursue an indigenous capability.

South Korea also has purchased a multipurpose communications, oceanography, and meteorology satellite, COMS–1, from EADS-Astrium in Europe. The spacecraft is intended to be launched to geostationary orbit on an Ariane 5 booster and will provide South Korea with communications connectivity and awareness of ocean environment monitoring that will be useful for commercial fishing and weather forecasting.

To date, the South Koreans have launched their spacecraft on commercial launch vehicles of other countries, most notably Russia. To develop indigenous launch capability, the South Koreans are building a launch complex on an island off the south coast of the mainland. The new Naro Space Center is intended to launch the KSLV–1 launch vehicle beginning in the summer of 2009. The vehicle will be capable of launching 100-kilogram microsatellites into low-Earth orbit. Although of limited capability, it would provide needed reconnaissance and environmental capabilities in an affordable manner.

The South Koreans are also pursuing human spaceflight through cooperation with the Russian space program. South Korean spaceflyer So-yeon Yi arrived at the International Space Station on April 8, 2008. Despite the cost effectiveness of cooperating with the Russian space program, the Koreans have been actively pursuing a closer relationship with the U.S. space program and NASA. The Koreans have designed a number of experiments that could be flown on the International Space Station and have approached NASA in hopes of an agreement to have U.S. astronauts operate the experiment on board.

The South Koreans have recently obtained formal agreements with NASA to explore cooperative activities. Seoul signed an agreement with NASA in late 2008 to boost cooperation in space science and exploration.17 Although earlier engagements with NASA met with limited results, this recently signed agreement had its impetus in a high level of engagement by South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, who held summit talks with U.S President George W. Bush.18

North Korea . For some years now, all eyes have been on North Korea and its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile systems. However, on August 31, 1998, something unexpected happened. After the launch of what was at first believed to be a ballistic missile test, North Korea announced the launch of its first satellite. Despite these claims, no foreign observer ever confirmed that North Korea had in fact launched a satellite to orbit. While the success of the alleged space launch is doubtful, the attempt was plausibly real.

Another alleged space launch in April 2009 on a Taepodong-1 missile resulted only in the splashdown of its payload far out into the Pacific after again flying directly over Japan. This event caused quite a bit of alarm in Japan, the United States, and many other nations. Despite calls by many for severe consequences for the antagonistic launch, the international community and the United States have yet to take any action, and it is not clear that they would be fully justified in doing so. It was, after all, according to the North Korean government, a space launch attempt for peaceful purposes.

As international attention focuses on the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and especially their delivery vehicles, this will likely discourage other nations from cooperating with them on space capabilities. While North Korea appears to be exercising its fledgling spacepower with only a phantom space program, it is not clear that this is a sustainable strategy or how the international community can best address these provocations.

South Asia

India is in many ways the most interesting emerging space power. While its entry into space is not recent, its patient approach has reached a point of critical mass at which it has begun to reshape the regional balance of spacepower in Asia. Pakistan's modest efforts in space are insufficient to challenge India's dominance, but enough to complement Pakistan's nuclear arsenal as a check against Indian hegemony. India also provides some of the most interesting opportunities for space cooperation with the United States. Similarly, partnering with the U.S. space program provides India with opportunities for more ambitious space exploration activities than they could afford on their own. In light of this reciprocal opportunity, the U.S. and Indian space programs take a central place in each other's international space partnerships. 19

India . India's space research efforts began in the 1960s and were mainly within the Soviet sphere during the 1970s and 1980s. They launched their first satellite in 1975. The overall approach of the Indian space program is very pragmatic and focuses on national communications, enabling educations, and remote sensing for agricultural and environmental concerns. India is beginning to commercialize its launch capability, including a recent agreement to launch an Israeli reconnaissance satellite. It is actively pursuing microsatellite technology for low-cost space missions. A lunar orbiting mission, Chandrayaan, was launched in October 2008 and began India's participation in the new space exploration efforts of the United States and other countries.

While the focus of the Indian space program is to provide benefit to its people, India also intends to use its space program as a tool of foreign policy. In the January 2004 agreement between the United States and India, the presidents of the two countries stated their intentions to strengthen and expand cooperation. This explicitly included participation in civil space cooperation. The new strategic partnership between the United States and India has the potential to be the turning point around which a new geopolitical balance of power might form. A key element in this partnership—U.S.-India space cooperation—will most likely become a defining relationship for space cooperation around which other spacefaring nations will posture their international space cooperation strategies. The central position of India in the Asian continent, its burgeoning economic growth, and its wealth of human capital will be crucial assets in achieving U.S. objectives in space and in broader objectives in global security.

The Indian space program is considered to be the fifth largest, coming in behind the United States, Russia, Europe, and China. Their annual budget is about US $675 million, and given their relatively low-cost workforce, this is equivalent to a multi-billion-dollar program in more developed nations such as the United States, France, or Japan. India's first satellite in 1975 provided communications to remote parts of the country on an experimental basis. Continuing a very pragmatic approach, this was later followed by remote sensing and weather satellites. Through buying foreign technology where needed and pursuing a parallel path of developing indigenous space technology, India's space capability has grown steadily over the years.

The Indian space program is very much a government-executed program, but the government has begun to build a private sector industrial base. In 1992, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) established the Antrix Corporation Limited for the global marketing and sales of Indian remote sensing satellite data. In anticipation of cooperation with the United States and other nations in both civil and commercial space activities, ISRO has made efforts to increase security and access controls at its various facilities to comply with anticipated requirements of export control regimes.

India has developed two primary launch vehicles. The Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) can launch a 1,500-kilogram payload to 600-kilometer polar orbits. Thus, the PSLV is ideal for launching remote sensing satellites. The PSLV–CA launch of April 2009 marked the twelfth consecutive operational launch of the vehicle. Previous PSLV payloads have included 10 small satellites deployed from one launch in April 2008; the Chandrayaan lunar probe; six Indian remote sensing satellites to polar orbit; a meteorological satellite, KALPANA–1, to geosynchronous orbit; as well as a wide range of small satellites from other states including Germany, South Korea, Belgium, Indonesia, Argentina, Italy, Israel, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Singapore, and France.

India has been developing a more powerful launch vehicle configuration for access to geosynchronous orbits. The Geosynchronous Space Launch Vehicle (GSLV) is derived from the PSLV central core with additional liquid-propellant strap-on boosters and a cryogenic upper stage. Following the second successful test flight of the GSLV Mark I in 2003, India is now one of six countries able to launch a 2,000-kilogram satellite into geostationary orbit. To reach geosynchronous orbit, the GSLV relies on an upper stage vehicle powered by a Russian RD56M cryogenic propulsion system.

The joint agreement that enabled the Indians to purchase the formerly Soviet propulsion system was temporarily sidetracked after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The GSLV project also ran into problems when the United States imposed sanctions against India over nuclear technology proliferation concerns. In the last few years, cooperation with the Russians has resumed, and U.S. sanctions have been relaxed. In the interim, however, India had entered into a program to develop an indigenous cryogenic upper stage. That work is nearing completion, and the first flight of the new upper stage was expected in July 2009.

The principle focus of the Indian space program has been to provide communications and broadcast capabilities where land-based infrastructure has not yet reached remote regions. The Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) is a series of satellites to deliver satellite communications. The latest of these, INSAT–4A, was launched in December 2005 aboard an Ariane launch vehicle into geosynchronous orbit. India has great interest in using satellite communications to support its national education initiatives:

EDUSAT is the first Indian satellite designed and developed exclusively for serving the educational sector. It is mainly intended to meet the demand for an interactive satellite based distance education system for the country. It strongly reflects India's commitment to use space technology for national development, especially for the development of the population in remote and rural locations. 20

While developing its indigenous capabilities, India continues to pursue international commercial markets for special capabilities. The Antrix commercial arm of ISRO recently teamed with Astrium Satellites of Europe for small telecom satellites, which in many cases provide affordable capability right-sized for a niche market application. ISRO earlier approached the Boeing Corporation in the United States, but discussions collapsed due to U.S. technology transfer concerns.

India is also exploring means to use satellite communications to augment existing navigation systems. Wide-area augmentation schemes use existing satellite navigation signals, such as from the Global Positioning System or the future Galileo system, and provide corrections based on fixed ground locations. These corrections can then be broadcast over any satellite communications system to provide improved accuracy to satellite navigation users. India is also planning on deploying their own dedicated navigation satellites using rubidium atomic clocks purchased from the French company SpectraTime. These satellites will provide regional augmentation for navigation in conjunction with existing global space-based navigation systems.

The Indian remote sensing satellite system began with the launch of its first satellite in 1988. It consists of a series of remote sensing satellites for imaging, cartography, natural resource mapping, meteorology, and oceanography. This system has been modernized to the present series of satellites. RESOURCESAT–1 was launched into polar orbit in 2003 and carries a suite of multispectral sensors in the visible and near-infrared suitable for land-use and resource studies. The system provides 5-meter-resolution Earth images in 3-color mode and 2.5-meter-resolution Earth images in monochromatic mode. CARTOSAT–1 was launched in May 2005 into a polar orbit and carries two panchromatic imaging cameras, each with 2.5-meter resolution. The stereoscopic imaging by the two cameras facilitates the construction of three-dimensional terrain maps. CARTOSAT–2 was launched in January 2007, and CARTOSAT–2A was launched in April 2008; these satellites feature imaging resolution of less than one meter. ISRO has also developed its first radar imaging satellites to provide the capability to image day or night and through cloud cover; RISAT–2, built with Israeli assistance, was launched in April 2009. Although primarily intended for civil applications, these optical and radar imaging capabilities will provide militarily useful images and could be made available to Indian security and defense forces.

While India has always explored space science as part of its space program, this has definitely been a lower priority than the practical applications of space. Nonetheless, India continues to expand its space science activities as part of the overall expansion of its space program. This area provides a low-cost opportunity for cooperation with other countries to explore space technologies with potential dual-use applications.

The most exciting developments in space over the last few years have been the new initiatives in space exploration announced by the United States, China, the ESA, and India. In 2004, the United States adopted a new vision for space exploration in the aftermath of the space shuttle Columbia disaster. In 2003, China launched its first manned mission into space and announced plans to eventually explore the Moon.

The Indian lunar mission, Chandrayaan-1, was launched into space on October 22, 2008. This was an historic first for India's space program and marked an important milestone in their space exploration efforts. Chandrayaan-1 provides high-resolution scientific data in the visible, near-infrared, X-ray, and low-energy gamma-ray spectrum that is being used in mapping the constituent materials and potential resources on the Moon and could later be helpful for planning human lunar exploration. The Indians had invited international participation on the Chandrayaan-1 mission and had signed agreements with NASA and ESA to participate by providing scientific payloads on the spacecraft. India has a long-term interest in pursuing lunar exploration and is eager to pursue international cooperation in this field of endeavor.

Oddly, despite establishment of a joint working group on civil space cooperation and other efforts to improve U.S.-India space cooperation, the United States has not taken the initiative to specifically include India in human spaceflight partnership, neither on the International Space Station nor in human missions to the Moon. Understandably, ISRO has obtained a commitment of assistance from the Russian space agency Roskosmos in developing an indigenously built Indian space capsule.21

While the focus of the Indian space program is providing benefit to its people, India also intends to use it for foreign policy purposes. This explicitly includes participation in commercial and civil space. India is anxious to commercialize its launch capability, already completing an agreement to launch an Israeli reconnaissance satellite. India has signed up to participate in the European Union Galileo satellite navigation mission. This is in parallel with its efforts to participate with the United States on the Global Positioning System. India would seem to be hedging its interests in the area of global satellite-based navigation. They are also participating in the Global Earth Observation System of Systems, a multinational coalition of over 60 nations established in 2004 to share environmental data. This will allow India to leverage its space-based meteorology, oceanography, and science sensors in order to participate in an international technological forum.

India is also establishing an avenue for cooperative engagement with their regional rival, China, in space activities. In November 2006, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited New Delhi. This visit included the signing of an agreement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh endorsing their intent to pursue cooperative activities in space for peaceful purposes.

While India has long viewed space capability as a strictly civil function, it is gradually including spacepower more and more in its security and military affairs. "India has established an Integrated Space Cell jointly operated by the three armed forces and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to protect India's satellites and enhance their capability for both military and civilian use." 22 This expansion into security and military space, along with its success in civil space, shows India's patient pursuit of a space program has established it as a regional space power well on the way to global influence.

Pakistan. Pakistan has pursued its space activities since 1962 with modest success compared to its regional rival, India. The Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) manages Pakistan's space activities. SUPARCO launched their first suborbital missions of the Rehbar space experiments in 1962. Pakistan's first satellite, Badr A, an experimental communications satellite, was launched into space from a Chinese launch site in 1990. The second satellite, Badr-B, was not launched until a decade later in 2001 from a launch site in Kazakhstan with the assistance of Russia.

Pakistan is undertaking its latest efforts in space through partnership with China.23 This new agreement on Pakistan-China bilateral cooperation in the space industry could span a broad spectrum, including climate science, clean energy technologies, clean water technologies, cybersecurity, basic space, atmospheric, and Earth sciences, and marine sciences. This latest agreement is an expansion of a 2006 accord for China to launch three Pakistani Earth resource survey satellites.

The Sino-Pakistani cooperation is a logical consequence of several factors. Pakistan seeks to maintain its position regarding India by modernizing its remote sensing and communications through space capabilities. Pakistan also finds itself with limited access to space capabilities driven by U.S. space and missile technology export controls that are supported by U.S. allies and signatories of the Missile Technology Control Regime. China finds the partnership with Pakistan helpful in maintaining a balance of power with India in the region.

The Middle East and Africa

The Middle East is a troubled region, with ongoing strife between Israel and the Arab nations, the growing influence of radical Islam, the predicament in Iraq, and the growing rise of the region's superpower, Iran. Africa is struggling to develop with very little industry and infrastructure. Governments in this region naturally leverage space services as the quickest way to establish communications infrastructure to support commerce, education, and resource monitoring. Satellite communications are especially critical and are in robust demand. 24 But reconnaissance satellites are increasingly becoming a hot commodity in the ongoing effort by all players to obtain strategic and tactical intelligence.

Israel. "Israel has a technologically advanced market economy with substantial, though diminishing, government participation."25Its advanced technology is critical to its national security and also one of the key elements in its export portfolio. Security in the region has always been of paramount importance, and thus the Israelis focus their space program on national security. They have two primary applications: the use of space as a force multiplier via communications; and the use of reconnaissance satellites for situational awareness of any massing of forces by adversaries and for up-to-date assessment of military operations.

The rise of Iran's space launch capability, and the pursuit of commercially provided remote sensing systems by regional neighbors, causes Israel concern about maintaining an advantage in the balance of power. Similarly, spacepower is increasingly a part of its economic strategy, as it attempts to develop a self-sustaining economy less reliant on foreign aid.

The Israeli Space Agency was established in 1983. Its budget of approximately US $80 million is only part of the total Israeli spending on space. National security space programs are managed through Israel's Directorate of Defense Research and Development within its ministry of defense. Some authorities estimate Israel's total spending on space at between US $200 million and $300 million. Another important organization in the Israeli space program is the Israeli Air Force. The leadership ranks of Israel's aerospace efforts, including industry, involve a significant number of retired military general officers and admirals. This involves a fairly collegial cohort with its members rotating between positions in government, industry, and academia. This is epitomized by the illustrious career of astronaut Air Force Colonel Ilan Ramon, who died tragically in the space shuttle Columbia accident in 2003. Israel now holds an annual Ilan Ramon Conference on Space to honor his service and to inspire Israeli youth.26

Israel has launched 11 satellites in the past 20 years, beginning with the Ofek series in 1988. Despite its modest budget, Israel developed its own space launch capability early on, albeit for very small space missions. The Shavit launcher was used on the initial 1988 space mission to launch the Ofek satellite into orbit. Interestingly, in order to avoid launching over neighboring countries to the east, the Shavit booster takes a westward trajectory to attain orbit. This launching against the rotation of the Earth incurs a 30 percent penalty in mass to orbit capability, but does provide Israel with indigenous launch capability of up to 300 kilograms to low Earth orbit without the sensitivity of launching over neighboring states.

The Ofek series of reconnaissance satellites has grown in size to about 200 to 300 kilograms in mass with primary optics of about 30 centimeters, which provides approximately 1-meter ground resolution. Israel has made strides in leveraging technology to get higher performance out of small satellites. It is developing a follow-on series of reconnaissance satellites, the OPSat series, with larger apertures and correspondingly better image resolution. Plans include a constellation of minisatellites with increasingly sophisticated electro-optical and radar payloads. 27

Israel first launched an imaging radar satellite, the TecSAR series, to provide critical day-night, all-weather imagery, in January 2008. The TecSAR series, significantly larger than the optical satellites of the Ofek series, could not be launched into orbit by the Shavit rocket. To do so, Israel contracted the launch services of the Indian government's Polar Space Launch Vehicle. Thus, Israel and India have begun to cooperate on space, at this point through commercial launch services, but the full extent of their cooperative activities may not have been publicly revealed. Israel has similarly built a series of communications satellites, the Amos series, being placed into geosynchronous orbit by foreign launch service providers.

Israel has begun launching Earth observation satellites, the EROS system, with 50-centimeter apertures and multispectral capability. This has value for national security and land-use surveys, along with being a viable commercial product. It has also announced a partnership with Northrop Grumman to explore sales of their TecSAR imaging radar satellite in the United States. Likewise, Israel has worked closely with the French on a joint project for a hyperspectral electro-optical satellite, the Vegetation and Environment Monitoring New Micro-Satellite.

Israel tries to leverage commercial sales of its aerospace, electronic, and optical technologies and systems to underwrite its support of national security efforts, somewhat the opposite model of the United States. To compensate for the relatively small amount of funding available for their space program, the Israelis have focused on small, low-cost space systems that deliver adequate capability for their needs. Israel has become rather expert at small, lightweight optical imaging systems for satellite missions. It has worked with European nations such as France to increase its access to technology. With the United States, the Israelis view the Operationally Responsive Space effort as complementary to their efforts in small satellites. Additionally, with the increasing potential of an adversary to block or interfere with their access to space and operation of space systems, they appreciate the value of having rapid launch and deployment capabilities. Thus, Israel is exploring options for airborne launch systems.

Israel is also working hard to develop second-tier suppliers for all of its critical space technologies. It appreciates a healthy, indigenous industrial base, especially with the potential threat of embargos on technology transfer to Israel, and is working hard to establish sustainable technology skills and suppliers.

With respect to the United States, the Israelis enjoyed the prestige garnered by having an astronaut be part of the International Space Station and are looking forward to continue this high-level association.

Israel is looking to export its expertise in exchange for international good will. One in particular is through a contract with the Mexican Ministry of Education to provide 4,400 very small aperture terminals. This will provide wide-band Internet access to 7,700 classrooms using Gilat's Sky Edge network technology. They will be undergoing a similar project in Colombia, teaming with Axesat of Bogata for a 1,500-site SkyEdge 2 broadband service provider.

Israel is using its regional spacepower to meet its immediate security needs and also to generate commercial sales to subsidize its high-tech sector. It works flexibly with other emerging regional space powers such as India to scale up its space systems in affordable ways, and it works with emerging spacepower users for commercial sales and good will. Israel continues to pursue participation on the U.S. human spaceflight for the prestige necessary to inspire its younger generation.

Iran. In the midst of turmoil in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the nearby Middle East, Iran finds itself a regional superpower, but one lacking many modern, high-technology capabilities useful in carrying out this role. Iran is pursuing steps to rectify this through establishment of an embryonic technology sector, pursuit of nuclear power, and pursuit of missile and space technology. With Israel now in possession of its own reconnaissance satellites, the Iranian space program could be considered a response to the Israeli space program. Iran's Sina-1 imaging satellite was launched by the Russians at the Plesetsk facility in October 2005. The satellite can take images with a resolution of about 50 meters—useful only for land-use surveys—but Iran has plans for more capable satellites in the future. In February 2009, Iran announced the launch of its second satellite, its first domestically built satellite, launched on its own Safir-2 launcher.28

Iran has also begun a suborbital space research program using the Kavosh-2 sounding rockets. Like all missile technology, space launch and suborbital launch systems help develop the technology for ballistic missiles, and some critics warn that the Iranian government is pursuing such technologies. This is a likely situation, and one that has been previously repeated by spacefaring countries around the world. The technology to do so is well known, and thus is not the limiting factor if Iran chooses to continue developing ballistic missile capability. It only takes the political will and adequate funding to develop operational systems.

Despite possible concern with Israeli activity, however, the Iranians have a more strategic purpose in mind:

In January [2005], Iran signed a $132 million deal with a Russian firm to build and launch a telecommunications satellite called Zohreh, or Venus. Its launch is planned within the next two years. That satellite will facilitate communications in remote parts of Iran, increase the number of land and mobile telephone lines, boost Internet service and improve radio and television coverage.29

Having control of its own space telecommunications capability gives the Iranian government control of critical communications and messaging. Iran has also been accused of participating in the jamming of communications satellites broadcasting in their region that were beaming programming made by Iranian expatriates in southern California. The Telstar-12 satellite broadcasting the programs was being jammed by a transmitter in Cuba, which turned out to be located at the Iranian embassy there. Diplomatic efforts were effective in disarming this Iranian counter-space weapon. Nonetheless, Iran is quite aware of the value of spacepower, is intent on developing its own, and has already taken steps to counter the spacepower it deems to be undermining its domestic stability.

Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia does not yet have indigenous space manufacturing capability but has been procuring satellite communications systems from other space powers. The Saudis currently have three orbital slots in the geosynchronous belt that provide them with the most advantageous position in this region of rapidly growing subscribers.30 The ArabSat series continues its successful growth. Saudi Arabia is also an important voice among its neighboring states, such as the United Arab Emirates, which is also considering the purchase of a commercial-quality reconnaissance satellite. As other Arab states begin to emerge as space users and operators, partnerships with Saudi Arabia will likely increase in number.

Turkey. Turkey has very little indigenous space capability. Its strategy is to develop capability in space applications while procuring systems and services on the commercial market. Although the debate within the European Union continues about whether Turkey is in Europe, Turkey undeniably has an affinity for European technology and space industry.31

Turkey has been a user of satellite communications and more recently has added to its satellite remote sensing and imagery to support its security and economic needs. The U.S. company GeoEye announced a deal with the Turkish company INTA Spaceturk, which has the exclusive rights to sell IKONOS and GeoEye-1 imagery in Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and has been GeoEye's partner and regional affiliate since 2001. INTA signed an agreement in February 2009 to become an authorized reseller of IKONOS and GeoEye-1 imagery and products.

Turkey is also making efforts to develop and procure indigenously controlled space assets. The Ministry of Defense is working closely with indigenous industry partners, the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and the International Satellite and Cable Operator. On December 19, 2008, a Franco-Italian team was selected to provide Turkey with a turnkey reconnaissance satellite and ground system. 32 The electro-optical imaging satellite system, named Gokturk, will be operated by Turkey and will provide sub-meter resolution black and white images with 3-meter-resolution multispectral images. The contract, valued at 250 million euros, includes the construction of satellite fabrication facilities for TAI in Ankara to further efforts to establish an indigenous satellite manufacturing capability.

Nigeria. Nigeria, being near the Middle East and supported by petroleum wealth, is making efforts to establish a modern high-technology commercial sector and finds space capabilities a worthwhile and necessary foothold to be made. Nigeria cooperated with Surrey Satellite Technologies to develop and fly its first microsatellite in space, the NigeriaSat-1, launched in September 2003. Similarly, Nigeria worked with China to develop its first communications satellite, NigComSat-1, that was launched by a Long March 3B from Xichang Launch Center in China in May 2007.

Algeria . Algeria is also eager to leverage space programs as a means to jumpstart a high-technology sector. It is working with the French on a collaborative microsatellite effort.33 Algerian aerospace engineers relocated to France to work with EADS Astrium on the production of two small but 2.5-meter-resolution Earth remote sensing satellites. Called Alsat-2, the satellite will use the French Myriade microsatellites design. Along with procuring the Alsat-2 satellites for the Algerian National Space Technology Centre, the Algerian aerospace engineers will return home to apply their newly acquired experienced to Algeria's indigenous aerospace efforts. This is similar to several contracts for commercial sales by the French aerospace firm, EADS Astrium, to emerging space powers such as South Korea, Malaysia, and South Korea. The French, in the meantime, also gain the good will of investing in the economic development of their former colony, helping to ease longstanding resentments.

Google Earth: The Globalization of Cyber-Space-Power

One of the biggest applications of space capability is the collection and dissemination of information. This makes for a natural fit with the information technology sector and innovative companies such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Cisco, and others. Combine with this the growing number of entrepreneurial space efforts such as SpaceX, Bigelow Aerospace, Virgin Galactic, and others, and what emerges is the synergistic effect of the globalization of cyber-space-power, where the neologism conveys the meaning of affordable information collected from space being rapidly disseminated around the globe to anyone with a credit card.

Google has launched its Google Earth project to make a wide variety of imagery, including satellite imagery, available to the public. This has led to more specific cooperative agreements with the United Nations and NASA. The recent partnership between Google Earth and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) has established an environmental monitoring program for UNEP overlays. This project will provide an online reservoir of remote sensing data on more than 100 environmental hotspots that UNEP has identified. Similarly, Google and NASA signed an agreement in 2006 to collaborate in making NASA science and exploration data, including scientific data, images, and video, available to researchers and the general public.

The Google-GeoEye partnership was announced in August 2008. "The combination of GeoEye's high-resolution, map-accurate satellite imagery from GeoEye-1 and Google's search and display capabilities provides users with access to rich, interactive visual image maps of the Earth."" 34 Google already uses imagery collected by another high-resolution GeoEye satellite, IKONOS, as well as imagery from other sources, including GeoEye's main rival, DigitalGlobe. In 2007, DigitalGlobe launched WorldView-1, a high-resolution satellite built by Ball Aerospace that offers half-meter resolution and can collect up to 750,000 square kilometers of imagery each day.

Cisco has teamed up with NASA Ames via a Space Act Agreement to cover the earth with a cyberskin to monitor the global climate. 35 Cisco itself is only providing the architecture and internet router technology to manage and disseminate data from a wide variety of data collected from land, sea, and air by NASA and other organizations. Such a capability would be useful eventually to monitor greenhouse gas emissions under any cap-and-trade system that might be put into place.

One additional impact likely to result from the merging of cyberspace and spacepower will be that increased accessibility to space-collected information will create even more demand for space collection of information. Government leaders, analysts and the general public will expect to have access to the latest information and images related to national and international security and emergency events, and will not be satisfied with excuses that huge financial investments and years of planning would be needed.36

Opportunities for Space Cooperation

Guiding Principles

In the early years of spacepower, dominated by the Cold War balance of power and strategic nuclear weapons, spacepower was wielded mainly as a weapon. But 50 years later, space systems are predominantly civil, commercial, and dual-use, with only a few systems dedicated to security applications. In today's world, spacepower is best obtained by skillfully balancing security, civil, and commercial space and using it liberally in the sphere of foreign policy:

Is there a way to share the benefits of these strategically and tactically important capabilities in a manner that enhances the peace, justice and security of all stakeholders? Many nations around the world are answering "yes" to this question as they enter into agreements on cooperative space projects for the commercial, environmental and military security. More and more they are using their space programs to realign the old balance of power and create new common interests.37

At a conference in Bangalore in June of 2004, Lee Morin of the U.S. Department of State emphasized, "The extent of space cooperation currently taking place between India and the United States is quite modest compared to the enormous potential." 38 It is indeed time the United States pursued this greater potential with India and with other emerging space powers.

Civil Space Exploration

Space exploration has always been enormously popular and remains so today. It is a magnet to attract less developed space powers into a cooperative agreement. This great interest creates an opportunity to establish mutually beneficial agreements that advance political, economic, and cultural interests. Once cooperation in civil space is ongoing, it becomes easier to consider expanding into security cooperation.

The U.S. space exploration program is enormously attractive to all the emerging space powers. The United States is in discussion with the traditional global space powers, part of the ongoing legacy of cooperation on the International Space Station, but has made little effort on expanding this to the emerging space powers. These initial activities are just a start. Israel and Brazil have both had astronauts participate with NASA's human spaceflight program. NASA has established an International Lunar Network, an open framework of robotic lunar science missions that allows any interested nation to contribute a node to their system.39 With very few security issues involved, civil space is an ideal area to begin cooperative engagement.40

Space Cooperation Possibilities for Security and Defense

The major security concerns today are nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and stability operations. This is a broad spectrum of security operations not limited to armed conflict. Spacepower provides significant enhancement to military and security operations for the United States and other spacefaring nations, including arms control treaty monitoring. In the case of the 2004 U.S.–India accord, that the strategic partnership identified civil space on one hand and nonproliferation and security on the other hand, it is natural to consider the possibilities for pursuing cooperative efforts in space for defense and security purposes. This is fairly representative of how space is often left out of the top-level strategic thinking. This is attributable to the overly classified and controlled nature of space capabilities in the United States—they are kept hidden as special security tools and not shared as important tools of national interest.

Specifically, the Defense Framework identifies the following objectives: collaborate on multinational operations, promote security and defeat terrorism, promote regional peace and security, combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, expand collaboration on missile defense, support disaster response, support combined operations, support peacekeeping operations, and pursue an increased exchange of intelligence. While these objectives are seemingly straightforward, they will have to be carefully constructed in the context of relations with China, Pakistan, and other powers in the region in order to enhance security and prevent unintended consequences.

In these global security challenges, coalition operations, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, are now the standard approach necessitated by the geopolitical ramifications of any desired endstate. The difficulties that arise in coalition security operations have led one military planner to argue for Coalition Operational Responsive Space (C–ORS).41 The responsive space paradigm was developed over the past decade specifically to advocate for simpler, more affordable space solutions that were more responsive to national decisionmakers across a broad spectrum of national security and national interest scenarios.42 C–ORS specifically addresses the need to implement space solutions constructed as a multinational architecture that is interoperable and extensible by diverse coalition members. As more space powers emerge with indigenous capabilities and procured systems and services, it should easier to undertake C–ORS approaches. More importantly, as more space powers emerge, it will be more necessary to do so to fully integrate coalition operations.

Opportunities in Satellite Communications

The global satellite telecommunications is very mature with government consortia, public-private partnerships, and commercial companies doing a thriving business, with many of the players trying to carve out shares in foreign markets.43 There are clear opportunities for the United States and its allies to cooperate in satellite communications. Both have an interest in providing strategic messages to populations and communications to forces in the broad land masses of the Gulf, North Africa, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. What is important is that common communications protocols and receiver equipment be fielded so that the capabilities can be used efficiently.

Opportunities in Earth/Ocean Remote Sensing

An important factor in international security is transparency. The nuclear weapons arms control treaties in effect today rely on the ability of signatory nations to verify compliance. Remote satellite imagery has been an important tool for verification and for monitoring impending aggressive actions. The ability of the United States and many of the emerging space powers to share reconnaissance and surveillance data could provide increased capability and build common interest. Going even further, an international reconnaissance system that provides data that is of commercial quality yet of sufficient acuity for verification of security agreements could be operated over central and southern Asia and shared by all cooperating nations in the region. These same reconnaissance systems could be used to support disaster relief operations.

Two important example of this are the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) global coalition and NASA's SERVIR regional coalitions. GEOSS is a partnership of over 70 nations contributing Earth observation data from land, sea, air, and space. "The aim is to provide the right information, in the right format, to the right people, at the right time, to make the right decisions." 44 GEOSS is the right framework, but it is not clear how active and effective the cooperation is. On a much smaller scale, but one that is vibrant and readily extensible, is NASA's SERVIR program, which "integrates satellite observations, ground-based data, and forecast models to monitor and forecast environmental changes and to improve response to natural disasters." 45 Originally established in Central America, the program has been so successful that a second project was established in Africa.

In the future, with global warming and climate change becoming such important issues, it may be necessary for the United States to formally establish a climate change emissions monitoring system. If treaties are agreed to by the nations of the world, then verifiability becomes of utmost importance. This might be done in a manner similar to how nuclear treaty monitoring capability was established early in the Cold War, with space remote sensing capabilities playing an important role.

Opportunities in Space Traffic Control

The recent collision in space of a commercial Iridium satellite and a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, with its ensuing space debris field, has highlighted the need to address the increasingly crowded outer space. While many in the United States and the international community have argued for more sharing of data on the location of objects in space, it has long been delayed due to concerns about revealing information on critical and classified national security assets. Space situational awareness has a legacy from the Cold War of being critical to all sides in gaining an intelligence advantage. The Iridium-Cosmos collision in February 2009, along with the growing presence of human spaceflight with the International Space Station, the Chinese spaceflight program, and private spaceflight by the commercial sector, argues for the need to spin off a public space traffic control function distinct from the more sensitive space surveillance capabilities.

The U.S. Air Force Space Command has begun a pilot project called the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) initiative. 46 Its transition to U.S. Strategic Command is planned for later in 2009, to begin operational support on space collision hazards to commercial and foreign space users. Uncertainties remain, however, on what level of liability might remain for the U.S. Government while it will be acting essentially in a good Samaritan role. The expansion of a space traffic control network is greatly facilitated by the number of contributors, and the space object data collection systems are relatively inexpensive, thus allowing many emerging space programs to join in a participatory manner.

Opportunities in Science and Technology

Science and technology used to be the one area where international cooperation was easily done. In this era of ever-increasing technology export control, it is becoming harder and harder to do so. Nonetheless, the United States should avidly pursue cooperation with emerging space powers and space information users in space science and technology. Cooperation in science and technology costs less than in operational systems, builds common interest between the technical communities, and provides insight into the aims and objectives of the partner's space program. Most importantly, the benefits flow both ways: U.S. experts will gain significantly from the collaboration with their international peers.

Conclusion

The common theme in all these emerging spacepower efforts is to pursue space and space-related technologies and capabilities that are practical and affordable. While ballistic missiles and missile defense systems are weapons intended to be used only in extremis, spacepower is exercised all the time in support of national and international security needs. A major consideration for these foreign space efforts is developing systems with dual-use capability, providing commercial, civil, and security benefits. Another important trend to observe is that foreign nations earnestly pursue international cooperation and influence through the use of their space programs. These approaches are very responsive to the security needs of the nations involved. While spacepower might provide an irresponsible government with additional military capability, for the most part, the rise of foreign spacepower can be allied with U.S. efforts to ensure international security.

The new and emerging space powers will test the bounds of current spacepower practice and may in the end reconstitute a more vibrant, more interesting milieu of opportunities and challenges in space than previously existed among the former small club of global space powers. The right spacepower leadership will find a host of followers to advance its national and international interests. Without such leadership, the dominant space powers may find their advantage squandered.47


Notes

  1. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Random House, 2002). Bobbitt analyzes the interrelationship of war and constitutional law throughout history and finds that new forms of constituting sovereign government arise after epochal wars often lasting many decades. He points out that after the long wars of the 20th century (World War I, World War II, and the Cold War), the nations of the world are reconstituting themselves as new "market-states."
  2. Some Members of Congress have asserted in public hearings that selling spacecraft components to foreign countries that may in turn transfer them to China is the moral equivalent of European and American industry selling material to Nazi Germany prior to the Second World War. The details of the Congressional hearing where this topic was discussed are available at <http://science.house.gov/publications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=2360>. Others have equated the selling of space technology that may one day be used against the United States with profiteering by munitions manufacturers during the First World War. These positions are fallacious in that they argue the extreme. By this logic, buying goods at Wal-Mart that are manufactured in China is morally reprehensible and should similarly be outlawed as the profits are used by the Chinese government for military spending.
  3. National Research Council Committee on Science, Security, and Prosperity in a Changing World, "Beyond 'Fortress America': National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World," National Research Council, 2009. U.S. technology export control regimes have a long and storied history. Especially unfortunate for space technologies, in 1999 U.S. law placed all space technologies on the controlled munitions list, and thus under strict controls. While this certainly slowed the transfer of U.S. space technologies to countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea, it did not stop the transfer of space technology from other nations. In fact, other nations were catalyzed to develop their own technology to replace the U.S. technology on which they formerly relied but that was now cumbersome to obtain. There is a growing chorus of voices across the U.S. political spectrum calling for a drastic reform of technology export control, but as of yet there is no champion with enough political power or will to challenge the small but powerful national security cult that now dominates U.S. international policy. The "Beyond 'Fortress America'" report is a useful guide to the history and dynamics of U.S. technology export controls. The authors' assessment of the effect of this policy is stated in the opening sentence of the report: "The export controls and visa regulations that were crafted to meet conditions the United States faced over five decades ago now quietly undermine our national security and our national economic well-being."
  4. Turner Brinton, "Gen. Chilton: Export Controls Pose Threat to National Security," Space News, March 23, 2009, 20. In a written submission to a Congressional committee, General Chilton testified, "I remain concerned that our own civil and commercial space enterprise, which is essential to the military space industrial base, may be unnecessarily constrained by export control legislation and regulation." General Chilton's full testimony is available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SF031709/Chilton_Testimony031709.pdf>.
  5. Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary (Sebastopal, CA: O'Reilly Media, 1999). The book documents how the open-source software movement became the dominant force in the emergence of the Internet and web infrastructure, economy, and culture much more so than the large established software "cathedrals" of established computing and software corporations. While recognizing that both the cathedral and the bazaar cultures made contributions, most planning and prognosticating overlook the significant and sometimes disruptive innovations that will emerge from the bazaar. In this work on spacepower, the author similarly argues that in fact the more significant changes in the spacepower landscape will arise from the teaming interactions of emerging space powers and established space powers other than the United States.
  6. John M. Diamond, ed., The Space Report 2009 (Colorado Springs: The Space Foundation, 2009), 23.
  7. Private communication with Wade L. Huntley regarding the presentation of this author's viewpoint at the Center for Space and Defense Studies Forum panel session, Colorado Springs, CO, January 12, 2007. Huntley pointed out that many influential strategic theorists arose in nations and states during disadvantaged times, that is, when they were not the dominant power.
  8. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization , Pursuant to Public Law 106–65, January 11, 2001, accessed on the Internet at <www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.html>. This report is often referred to as the Space Commission Report.
  9. Wade Huntley, "Perspectives on Small and Emerging Space Powers," remarks given at the Center for Space and Defense Studies Forum panel session, Colorado Springs, CO, January 12, 2007.
  10. Press release, "MDA delivers RapidEye information solution," MDA corporate Web site, accessed at <www.sm.mdacorporation.com/what_we_do/rapideye.html>.
  11. Embraer Web site, available at <www.embraer.com/english/content/home/>.
  12. "Chinese-Brazilian Satellite Slated to Launch this Fall," Space News, August 6, 2007, 9.
  13. "France to Work with Brazil on Satellite Bus Designs," Space News, January 5, 2009.
  14. Diamond, 112.
  15. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2009, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html#Econ >.
  16. Private discussion with Dr. Simon P. Worden.
  17. Embassy of the Republic of Korea, "Korea, U.S. to sign agreement to bolster cooperation in space exploration," October 2, 2008, available at <http://dynamic-korea.com/news/view_news.php?main=KTD&sub=TCH&uid=200800251780&keyword=>.
  18. Ibid.
  19. Randall R. Correll, "U.S.-India Space Partnership: the Jewel in the Crown," Astropolitics 4 (2006), 159–177. The author argues that space cooperation provides an ideal tool to advance the reinvigorated relationship between the United States and India in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
  20. Official EDUSAT India Web site, available at <http://edusatindia.org/ >.
  21. K.S. Jayaraman, "India Plans First Manned Mission with Assistance from Russian Space Agency," Space News, February 2, 2009, 11. Former NASA administrator Dr. Michael Griffin recently remarked on the significant international cooperation in space projects being pursued by other nations and lamented that the United States was letting opportunities slip away. Yet other than the development of a Global Space Exploration Strategy document, NASA has shown little effort since the announcement of the exploration vision to pursue tangible cooperative efforts with foreign space agencies.
  22. Diamond, 113.
  23. Syed Fazl-e-Haider, "China, Pakistan Cooperate in Space," Asia Times Online, April 26, 2007, available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ID26Df01.html>.
  24. Peter B. de Selding, "Satellite Business Booming in the Middle East and North Africa," Space News, October 20, 2008, 5.
  25. The World Factbook 2009.
  26. Private discussion with Dr. Simon P. Worden.
  27. Barbara Opall-Rome, "Conference Highlights Untapped Potential of Israeli Space Program," Space News, February 2, 2009, 15.
  28. Press release, "Iran puts Omid data-processing satellite into orbit," February 3, 2009, available at <www5.irna.ir/En/View/FullStory/?NewsId=335409&IdLanguage=3>.
  29. Ali Akbar Dareini, Yahoo News, November 16, 2005, available at <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051116/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_space>.
  30. "Arabsat to Order Two More Satellites in 2008," Space News, September 15, 2008, 13.
  31. Aside from geographic propinquity, Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and thus participates routinely in military operations and exercises with European and North American military units, which heavily involve space-based communications and information. Difficulties with stringent U.S. export controls on space technology naturally advances Europe, eager to accumulate foreign commercial sales, as Turkey's primary supplier of space systems.
  32. Andi Nativi and Michael A. Taverna, "Turkish Delight: Telespazio to Supply Gokturk Surveillance Satellite, US MILSATCOM Capability," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 5, 2009, 31.
  33. Peter B. de Selding, "Algeria Buys Two Small Remote Sensing Satellites—EADS to Train 25 Algerian Aerospace Engineers," Space News, February 6, 2006.
  34. Andrea Shalal-Esa, "GeoEye signs deal to provide imagery to Google," Reuters, available at <www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSN2837224420080829?sp=true>.
  35. Press release, "NASA, Cisco Partnership on Climate Change Monitoring Platform," March 3, 2009, available at <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2009/prod_030309b.html>.
  36. "Congressman Demands Answers from Google," Space News, April 9, 2007, 3. U.S. Representative Brad Miller reportedly demanded to know why images on Google Earth did not show the city of New Orleans ravaged by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Google Earth and similar Internet-based services do not have an operational mission, and the data, while impressively arrayed, is sparse and stale. Yet government officials at local and national levels around the world are coming to expect ready access to up-to-date information.
  37. Randall R. Correll, "Military Space Cooperation: Aligning the Balance of Power and Building Common Interest," Astropolitics 2, no. 2 (2004), 133–147.
  38. Lee Morin, "Space Cooperation: Expanding Human Frontiers, Enhancing Development, Strengthening Relations," prepared remarks for the India-United States Conference on Space Science, Applications, and Commerce—Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation, Bangalore, India, June 21–25, 2004.
  39. See NASA's official Web site for details on the International Lunar Network program, available at <http://nasascience.nasa.gov/missions/iln>.
  40. Randall R. Correll and Nicolas Peter, "Odyssey: Principles for Enduring Space Exploration," Space Policy 21 (2005), 251–258.
  41. Colin Clark, "U.S. Official Cites Need for International Coalition on ORS," Space News, May 28, 2007, 14; Tom Doyne, "Coalition Operationally Responsive Space: A 100 Satellite Solution," presentation to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, October 2007.
  42. Simon P. Worden and Randall R. Correll, "Responsive Space and Strategic Information," Defense Horizons 40 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2004).
  43. Peter B. de Selding, "More European Satcomm Companies Looking to Crack U.S. Defense Market," Space News, January 26, 2009, 13.
  44. See a description of GEOSS at the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency's Web site, available at <www.noaa.gov/eos.html>.
  45. See the SERVIR project Web site at <http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/servir/index.html> for more information.
  46. Michael A. Taverna, "Traffic Cop," Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 20, 2009.
  47. Randall R. Correll and Simon P. Worden, "The Demise of U.S. Spacepower: Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Astropolitics 3, no. 3 (December 2005), 233–264. The authors argue that staggering cost growth and schedule delays in U.S. space programs are causing national leadership to consider divesting from spacepower in pursuit of other solutions—an ill-advised course of action, but understandably tempting in the face of poor performance by the U.S. military-industrial aerospace complex. A better solution would be to install more competent leadership who could deliver cost-effective spacepower, just as many emerging space actors are doing.


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